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Beginning from the observation of a range of apparently "inexplicable 
inhibitions"1 in myself and others – inhibitions one might not expect from 
having grown up in a culture constituted by the "free exercise of free human 
reason under conditions of liberty"2 – this dissertation examines and evaluates 
prominent ancient and modern political theory, neuropsychology, and a 
specific dance practice in terms of their neglect or use and understanding of 
specific practices and techniques, employed in human relations, that might 
affect the psychophysiology of the political subject.  
This analysis – based in part on recent neuroscience evidence – is 
intended to achieve an understanding that might transform its author and 
readers. To the extent that, in our "democracy“ (i.e., rule by us, the people), we 
find ourselves dissatisfied and yet in the habit of feeling, thinking, and acting so 
as to maintain and reinforce conventional arrangements of power, we may, 
through this improved understanding, be able to work directly upon ourselves 
– the feelings, thoughts, and actions that affect us in those moments when we 
decide our relations to institutional authority (as it exists in ourselves and 
others), and thereby maintain or disrupt existing power relations, as they exist 
in our own subjectivities and in our associations with others. 
 
                                               
1 See Chapter 4, below. 
2 John Rawls Political Liberalism (New York : Columbia University Press, 1996), 144. 
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1. Introduction 
About five years ago, I was teaching assistant to a professor in a 300-
student university class. He assigned essay questions that students could not 
answer given the readings and lecture material. Students got frustrated and 
sometimes the courageous ones would ask questions in lecture; where should 
they look for answers to the essay questions if the lectures and readings didn't 
provide the necessary background? But instead of addressing their questions, 
the professor would make fun of them. I met with him privately a few times, 
asking him to make changes to the reading list and lectures, or to suggest 
additional sources, so students could formulate answers, but he kept on 
refusing. Finally I told my students that if he continued abusing his position of 
authority with them during lecture, and in the course generally, I would back 
them up and ask him their questions again. I knew a TA shouldn’t be 
challenging the professor in public, but isn’t this what the liberal arts education 
is all about – the right to ask questions of authorities – authorities who are 
accountable for the demands they make? 
It’s the last class. The professor's doing it again. A student has asked a 
good question, and he’s making fun of her. So I put up my hand, objecting, 
“But that doesn’t really answer the question…” and I explain why. He starts 
responding, but he’s evading the question, and by the end he’s trailing off, 
talking so quietly that no one can hear him. So, I rephrase her question. Now 
it’s getting really silent. People seem nervous, are shifting in their seats, 
whispering to each other. This time he retorts, “I really want to distribute these 
hand-outs!” And I know it’s now or never. I risk it: “But if you don’t answer 
now, they’ll never get an answer.” Everything in my body, including my 
thought, is screaming at me that something is "very wrong!" Why is no one else 
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asking questions? Why am I making a big deal out of this? "What am I doing?" 
In this moment, I notice my body, sweating but cold, shaking, my voice 
trembling, my body contracted in on itself, very literally – I am hunched over, 
leaning forward. So, when he replies angrily, “Well, they may not!!” I can’t take 
it anymore. I just want this feeling to end. I’m scared. I stop asking questions, 
go silent, pick up the sheets with all the other TA’s, and pass them out, still 
feeling high tension throughout my body. And I'm still ambivalent – maybe I 
should have kept asking; it was at least possible. 
Afterwards, sitting there, I suddenly realized, I knew this feeling! I 
remembered it from when I was small. My mom angry or hurt – at me, I think. 
My dad angry and punishing: “Your mother is very upset!” I knew what came 
next. My body felt the same (as it does now in the classroom). I’ve gone 
somewhere deep back inside the shell of my skin, hiding, watching. I know it’s 
going to hurt. I search out my sin and blame myself ahead of time, humble 
myself, feel the guilt, and apologize. Walking out of the lecture hall, and during 
the days after, my thoughts returned to that moment in the classroom. The 
decision not to engage further, not to ask questions, was made in that moment, 
in relation to those sensations, feelings, and thoughts. 
 
 This physically intense experience provided my first piece (then, at least) 
of easily recallable evidence that power seemed to operate through these 
"intensities." Subsequently, I became more aware - in part through reading, 
thinking, discussions, but also other "bodily" techniques aimed at developing 
my awareness - of a whole series of what Rawls calls "inexplicable inhibitions"3 
in myself and others, inhibitions that seemed general and that one might not 
                                               
3 See Chapter 4, below. 
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expect from having grown up in a culture constituted by the "free exercise of 
free human reason under conditions of liberty."4 These inhibitions seemed to 
have resulted from a conditioned (i.e., learned) disposition to authority – a 
subjectivation that appeared to maintain and reinforce traditional arrangements 
of power through these moments of perception, judgment, and behavior. If one 
wanted to transform oneself, so that one did not just "automatically" obey 
particular rules and avoid confronting authority, in oneself, with others, and 
institutions of power, then perhaps direct work upon those feelings, thoughts, 
and actions that seem central to the moment of decision was prerequisite, and 
therefore an important focus for not just myself, but also political theory. 
Political theory might become more truthful about the foundational nature of 
techniques ("disciplinary" and "of the self") in the establishment of allegedly 
"legitimate" power relations. Finally, in our technical work upon ourselves 
(which includes our theorizing), we might find ourselves thinking and acting in 
even more aggressive ways than those conceived of as "proper" (e.g., voting, 
public and private debate, and techniques of the  self conceived entirely in 
terms of their effect only upon the "ethos" of one's immediate and intimate 
relations) in a liberal democracy; the creation of a real "rule of the people" 
would probably require a disposition not only ethically predisposed to 
democratic governance but also willing to confront arbitrary authority in its 
several forms. That is, a less fearful disposition. One that could speak and act 
fearlessly, truthfully, even in the midst of fearful experiences; a subjectivity 
who would risk this confrontation, and thereby change the distribution of 
power. This was the thinking behind the following chapters. 
 
                                               
4 John Rawls Political Liberalism (New York : Columbia University Press, 1996), 144. 
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Foucault, the focus of chapter one, offers a way of thinking about these 
"inexplicable inhibitions" in his understanding of both the institutional 
application of disciplinary techniques through which one is corporealized to 
automatic obedience and self-surveillance, and also "techniques of the self," 
which one intentionally applies to oneself in order to transform one's being to 
meet certain standards of conduct and aesthetic values. But while Foucault 
observes the body as the site of power's operation, what remains unclear is the 
political significance of specific techniques of the self, parrhesia (or fearless 
speech) in particular, and, relatedly, how exactly they relied on and 
simultaneously changed the body; could one simply assume an ability to 
"remark, describe, and remember"5 as the basis for critique, if one were an 
automatically disciplinary subject? Should not one know more about the body 
first? 
 Chapter two dicusses how Plato's legitimation of the rule of philosophy 
and the philosopher over the demos, though criticized in political theory and 
philosophy repeatedly for being founded on his untenable opposition of reason 
and the soul to appetites and the body, relies not simply on this binarizing 
discourse but also, and more importantly, on an entire psychophysiological 
project. Breaking the rules in small, everyday things – including dance, music, 
games, diet, sex, and physical regimen generally – would establish not 
"harmonious" and "moderate" obedience, but rather habits that undermined the 
polis. That political theory in general focuses on Plato's conceptual oppositions 
                                               
5 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 385, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
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to the neglect of these everyday practices seems indicative of a conceptual habit 
which Foucault connected to the enlightenment. 
 Therefore, I turn next, in chapter three, to Kant's enlightenment 
philosophy. Kant, to whom much of mainstream democratic theory is indebted, 
claimed that freedom depended on establishing reason's autonomy from and 
legislative power over bodily passions and prejudice. This absolute opposition 
of reason to passion breaks down in Kant's texts, and it turns out that bodily 
passion and habit, cultivated by coercive techniques of humiliation, provide the 
motive force for obedience of the allegedly universal, rational law. Insofar as 
Kant has set the terms of liberal democratic theory, then perhaps our liberal 
democratic institutions and way of thinking about politics continue to rely on 
coercion and manipulation rather than "universal, free" consent. 
 In chapter four, I examine Kant's most prominent heirs, Rawls and 
Habermas. Rawls continues the Kantian tradition of establishing his conception 
of justice on the basis of universal rational autonomy. This rational autonomy, 
in A Theory of Justice, ensures the universal commitment of all rational beings to 
the ideal of autonomy – i.e., their commitment to not being guided by 
prejudices in choosing principles of justice. Rawls, in dialogue with critics 
(including Habermas) later in Political Liberalism admitted that in conditions of 
reasonable pluralism, one could not expect that all citizens' comprehensive 
doctrines would accept this essentially liberal ideal as the basis for choosing 
their principles of justice, but that they would still agree to the liberal principles 
of justice because they have been accultured by and believe in the liberal 
political practices and institutions embodying liberal principles of justice. But 
Rawls' account of the historical development from temporary acquiescence to 
liberal principles of justice to the overlapping consensus, and his account of 
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childhood moral development, raise the same suspicions about the essential 
role of coercion and manipulation as in Kant. Habermas, critical of the 
exclusionary potential of Rawls' overlapping consensus, aims to achieve 
political freedom and equality on the basis of our universal communicative 
rationality, guaranteed by a similarly universal psychological development. 
Habermas' later admission that in fact there are motivation problems in 
realizing this ideal speech community reiterates, but in different ways, the 
legitimacy problems in Rawls' account. That these two theories of liberal 
democratic justice and their assumptions continue to affect the imagination of 
much political thought, despite their legitimation problems and "motivational 
deficits,” only furthers suspicion about what in fact does establish consensus in 
liberal democratic societies - what motivates our moral and political choices. 
 Connolly's theory of "neuropolitics" suggests that instead of the 
universal, rational humans that Rawls and Habermas assume, we are in fact not 
very "in control" of our perceptions and decisions. Using Connolly's 
neuroscientifically informed discussions of our dispositions, chapter five begins 
to answer the question originally posed and variously answered in the 
preceding chapters: how can we be free, and how free can we be? Based on his 
understanding of neuroscientific evidence, Connolly suggests certain 
techniques that we can use to work via neural mechanisms upon "the visceral 
register,” recultivating our subjectivity to a disposition of "agonistic respect" in 
relation to others. Given the "ubiquity" of technique in all of our daily lives, 
Connolly's preoccupation with cinematic technique probably needs 
supplementing. In fact, recent neuroscientific evidence suggests that if we want 
to recultivate our dispositions more thoroughly and consequentially, we will 
need techniques that can be applied more ubiquitously throughout the day, and 
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especially in those moments of tension not typically encountered in the quiet 
and dark of the theater or living room.  
 In the final substantive chapter (six), I discuss Steve Paxton's contact 
improvisation (CI) as a technique of the self that aims at developing the basic 
critical capacities of the human organism into a "habit of attending;” but this 
attention was directed specifically and exclusively to sensations and "reflexes,” 
in order to overcome what Paxton called American democracy's "conditioning" 
to "voluntary slavery.” While there are limits to this technique, and 
undeveloped potentials in the practice of CI, Paxton's technique could be 
altered in ways that might develop its political potential beyond the dance 
studio walls, as a "truth-telling" rather than disciplinary subjectivity in 
confrontation with authority. 
This exploration of texts and techniques has been both personal and also 
an attempt to encourage a rethinking of the attentional focus of political theory. 
Only if we understand and experiment with the "minute" everyday 
mechanisms of our perception and decision can we begin to change those habits 
of obedience and avoidance that continue to characterize our lives, even as we 
profess our desire for freedom and critique. 
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2. Foucault's Truth-teller 
In his work, Michel Foucault discusses how power operates to produce 
bodies; bodies whose efficient and obedient production is ensured through 
various disciplinary techniques that make authority function, without coercion, 
automatically in the individual. The body is thus corporealized political power. 
Because the body is the means by which political power is realized, by which 
“forms of existence or political society”6 are created and maintained, the body 
remains central throughout Foucault’s writings and interviews – from the 
genealogical work through the books and lectures on ”arts of the self” (Foucault 
also calls them "techniques, technologies, aesthetics, practices, exercises… of the 
self,” and “arts, aesthetics… of existence”) - “those intentional and voluntary 
actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to 
transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to 
make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets 
certain stylistic criteria.”7 
Despite the body’s centrality to political power, however, Foucault does 
not fully explicate the political significance of specific techniques of the self, nor 
does he explore the physiological mechanisms by which they work. This does 
not seem to have been, as Alexander Nehamas suggests, because Foucault saw 
new forms of knowledge as new forms of control – i.e., any system of political 
power is and always will be just as oppressive as any other - and therefore 
investigated arts of the self as a personal but not political project. Foucault did 
conceive of arts of the self and his “critical ontology of ourselves” as politically 
consequential, and even foundational to political society. Foucault's discussion of 
                                               
6 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1,  
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow et al. (New York: New Press, 1997), 283. 
7 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. II: The Use of Pleasure, tr. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Random House, 1985). 
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parrhesia in particular, in combination with his attention to the body as the site 
of application of both disciplinary techniques (on the one hand) and techniques 
of the self (on the other), suggests an important attentional focus for political 
theory, one that, I will argue, has been largely neglected, but to some extent 
even by Foucault. If our bodies are the means of stabilizing political power in 
the ways Foucault describes, and we want to change our relation to power, then 
perhaps we should know more about our bodies, specifically the 
neurophysiological mechanisms which make certain disciplinary techniques 
and techniques of the self succeed or fail. 
 
Disciplinary Techniques 
Throughout his oeuvre, Foucault connects political power with 
techniques applied to the body. Foucault discusses the historical establishment 
of techniques that create our subjectivity in terms of a capillary/micro- system 
of panoptic/disciplinary power. This system, which is nonegalitarian and 
asymmetrical, emerges and takes form through the eighteenth century. This 
system is the real basis of the formal juridical system of rights (which is 
egalitarian only in principle) which we assume that we enjoy as "free" political 
subjects. In other words, real, corporeal disciplines constitute the foundation of 
the formal, juridical liberties and norms according to which an unequal 
redistribution of power in society is formally legitimated.8 At the same time that 
enlightenment philosophy’s celebration of reason’s autonomy, of individual 
freedom, set the stage for a Kantian legacy in political thought, projects of 
docility set the terms of our obedient subjectivity - the automatic functioning of 
authority in the individual through the disciplinary techniques of the army, 
                                               
8 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 223. 
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school, hospital. These institutions were/are able to achieve a new scale of 
control through “uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising processes of 
activity according to the partitioning codification of time, space, movement.”9  
Specifically, these techniques control activity through minute attention, 
in the application to the body of 1) the time-table 2) anatomo-chronological 
schema – positioning of body, limbs, articulations; movements are assigned 
direction, aptitude, duration, order of succession; 3) the imposition of the most 
efficient relation between particular gestures and the overall position of the 
body 4) the definition of relations of the body to its object of manipulation 5) 
increasingly detailed internal arrangement (analysis), specialization to 
maximize efficiency and speed.10 These technical arrangements make possible a 
perpetual characterization of the individual, and the production of a subject in a 
system of command that triggers the right combination and order of forces.11 
The application of these techniques allows: hierarchical observation – 
surveillance by specialized personnel, constantly present, seemingly less 
“corporal” but only because it is more subtly “physical;”12 normalizing 
judgment – subjecting even slight departures from correct behavior to 
punishment, preferably through exercise; distribution according to rank/grade 
to hierarchize and order but also to punish and reward;13 and examination – to 
classify (from psychiatry to pedagogy, diagnosis of diseases to hiring of labor), 
to require the individual to be constantly seen, to be documented as a case (an 
object for a branch of the sciences of man and an object of control). The “birth of 
disciplines in the new sense” occurs when the art of the human body is born – 
                                               
9 Ibid., 137. 
10 Ibid., 150–56. 
11 Ibid., 165. 
12 Ibid., 173–77. 
13 Ibid., 178–84. 
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directed at not only growth of skills and intensification of subjection but also 
the formation of a relation that makes the bodily mechanism itself more 
obedient as it becomes more useful; “Discipline increases the forces of the body 
(in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political 
terms of obedience).”14 
In the body, the capillary system of power works through conditioning 
of habit – the mobilization and direction of the “mechanics of forces” of the 
body into a stable configuration.  The application of disciplinary techniques 
creates associations that work “naturally” and automatically in the individual 
body to create an obedient subject. In the second half of the 18th century, for 
example, the transition out of the classical period of punishment is marked by 
the application of punishment to the “mind… the play of representations and 
signs circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the minds of all… 
the soul… One must set up a complex of obstacle-signs [to the crime] that 
subject the movement of the forces to a power relation.”15 The nature of the 
punishment must be made to resemble the nature of the crime, so that their 
association, though not natural, seems natural, “comes to mind in the train of 
thought that considers committing the crime;”16 penalties are made to seem like, 
have an analogic relation to, the crime. But this “complex of signs” which works 
on the “mind” functions by mobilizing and directing “the mechanics of forces” 
of the body. One must “reduce the desire that makes the crime attractive; 
increase the interest that makes the penalty be feared; reverse the relation of 
intensities, so that the representation of the penalty and its disadvantages is 
more lively than that of the crime and its pleasures.”17 In other words, this 
                                               
14 Ibid., 138. 
15 Ibid., 104. 
16 Ibid., 104–5. 
17 Ibid., 106. 
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enlivening and redirection of desire, fear, intensity is a corporealization of the 
association of crime with punishment/displeasure. Foucault’s point is that 
“discourse becomes the vehicle of law,”18 but discourse works upon and 
recreates the subject’s body through an associating mechanism that organizes 
pleasure and pain.19 
Just as the body is the means of discourse's encouragement of obedience, 
it is also the means of rehabilitation of the criminal disposition that needs 
changing. In the developing project for the 18th century prison, corrective 
penalty acts on the “body, time, everyday gestures and habits, the soul too… as 
the seat of habits… time-tables, compulsory movements, regular activities, 
solitary meditation, work in common, silence, application, respect, good 
habits…” – all these aim at restoration of the obedient (rather than juridical) 
subject – “the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders, an authority that is 
exercised continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow to 
function automatically in him.”20 Indeed, the prison is, according to Foucault, at 
least in theory the “ideal form of apparatus intended to render individuals 
docile and useful, by precise work on their bodies.”21 This precise work 
conditions subjects by “gratification-punishment”22 systems. 
At the end of the 18th century, the panoptic functioning of power in the 
prison becomes generalized in the human sciences, the disciplines governing all 
human activity. The habituating techniques that applied in the prison become 
generalized. Power’s regulative penetration “into even the smallest details of 
everyday life” now takes place through the “mediation of a complete hierarchy 
                                               
18 Ibid., 112. 
19 This is also Plato's perspective. See Laws 653a, b.  
20 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 128–29. 
21 Ibid., 231. 
22 Ibid., 180. 
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that assured the capillary functioning of power.”23 Each individual is assigned 
to his “‘true’ name, place, body, disease.” The disciplines in general function to 
increase the utility of individuals,24 the mechanisms of the prison begin to 
function and circulate in the free state, “centers of observation disseminated 
throughout society,”25 and the police power of the state bears over “events, 
actions, behavior, opinions – ‘everything that happens,’ ‘things of every 
moment,’ ‘unimportant things.’”26 Disciplinary power doesn’t replace all other 
modes of power. It rather infiltrates them and thus enables it to reach “the most 
minute and distant elements.”27 In the clinic and clinical medicine, whose 
imperative is a “definition of a political status for medicine and constitution of a 
medical consciousness (at the state level) with the constant task of providing 
information, supervision, constraint – that is, as much a police as a medical 
function,”28 the medical consciousness/knowledge/gaze “dominates and 
founds all perceptual experiences, structures into a sovereign unity the lower 
level of eye, ear, touch.”29 This gaze, the corporealized authority functioning in 
the disciplines, and in the individual himself, assures the success of capillary 
power. The penetration of political power in the individual human body, 
whether in the formal institutions of the prison, hospital, the army, the school, 
or through the reach of the human sciences, is thus extensive. 
 
                                               
23 Ibid., 198. 
24 Ibid., 210. 
25 Ibid., 212. 
26 Ibid., 213. 
27 Ibid., 216. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Michel Foucault, Birth of the Clinic (New York: Pantheon, 1973), 165. 
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Physiology 
It is clear, then, from Foucault’s discussion that in order to be disciplined 
into an automatically obedient subject one’s body must in general and to a 
considerable degree be physiologically accessible – its forces and mechanisms 
amenable to formation and direction, to conditioning by disciplinary 
techniques. If the disciplinary corporealization of the subject works, as Foucault 
says, through the application of disciplinary technique to neurophysiological 
conditioning systems (pleasure and pain mechanisms) whose recruitment and 
direction is in no way guaranteed ahead of time but in fact produced (“the 
product of arbitrary constraints”30), then these bodily systems might also be 
recruited for the recorporealization of the subject in another direction. Through 
the individual's own self-application of techniques ("of the self") that work on 
these same "forces,” pleasure and pain mechanisms, to transform himself, 
established (political) authority might come to function less automatically in 
him. 
But the application of techniques of the self would require some 
understanding of the effect of one's "arts" or "practices" upon the body – our 
neurophysiological organism. An understanding of the neurophysiological 
means by which specific disciplinary techniques corporealize power and arts of 
the self would not, then, be a merely academic pursuit, another exercise in 
knowing. It would help provide the basis for discerning what it is about a 
particular technique – either "disciplinary" or "of the self" - that makes it, in its 
action (in creating, maintaining, or changing the neurophysiological structure 
of corporealized power) succeed or fail; it would allow the selection and 
                                               
30 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 45. 
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refinement of technique based on a more specific understanding of technique's 
operation.31 Foucault, while he was clearly concerned with "techniques of the 
self" in much of his later work, did not undertake this study. 
 
Techniques of the Self 
Alexander Nehamas argues that Foucault did not investigate or 
prescribe any kind of positive epistemic or political project of the subject for 
strategic reasons, and ultimately because of his pessimistic despair regarding 
political power. Foucault’s books in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nehamas 
writes, “were intended to show that everything we take as orderly and rational 
(the prison, the court system, the school, the statistical information a 
government collects about its citizens) is a product of domination and 
subjugation, in short, of power; and that no system can be created from which 
domination and subjugation can ever be even partially absent.”32 Given this 
situation, even if one intends to control or modify established power relations, 
one cannot, because these relations “reassert themselves in constantly changing 
forms.” According to Nehamas, Foucault held that trying to 
humanize… rationalize, even to renounce power results only in the exercise 
of new forms of it—in the creation of new ways of knowing what 
individuals or "subjects" are, indeed, in the creation of new individuals or 
"subjects." New forms of knowledge and new forms of control, of power, 
thus go together. That is why Foucault refused, throughout that period, to 
offer alternatives to the "intolerable" situations he exposed in his writings 
                                               
31 Should not the same kind of “minute attention” that the disciplinary project directs towards 
the goal of domination, the controlling of all activity, must be applied to discovering the 
neurophysiological means of corporealizing freedom? 
32 Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 174. 
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and in his political activities. Any alternative would simply perpetuate 
power relations.33  
Thus, Nehamas argues, Foucault’s later technical experimentation with the 
corporealization of power was not a political but personal question of ethics 
and not politics. “Foucault came to believe that he might combine ancient ethics 
(which ‘was not a question of giving a pattern of behavior for everybody [but] a 
personal choice for a small elite’) with the stuff of his own life and thereby 
fashion a self of his own;”34 Foucault looked at Socratic parrhesia because “he 
was looking in Socrates for a model of his own manner of caring for himself.”35 
This personalization of Foucault’s analyses of Greek arts of existence assumes 
that the later Foucault was no longer concerned with the capillary/micro- system 
of panoptic/disciplinary power (i.e., the motivating concern of Foucault’s 
earlier work).  
But if Foucault is right about the penetration of disciplinary power into 
the corporeality of the subject, then there can be no such thing as a purely 
"personal" ethical project. Nehamas' characterization of Foucault's 
investigations of Greek aesthetics of existence implies, at the same time, 
therefore, both a) Nehamas' rejection of Foucault on the basis of a misreading of 
him, according to which Foucault thought any system of political power is and 
always will be just as oppressive as any other (which, if true, would make 
Foucault's personal ethics into a kind of voluntarism), and b) Nehamas' own, 
thoroughly un-Foucauldian view that ethics is apolitical. 
 
Minute, Everyday Practices 
                                               
33 Ibid.. 
34 Ibid., 178. 
35 Ibid., 183. 
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Nehamas’ opposition of ethics to politics is clearly at odds with 
Foucault’s extensive research, in the early work that Nehamas surveys, into the 
ways the disciplinary project makes authority function automatically (is 
corporealized) in the subject, as we have already seen. In the course of his 
writing, Foucault focuses on both those techniques/practices that we do not 
choose, that result from a disciplinary regime of power, but also on an arts of 
the self that aims at the very least to decrease the degree of domination in 
power relations. Indeed, Foucault's persistent concern in his writings and 
interviews to address the relationship between political power and practices of 
the self is even a distinguishing feature. He repeatedly emphasizes the political 
importance of his “critical ontology of ourselves” as an “attitude… ethos… 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same 
time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an 
experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”36  Attending to the 
everyday, small things that are the foundation of the asymmetrical and 
nonegalitarian power arrangements in our society is the basis of the 
revolutionary process; if one wants to avoid  
the Soviet experience and prevent… the revolutionary process from running 
into the ground, [that is, to]… render impossible the reproduction of the 
form of the State apparatus within revolutionary movements… one of the 
first things that has to be understood is that power isn't localized in the State 
apparatus and that nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of 
power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on 
a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed.37 
                                               
36 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York: Pantheon, 1984), 50. 
37 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972–1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 60–61. 
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It is for this reason that a “critique of relations existing at a minute level”38 is 
necessary. 
Foucault makes this same point in “The Ethics of the Concern for Self” 
where he distinguishes between the “process of liberation” and “practices of 
freedom;”39 the latter, he says, are necessary if a people, a society, a group of 
individuals “are to be able to define admissible and acceptable forms of 
existence or political society.”40 Liberation paves the way, is prerequisite to, but 
is not sufficient to ensure, new power relationships, which are instead 
“controlled by practices of freedom.”41 The care of the self is political insofar as 
it is self-government, but this entails also government of others – it “enables one 
to occupy his rightful position in the city, the community, or interpersonal 
relationships, whether as a magistrate or a friend… and… proper care of the 
self requires listening to the lessons of a master."42 Care of the self is “ethically 
prior” to the care of others because the care of the self is “ontologically prior.”43 
Clearly, Foucault's persistent association of the care of the self with political 
power in the internal and external power relations of subjects (with themselves 
and one another) was not  the kind of despairing pessimism that Nehamas 
thinks explains Foucault's turn to the "arts of existence.” Indeed, Foucault's 
examination of the relation between techniques of the self and critical 
perception – parrhesia – even appears to suggest that techniques of the self was a 
kind of positive political project. 
 
                                               
38 Ibid., 61. 
39 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1,  
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow et al. (New York: New Press, 1997), 282–23. 
40 Ibid., 283. 
41 Ibid., 283–84. 
42 Ibid., 287. 
43 Ibid., 287. 
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Parrhesia 
This question of the relation between techniques of the self and critical 
perception was one, Foucault writes,44 that became salient in Athens in the 5th 
century B.C. – a crisis of parrhesia [fearless/frank speech]. "Fearless speech" was 
supposed, ideally, to be the courageous speaking of truth to one’s political 
superior, for example, the king. But this speech could also be just ignorant 
outspokenness. Given this ambivalence in parrhesia, and since they took for 
granted the influence of arts of the self on thought and behavior, the Greeks 
asked what was the relationship between true parrhesia, on the one hand, and 
mathesis (knowledge and education), on the other. In other words, what 
practices/techniques are prerequisite to being able to speak the truth – to 
having a critical perception of, a courageous relation to, reality? This was 
essentially Plato’s question in Republic: given that only a few are able to achieve 
a critical and courageous relation to truth, what political organization of power 
is appropriate, and what mathesis is necessary to the creation and maintenance 
of this form of organization of political power? The question of mathesis was a 
question of askesis – physical training or exercise that aims at endowing the 
individual with the preparation and moral equipment permitting him to fully 
confront the world in an ethical and rational manner.45 In The Use of Pleasure, 
Foucault examines not just Plato but also more generally the ancient Greek 
effort to engender mastery, self-governance, through particular practices – 
exercises, food, drink, sleep, and sexual relations.46 The Greeks were emphatic 
                                               
44 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2001), 
http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/foucault.DT5.techniquesParrhesia.en.html. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. II: The Use of Pleasure, tr. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Random House, 1985), 101. In the “Introduction” to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault indicates 
that the moral problematization of sexual conduct was and is connected to a group of practices 
of “unquestionable importance in our societies” – that is, the “arts of existence” (10). The moral 
 20 
in establishing the relationship between the care of the body and the soul’s 
purity and harmony;47 Plato makes clear that physical regimen is not conducted 
for its own sake; one cultivates harmony in the body for the sake of his soul’s 
consonance.48 And Foucault indicates that all these things were considered in 
terms of mastery, that askesis was conceived in political and personal terms 
simultaneously – if a man could not find some degree of mastery of himself 
through regimen, he was not fit to be master of others who could not master 
themselves. 
Care of the self was for the Greeks “a way of limiting and controlling 
power.”49 A good ruler governs himself at the same time as he governs others, 
and so doesn’t abuse others. Abuse, the enslavement of others, comes rather 
from the failure of caring for the self, since this allows one to become slave to 
one’s desires. The relation between care of the self and politics is obvious in the 
case of Ancient Greece; “the care of the self appears a pedagogical, ethical, and 
also ontological condition for the development of a good ruler.”50  
 
But Foucault’s examination of the question here (in Fearless Speech) is 
intended not simply as an intellectual, historical exercise but as an interrogation 
of our own subjectivity, a "critical ontology of ourselves.” The techniques of the 
                                               
conceptions of Greek antiquity were much more oriented “toward practices of the self and the 
question of askesis than toward codifications of conducts and the strict definition of what is 
permitted and what is forbidden” (30), as is the case in Christianity. These moral conceptions 
were concerned with “four great axes of experience: the relation to one’s body, the relation to 
one’s wife, the relation to boys, and the relation to truth” (32). Foucault considers the Greeks’ 
dietetics, economics, and erotics – “the three great arts of self-conduct” or “three major 
techniques of the self” (251) – as the form of relation to the self that were considered to enable 
the individual to mold himself into a “subject of ethical conduct” (Ibid., 251). 
47 Ibid., 102. 
48 Ibid., 104. 
49 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1,  
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow et al. (New York: New Press, 1997), 288. 
50 Ibid., 293. 
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self Foucault finds in the ancient Greeks are very different from those that 
characterize our own ontology. The arts of existence and moral conceptions of 
Greek antiquity are more in accord with a practice of freedom than the ascetics 
of Christianity, which aim at self-renunciation or repression in the effort at 
realization of a universal code, and detachment from the world (in a sense, an 
arts of non-existence). Foucault is therefore careful to distinguish between the 
“arts of existence,” “techniques of the self,” on the one hand, and the asceticism 
of Christianity, on the other. The first Christian doctrines and the ancient moral 
philosophy did borrow directly from, and shared continuities with, each other.51 
Even if the ancient and the Christian moralities share many themes, principles, 
notions, they are valued and placed differently in each.52 The Church and its 
pastoral ministry organized “the demands of austerity… into a unified, 
coherent, authoritarian moral system that was imposed on everyone in the 
same manner”53 – an ascetics. Classical thought, on the other hand, treated the 
same principles as a “supplement, a ‘luxury’ in relation to the commonly 
accepted morality.”54 Classical thought's arts of existence originated in a 
nonuniform manner and in scattered locations; and they “proposed – more than 
they imposed – different styles of moderation or strictness, each having its 
specific character or ‘shape.’”55 Ancient Greek and Greco-Roman "freemen" 
were more concerned with “practices of the self,” aimed at the transformation 
of one’s own mode of being, the question of askesis, and of attitude, than they 
                                               
51 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. II: The Use of Pleasure, tr. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Random House, 1985), 15. The arts of existence were “assimilated into the exercise of 
priestly power in early Christianity, and later, into educative, medical, and psychological types 
of practices" (Ibid., 11). 
52 Ibid., 21. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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were ascetics – i.e., codifying their conduct according to “the strict definition of 
what is permitted and what is forbidden.”56 
This can be seen, Foucault observes, in the ancient Greek notion of 
aphrodisia, which included “act, desire, and pleasure”57 as a closely bound unity. 
The Christian clergy morally devalued pleasure by its injunctions against its 
pursuit as the aim of sexual practice; desire was a sign of fallen nature and the 
human condition. Socrates held mastery over, rather than abstinence from, 
pleasures to be best;58 a relationship of the “’domination-submission,’ 
‘command-obedience,’ ‘mastery-docility’ type.”59 Whereas, Christian 
spirituality demanded that the individual's relationship to himself be of the 
‘elucidation-renunciation,’ ‘decipherment-purification’ type” (in which 
“subjection was to take the form not of a savior-faire for oneself, but of a 
recognition of the law and an obedience to pastoral authority”60). The relation to 
truth via techniques of the self in the ancient Greek morality was “a structural, 
instrumental, and ontological condition for establishing the individual as a 
moderate subject leading a life of moderation” rather than as in the Christian case an 
ascetics aimed at “epistemological conditioning enabling the individual to 
recognize himself in his singularity as a desiring subject and to purify himself 
of the desire that was thus brought to light.”61 The Greeks shared the same 
anxieties (“violence, expenditure, death”) as the Christians, but the Greek techne 
aimed at “making oneself like a doctor treating sickness, the pilot steering 
between the rocks, or the statesman governing the city – a skillful and prudent 
                                               
56 Ibid., 30. 
57 Ibid., 42. 
58 “’It is not abstinence from pleasures that is best, but mastery over them without ever being 
worsted” (Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers, IV, 7, 49; cited Ibid., 70). 
59 Ibid., 70. 
60 Ibid., 92. 
61 Ibid., 89. 
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guide of himself, one who has a sense of the right time and the right measure.”62 
While the Christian teaching required mutual chastity on the part of husband 
and wife, classical Greece was concerned with the spouses’ sexual behavior 
only when it was a question of having children63; moderation in marriage was 
prescribed only in terms of an ethics of submission on the wife’s part and “self-
delimiting domination” on the husband’s.64 The kind of mastery that 
characterized the ancient Greek techniques of the self, then, was to be not an 
attempt at purity, renunciation, not authoritarian command, but the 
modification of one’s attitude, one’s mode of being, moderation so that one is not 
enslaved by the violence of the passions, but rather learns to be doctor, pilot, 
and statesman – to oneself first, and then to others.  
Foucault’s critical ontological attitude is, thus, simultaneously a question 
of ethics - arts of existence – and politics. As opposed to Nehamas’ reading, 
Foucault was concerned throughout his oeuvre with questions of political 
power, and this was no less true of his examination of arts of the self. If one 
reconceives political power as corporealizing/producing a habituated, obedient 
body, then techniques of the self are politically significant. For this reason 
Foucault explicitly and repeatedly acknowledges the inextricability of ethics 
and politics. The problem posed by power relations is “to acquire rules of law, 
the management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of the 
self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as 
possible,”65 for example, learning how to keep a child from being subjected to a 
                                               
62 Ibid., 138–39. 
63 The Christian “juridico-moral codification” specified the rules regarding times, specific acts, 
and purpose/intention (procreation within marriage) that defined legitimate sexual activity. 
64 Ibid., 184. 
65 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1,  
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow et al. (New York: New Press, 1997), 298. “This 
problem must be framed in terms of rules of law, rational techniques of government and ethos, 
practices of the self and of freedom.” Because between strategic games (through which groups 
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teacher’s arbitrary and unnecessary authority or a professor’s abuse. Since “our 
own moral subjectivity is rooted, at least in part, in… practices” that try to 
“shape the specific relations individuals have to themselves,” techniques of the 
self are of “unquestionable importance in our societies.”66 
 
 Nancy Luxon suggests that what Foucault offered in the lectures on 
parrhesia can be "reconstructed" as a model of what she calls an "educated" 
"expressive subjectivity"67 (as opposed to a "produced" docile one), in which 
individuals' "practices of ethical self-governance" would prepare them for 
"ethical subjectivity" (establishing in them a "disposition to steadiness"68). This 
new subjectivity would impel them to political action, and allow them to 
identify themselves via their relationships with each other (via a "body of 
practices") rather than atomistically in terms of their "body of knowledge" 
which establishes and is established through an essential external order (e.g., 
"nature, custom, tradition, religion"69). The practices and tactics of the 
"disposition to steadiness" are meant to "supersede" the corporealization of a 
docile subject (created by governmentality's disciplinary techniques). Instead of 
answering ethical uncertainty by reference to some external standard, the 
parrhesiastes (truth-teller) merely "attends" to his initial responses with 
"curiosity and resolve;” this ability "simply to be present to [oneself]" is 
                                               
try to control the conduct of each other) and states of domination are technologies of 
government – “not only the way institutions are governed but the way one governs one’s wife 
and children,” and the latter must be analyzed because “it is very often through such 
techniques that states of domination are established and maintained" (Ibid., 299). 
66 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. II: The Use of Pleasure, tr. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Random House, 1985), 10. 
67 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 378, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
68 Ibid., 386. 
69 Ibid., 378. 
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developed through various practices, including walking, writing, and 
meditation. Unsteadiness or "shakiness" in the individual (e.g., Serenus is 
Foucault's example) is a sign not of his failure to examine the truth of himself as 
a disciplinary object. His unsteadiness means, rather, that he cannot "orient and 
steady"70 himself in relation to others, himself, and truth-telling – in relation to 
his chosen ideals.71  
Luxon maintains that Foucault is less concerned in these lectures with 
actual ethical content; in these practices one's ethics consist in the "harmony of 
words and deeds."72 But Luxon also indicates that ethical content is provided by 
normative convention, which is "given" for a particular community. Serenus 
"knows the relevant ethical guidelines;” he is just uncertain about how to 
"dispose himself to these guidelines in his relations to others."73 The 
parrhesiastes evaluates his actions and techniques in terms of their effects in his 
personal relationships. In addition, however, parrhesiastic education teaches 
the individual to recognize (rather than simply expect, on the basis of some 
universal normative criterion, some version of the categorical imperative) 
instances of manipulation as opposed to sincerity. He must learn which 
relationships to avoid and which to engage in. "It is as much as education in 
sincere suspicion as in sincere trust."74 Truth-telling practices rely on their 
collective rather than individual maintenance.75 Parrhesia's political effect is 
that of "re-formation" rather than "revolution;” the parrhesiastes is neither a 
legislator nor a governor, but a doctor, who will "'heal and bring [others] an 
                                               
70 Ibid., 386. 
71 Ibid., 387. 
72 Ibid., 388. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 390. 
75 Michel Foucault, Le Courage de la vérité 21 Mars 1984, CD1A, cited in Nancy Luxon, “Ethics 
and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of Michel Foucault,” Political 
Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 385, http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
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education… thanks to which they will be able to assure their own healing and 
happiness.'"76 
  
Supersession and side-stepping 
 The "supersession" that Luxon and perhaps Foucault suggest, however, 
which would allegedly leave behind the disciplinary subject corporealized 
("produced") by disciplinary techniques, seems unrealistically voluntarist, given 
the automaticity with which the earlier Foucault said the disciplinary subject 
functioned. Luxon is right to indicate that the subject here is not explored in its 
interiority or as a body of knowledge but rather in terms of its "body of 
practices" in relationships. But if the earlier Foucault was right about power 
corporealizing bodies, then these bodies are corporealized in their practices too. 
The earlier Foucault's work, which indicated that the material effects of 
practices on the body by disciplinary techniques are real. In his discussion of the 
emergence from the classical period in the 18th century, Foucault is not merely 
describing a theory of the body implied by theories of punishment;77 the 
corporealization of discipline in the body's automatic obedience – its docility – 
appears as a real effect of these disciplinary techniques. Likewise, Foucault 
implies that the practices of the self have material effects on this subject, in its 
practices. If this is true, then the disciplinary subject needs to be confronted, and 
cannot be simply "superseded.”78 
                                               
76 Luxon, citing Foucault, Le Courage de la vérité 21 Mars 1984, CD1A, in Ibid., 393. 
77 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Pantheon, 1977), 104–5. 
78 This latter solution to the problem posed by the disciplinary subject would only further 
support Nehamas' assumption, though it disregards the conclusions of Foucault's earlier work, 
that Foucault's aesthetics of the self is a merely "personal" endeavor; that is, this solution also 
appears to disregard the conclusions of Foucault's earlier work. 
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 Luxon says the "curiosity and resolve" – those "basic human capacities to 
remark, describe, and remember"79 – "side-step[s]"80 the "putative… late modern 
conception of individuals as fundamentally divided against themselves" – that 
is, a conception which relies on a problematic humanist attempt to oppose an 
"essential" and resistant self to an oppressive "cultural order,” and a kind of 
neoKantian (possibly Habermasian) subject that is motivated by its essential, 
universal psychological constitution to "face the demands of the day."81 But the 
divided subject is not only a conception of these two perspectives; it is also a 
conclusion of Foucault's earlier, and even later, work discussing the differences 
between Christian ascetics and ancient Greek arts of the self (i.e., the basis for 
the discussion of parrhesia). But Foucault's disciplinary subject must also be 
divided – by those disciplinary practices, the ascetics, that the modern 
disciplinary subject applies to itself, as Foucault spends much of The Use of 
Pleasure establishing. This subject, it would appear, is our reality, and cannot 
simply be "side-stepped." Likewise, according to Luxon, because "parrhesia 
operates before scientific rationalization and Christian confession" we "need not 
harbor the same epistemological skepticism that plagues their modern 
counterparts;"82 we can again "side-step" or "supersede" the problems of late 
modern morality's basis in disciplinarity. But this observation, as opposed to 
                                               
79 To which Luxon says Foucault attends in terms of the effects of their "elaboration and 
externalization" (Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the 
Late Lectures of Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 385, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377).  
80 Ibid. Italics mine. 
81 Ibid. Italics mine. 
82 Ibid., 395. "In  order  better  to  analyze  the  forms  of  relation  to  the  self,  in and  of 
 themselves,  I  found  myself  spanning  eras  in  a  way  that  took  me farther  and  farther  from 
 the  chronological  outline  I  had  first  decided  on, both  in  order  to  address  myself  to 
 periods  when  the  effect  of  scientific knowledges  and  the  complexity  of  normative 
 systems  wee  less,  and  in order  eventually  to  make  out  forms  of  relation  to  the  self 
 different  from those characterizing  the  experience  of  sexuality" (“Preface  to  The  History  of 
Sexuality, Volume Two,” in Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1, 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow et al. (New York: New Press, 1997), 204). 
 28 
being a "way out,” should merely remind us of the problem with which we late 
modern disciplinary (rather than ancient allegedly pre-disciplinary) subjects are 
faced with in our subjectivity – the automatic functioning of disciplinary power 
in us. 
  
Curiosity and Obstinacy 
 Foucault's observations of these basic human capacities, and indeed the 
entire practice of techniques of the self, relies on a conception of a subject that is 
still capable, though not accustomed – because of disciplinary conditioning – to 
using his curiosity and resolve to the degree characteristic of the successful 
parrhesiastes. In Foucauldian terms, this conception cannot be a simple 
voluntarist supersession or side-stepping of the disciplinary subject, since 
according to Foucault we are disciplinary subjects. Our truth-telling capacity, if 
it exists, depends upon a subject that, despite its disciplinary conditioning, 
retains these basic psychological capacities, which Luxon notes the disposition 
to steadiness is "rooted in."83 (The position that freedom in Foucault is 
"freedom-as-power"84 merely defers the question of how freedom exists in the 
corporealized subject; in any case, Foucault makes no effort in Fearless Speech to 
base these basic psychological capabilities in freedom-as-power.85) 
 These basic human capacities, exercised in the practices Luxon calls 
                                               
83 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 377, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
84 See Saul Tobias, "Foucault on Freedom and Capabilities," Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 4 
(2005), 65–85; Réal Fillion, "Freedom, Truth, and Possibility in Foucault’s Ethics," Foucault 
Studies, no. 3 (November 2005), 50–64, . 
85 Foucault's statements regarding Kant's enlightenment project, implying Foucault's own 
perspective on freedom, do not necessarily provide a clear answer. For example, “Men  are  at 
 once  elements  and  agents  of  a  single process.  They  may  be  actors  in  the  process  to  the 
 extent  that  they participate  in  it;  and  the  process  occurs  to  the  extent  that  men  decide 
 to be  its  voluntary  actors" (Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, 
ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 35). 
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"expressive subjectivity,” form an ethics, an ethical model and standard, indeed 
a normative practice and disposition which Luxon and Foucault recommend. 
But this practice is one at odds with the conclusions of Discipline and Punish and 
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 – what Luxon calls "the haunting unease prompted by 
Foucault’s claim that individuals unwittingly replicate the very structures that 
are the conditions and limits to their claims to self-hood."86 This unease would, 
it seems, rather than prompt one to suggest a positive practice of freedom, 
make one hesitate at the suggestion that a positive practice of freedom was even 
a possibility, especially one with normative practices defended on assumptions 
about basic/essential human psychological realities – i.e., curiosity and resolve. 
If the conclusions of Discipline and Punish and the History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 still 
have an effect, it may be to make Luxon and Foucault (and perhaps us), in their 
pessimism over the possibility of human freedom, hesitate over leadership. 
Luxon takes care to note that the parrhesiastes is not a legislator;87 but then this 
pessimism should also make us hesitate over any positive practices of freedom, 
including personal ethical ones. We would be left simply with the norms with 
which we are born (i.e., a subjectivity to which we are supposed to be brought, 
in fact, by the ascetic disciplinary practices that Foucault and Luxon are 
concerned to avoid). 
Whether Foucault's techniques of the self, Luxon's "expressive 
subjectivity,” provide a "way out" or not depends on the answer to the question 
                                               
86 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 378, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
87 "To the extent that parrhesia has political effect, it leads to a different politics of re-formation 
rather than a revolutionary politics. Yet, Foucault cautions that the parrhesiastes does not have 
'the mission of a legislator, or even a governor … It is a relation to the self, it is the relation of a 
doctor. … who will heal and bring [others] an education, an education thanks to which they 
will be able to assure their own healing and happiness' [Le Courage de la vérité, 21 mars 1984, 
CD10A]. The parrhesiastes is an educative healer, not a legislator; he does not aspire to the 
position of Solon" (Ibid., 393). 
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posed by the combination of, on the one hand, the conclusions of Foucault's 
earlier writing and, on the other, the observations about basic human 
capabilities of freedom in The Use of Pleasure and Fearless Speech; that is, just how 
disciplined are we, how in/capable of freedom? Just how effective is the 
disciplinary corporealization of ourselves? If these practices do provide a "way 
out,” then it has to be because his basic capacities allow the subject to confront 
rather than sidestep or supersede his disciplinary subjectivity. This 
confrontation would require an understanding of just how disciplinary this 
subject is, not simply culturally, in terms of one or other particular community's 
disciplinary "production" or parrhesiastic "education,” but in terms of its "basic 
human capacities to remark, describe, and remember" – the very site of 
Foucault's and Luxon's hope. What are its limits and possibilities 
neurophysiologically? Is it always able to exercise these? If not, in what kind of 
situations? How does its previous conditioning affect this ability? - All 
questions that neuroscientific research has been engaged with for some time, as 
we shall see. Answers to these questions, questions that are guided by a 
curiosity regarding what will enable us to free ourselves, would provide a 
foundation for establishing "ethical standards"  (as opposed to simply accepting 
the norms of a particular community88) and techniques that "heal and bring 
others an education… thanks to which they will be able to assure their own 
healing and happiness.'"89  
The answer to these questions does lie in practices of observation based in 
curiosity and resoluteness, and in relationships that provide the guiding 
concerns of our own arts, but these relationships include those with the bodies 
                                               
88 Luxon writes, "Serenus’ discomfort results not from epistemological uncertainty—he knows 
the relevant ethical guidelines—but an uncertainty of how to dispose himself to these 
guidelines in his relations to others" (Ibid., 388). 
89 Luxon, citing Le Courage de la vérité 21 Mars 1984, CD1A, Ibid., 393. 
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of knowledge, and those involved in "the human sciences… codify[ing] and 
reproduc[ing]" the "insight gained"90 – actual doctors91 and medical sciences, for 
example. Even for Foucault, the curiosity and "obstinacy" that characterize the 
parrhesiastic practice do not seem to be incompatible with his analyses and 
codification of not only disciplinary techniques and ascetic practices themselves 
but also techniques/practices of the self including parrhesia: 
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple; I would hope that in the eyes 
of some people it might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity - the only kind 
of curiosity, in any case, that is worth acting upon with a degree of 
obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to assimilate what is proper for one to 
know, but that which enables one to get free of oneself.92 
It would appear that all bodies of knowledge can be used in practices of 
freedom, an extended techniques of the self, and also that a practice of freedom 
can lead to a codified body of knowledge. 
  
Suspicion and Trust in Parrhesia and Politics 
Luxon holds that the problem to which Foucault tries to find an answer 
in Discipline and Punish and the History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 is the fact that 
individuals are "over-steady, over-coherent, disciplined"93 while in parrhesiastic 
practice the problem is one of attaining "steadiness and a forever imperfect 
coherence;” whereas the answer to the first problem is political governance 
                                               
90 Ibid., 379. 
91 Luxon's use of Foucault's metaphor of the parrhesiastes as "doctor" at least seems at the same 
time to preclude the "human sciences" as a locus for or partner in legitimate parrhesiastic 
"educatory" rather than disciplinary "productive" relations. 
92 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. II: The Use of Pleasure, tr. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Random House, 1985), 8. 
93 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 397, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
 32 
relying on an "artful interruption of cultural attitudes and actions,"94 the 
"contestation of those collective practices that might facilitate the internalization of 
cultural values and norms and unfolds through the contest of claims"95 –  the 
answer to the second is the suspicion and trust one learns in the interpersonal 
practices of parrhesia. But by juxtaposing "politics" as deciding collective 
practices that internalize subjectivity (on the one hand) to parrhesiastic 
practices that develop awareness and "reflexivity" (on the  other), politics looks 
like it can only work against parrhesia, and parrhesia against politics. This 
conception of politics also appears to rely on the pessimistic assumption of a 
totally disciplinary subjectivity96 that is incompatible with the hopeful trust in 
the "basic human capacities to remark, describe, and remember" that make 
parrhesia possible. As I have suggested above, Foucault's focus on parrhesia 
appears to be motivated precisely by the desire to free the disciplinary subject; 
if parrhesiastic practice ends up being a merely private, personal practice that is 
meant to change only the individual's coherent harmonization of oneself with 
standards that are decided through what may turn out to be disciplinary 
techniques, then its political significance appears to be that it acquiesces to the 
problem of the disciplinary subject by a kind of voluntarist self-distraction (as 
implied by Nehamas' characterization of Foucault). 
But parrhesiastic practices appear (at least for Foucault) to aim at not the 
steadying of the individual in terms of its cultural values and norms but a 
steadying of the individual to his own unsteadiness, to the fundamental 
uncertainty of one's norms, a simple observation of one's initial responses, to 
approach the truth of oneself – one's basic capabilities. What is parrhesia if it is 
                                               
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Or something in between. But Luxon and Foucault leave this unspecified. 
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not precisely the "contestation of those collective practices that might facilitate the 
internalization of cultural values and norms"97 that Luxon says constitutes 
"politics"? Parrhesia, writes Luxon, provides its students " the means to work 
past the dependency provoked by ethical unease;"98 Foucault observes that 
Serenus' "malaise" is “due to the instability, the unsteadiness of his mind,” 
which keeps him “from advancing towards the truth, towards steadiness, 
towards the ground."99 But if parrhesia takes as "given" the individuals' 
standards/norms, this does not have to mean that it aims simply to 
"harmonize" the parrhesiastic participant with them – i.e., that parrhesia is 
ethically contentless, as Luxon contends;100 the teacher, at least, points to the 
basic facts, basic observations, intervening and truth-telling in precisely a 
"rough-and-tumble"101 way; "the master still uses frankness of speech with the 
disciple in order to help him become aware of the faults he cannot see."102 His 
intervention, at least in Foucault's (and Luxon's) case, is based on what he 
observes and has observed of the student's "basic human capacities to remark, 
describe, and remember"103 to prompt him in elaborating and externalizing 
them; in contesting them – especially in the "barbed dialogues" during the final 
                                               
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid, 385. 
99 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2001), 153–54, 
http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/foucault.DT5.techniquesParrhesia.en.html. 
100 Luxon does indicate that individuals are in parrhesia to "take their norms as starting rather 
than stopping points" (Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in 
the Late Lectures of Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 388, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377). But Foucault begins, even according 
to Luxon, from basic human capacities and a desire for freedom. These are as much the basis of 
parrhesia as is the "harmony of one's words and deeds,” of one's norms and actions. 
101 Ibid., 397.  
102 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2001), 
http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/foucault.DT5.techniquesParrhesia.en.html. 
103 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 385, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
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stages of parrhesiastic education.104 Could not political contestation aim at 
precisely this goal? If Foucault hesitates over government, he also indicates that 
the care of the self (epimeleia heautou) – i.e., proper self-government - was 
prerequisite to caring for not just oneself but also governing others; in ancient 
Greece, the parrhesiastes is, though not a political dictator, still a citizen, a 
member of a class, a slaveholder, and head of a household. 
If the earlier pessimism regarding the disciplinary subject is replaced by 
an instead "suspicious" and "expressive subjectivity" who risks the trust of his 
interlocutor - Foucault states in the very first of these lectures that the 
parrhesiastes is "someone who takes a risk" in relation to an authority, "a 
sovereign,” "a tyrant"105 – then it turns out that one never ultimately knows 
whether one is in a parrhesiastic relationship or not. The "contest" of claims in 
politics is not unlike this. Perhaps this explains the apparent steadiness with 
which Foucault simultaneously discusses parrhesiastic practices in terms of 
both "personal" relationships while explaining that its essential practices 
(curiosity and obstinacy) motivate him in a research practice that has clearly 
been useful in public debate and interviews (rather than only in his closer and 
intimate relationships). 
If the “problematic of care of the self [is] at the heart of a new way of 
thinking about politics, of a form of politics different from what we know 
today,”106 perhaps this politics can be a kind of parrhesiastic practice, which 
focuses on the development of those basis human capacities it observes in its 
                                               
104 Luxon writes, "Such barbed dialogues school the student in independence, and, as a result, 
being to confer the ability to act with sincerity and courage from positions of strength rather 
than from dependency on 'experts'" (Ibid, 395). 
105 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), 
http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/foucault.DT1.techniquesParrhesia.en.html. 
106 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1,  
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow et al. (New York: New Press, 1997), 294. 
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relationships, with both suspicion and experimental trust. In this politics, if we 
want to increase our freedom in relation to those "mechanisms of power" that 
work by means of the individual body on a "minute and everyday level"107 
through techniques of the self, we will need to find out what our natural 
capabilities are, their limits and their possibilities. This will involve, as Foucault 
indicates, “the exercise of the self on the self”108 to become closer and more 
courageous in relation to the truth of our everyday relations. But this truth will 
require knowing what practices have what effects, what in these practices 
makes them fail/succeed, which techniques109 act to further corporealize a 
productive body and which to free it, a knowledge of what we can expect and 
hope for from the body. In this respect the experience of neuroscientists and 
practitioners of these techniques may be instructive. Such an exercise might still 
be motivated by and effect a greater curiosity and less domination. But it must 
also be based in limits one finds in "nature" as a result of one's experimentation 
within it. 
                                               
107 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972–1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 60–61. 
108 Michel Foucault, The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1,  
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow et al. (New York: New Press, 1997), 282. 
109 Or techniques within techniques, as it were. Since the same technique, e.g., sitting in 
meditation, can have different effects on different subjectivities, we will need to understand 
what it is in the technique that makes it work or not. 
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3. Plato's Continual and Measured Agitation 
[I]f he persistently refuses to allow his body 
any degree of rest but exercises and 
continually agitates it through its whole 
extent... and if the agitation is a measured 
one, he will succeed in bringing order and 
regularity to those disturbances and… 
elemental parts that wander all over the body 
according to their own affinities. (Plato, 
Timaeus 88e110) 
 
Many have indicted Plato for establishing a definition of philosophy that 
relies on a fundamental and untenable dualism: by elevating the philosopher's 
rational soul and denigrating the demos' irrational body –  passion, appetite, 
emotion, Plato tries to establish the legitimacy of the soul's/philosopher's 
authoritarian tyranny over the body/demos.111 Seeing Plato's dualism as the 
source of Platonic authoritarianism and exclusion, some of this literature tries to 
expose contradictions in and therefore the rational/logical untenability of 
Plato's perspective. Insofar as Plato's idealism "sets up the whole of western 
metaphysics in its conceptuality,"112 such a critique, by displacing the 
                                               
110 Unless otherwise indicated, Plato quotations are taken from Plato: Complete Works, ed. John 
M. Cooper (Hacket Publishing Company: Cambridge, 1997). 
111 See, for example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979); Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985); Diana Coole, Women in Political Theory: From ancient misogyny to contemporary 
feminism (Boulder, Colorado: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988); Michelle Boulous Walker, Philosophy and 
the Maternal Body: Reading Silence (New York: Routledge, 1998); Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter (New York: 
Routledge, 1993). 
112 Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in in Dissemination, tr. B. Johnson (Chicago: University 
Press, 1981), 76. 
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assumptions that lie behind or within our own thought and action, would 
presumably alter our thought and action. Two such critiques prove illustrative. 
E. R. Dodds and Jacques Derrida demonstrate respectively that: a) in 
contradiction with his soul/rationality-body/irrationality dualism, Plato also 
says that the soul is infected by the body, and even acts like the body; and b) 
against Plato's opposition of speech/philosophy and writing/sophistry, 
speech/philosophy end up being another kind of writing/sophistry.  
These critiques are not mistaken about Plato's authoritarian proclivities, 
or that signification is essential in the work Plato carries out to establish the 
boundaries of legitimacy in philosophy and in politics. What they overlook, 
however, is the larger psycho-physiological project (i.e., a system of physical 
practices/techniques in which signification must be understood as issuing from 
and affecting differential power relations) that Plato himself says provides the 
foundation of his system; Platonic idealism/authoritarianism's only hope of 
realization is the conditioning of habit by and to "seemingly insignificant" 
everyday activities. This habituation works to produce what Plato sees as a 
"moderate" and "harmonious" subject, with an obedient disposition, amenable 
to an orderly life in the republic. While it is plain that Plato wants to establish 
conceptual boundaries, this is only part of a broader psycho-physiological 
project aimed at creating a particular kind of political subject. 
 Drawing attention to Plato's concern with habit-producing techniques is 
not meant to distract from his prescription of authoritarianism. It is to suggest 
that Derrida's and Dodds' inattention to technique ("disciplinary"113 and "of the 
self") replicates Plato's more idealist assertions (regarding the autonomy of 
                                               
113 While some may object to the use of "disciplinary technique" in referring to ancient Greek 
governmental practices, it is clear that the intention of these techniques – the automatic 
functioning of power in the individual's habit – is the same as that in the techniques to which 
Foucault refers from the 18th century onwards. 
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soul/philosophy/philosopher from the body/sophistry/demos) about how 
authority establishes itself, in philosophy and more generally. Criticizing Plato 
on the basis of his self-deconstructing definitions directs our attention away 
from the "seemingly insignificant" practices that Plato prescribes for achieving 
the unthinking obedience that maintains order in the polis, and, possibly, away 
from the habit-conditioning techniques that may in our own time continue to 
provide the foundation for the predominance of Platonic metaphysical 
conceptuality and attitudes to authority in our own thought. 
 
Body and Soul 
Plato has for a long time been conceived of as dismissing and 
denigrating the body, and as inaugurating for Western philosophy an 
antagonistic relationship with the body – the alleged unruliness of the body’s 
sensations, affects, passions, "this mortal coil” to a rational and legislating 
consciousness.114 To the extent that, as Alfred North Whitehead claimed, all 
philosophy has been a footnote to Plato, it cannot be surprising that he in 
particular has received much attention in this regard—for his efforts to define 
and establish hierarchical relations between soul and body, and on this basis 
also between philosophy and sophistry, virtue and vice, male and female, 
political leaders and followers, authoritarianism over democracy. In Plato’s 
hands, the rational soul's superiority seems to legitimize the authoritarian 
tyranny  of the "rational" over the "bodily." This can of course amount to a 
defense of systematic political exclusion and violence.115 
                                               
114 Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason (Minneapolis: U. Of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
115 For example, against women: Love, according to Plato in Symposium, on the mother’s side is 
poor, ugly, and always in need; on the father’s side, love is a philosopher (203d). Woman, 
because she is associated with the body, is hysterically fearful of death (Phaedo, 60a, 112d; 
Apology, 35b), is the next reincarnation of a man who fails to live according to reason (Timaeus, 
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There can be no doubt that Plato was concerned with staking out 
autonomous territory for the soul. Socrates, in Apology, says he spent “all [his] 
time going about trying to persuade you [Athenians], young and old, to make 
your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but 
for the highest welfare of your souls.”116 The soul and its intelligence preexist 
the body.117 Indeed, the soul is responsible for the fact that the body even lives 
at all.118 Mortals come into being when certain souls lose their wings and then 
drift along until they can land on something secure—an “earthly body”—that 
moves, not on its own but by the soul’s power. “This united whole of a soul and 
a body fastened together is called a living being and has the name ‘mortal.’”119 
The soul is that which changes itself, the originless origin, which is always 
changing, but not dependent on anything else for this change.120 
When the soul uses the body to investigate phenomena, it becomes 
“confused and dizzy, as if it were drunk.” But when it “investigates by itself it 
passes in to the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and 
unchanging… it ceases to stray and remains in the same state as it is in touch 
                                               
42b-c, 76e, 91a), fails to distinguish between Beauty itself and beautiful things (Republic 557c). 
Though women can potentially occupy all the same offices as men in the ideal state, women are 
still to be owned in common by the guardian class. In general, children, women, and slaves, and 
the inferior free majority – in sum, the “licentious” – who have “all kinds of diverse desires, 
pleasures, and pains” must be controlled by those “few” born with the best natures and 
provided the best education, whose desires are “simple, measured, and directed by calculation 
in accordance with understanding and correct belief” – that is, the “self-controlled” (Republic, 
431b, c). Also, against homosexuals: Though in the Symposium, Plato clearly indicates that same-
sex attraction can be the basis of a life of philosophy, this philosophical life only derives from 
transcendence/sublimation of the erotic, physical attraction. In Laws, on the other hand, Plato 
writes that homosexual sex acts are “unnatural” (636c). Accordingly, the Athenian prescribes 
legislation banning homosexual acts, masturbation, and illegitimate procreative sex (838-839d). 
116Apology, 30a-b. Cited in Elizabeth Spelman, “Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary 
Views,” Feminist Studies 8, no. 1 (Spring 1982), 111. 
117 Phaedo, 76c. 
118 Ibid., 105c. 
119 Phaedrus, 246b-c. 
120 “Only what changes itself, since it needs nothing beyond itself, never stops changing” 
(Phaedrus, 245c); “Every object that is changed from without lacks a soul, but every object in 
which change comes from within itself has a soul, as that is the nature of the soul” (Phaedrus, 
245e). 
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with things of the same kind, and its experience is then called wisdom….”121 
The body is a tomb,122 a grave or prison,123 barnacles or rocks to the soul.124 The 
soul, Plato writes, “reasons best when none of these senses trouble it… in its 
search for reality,125 because the body confuses the soul and does not allow it to 
acquire truth and wisdom whenever it is associated with it;”126 the soul must try 
to “escape the contamination of the body’s folly.”127 In Phaedo, Socrates says that 
every man's soul, when it feels object-related pain or pleasure, believes that the 
cause of its feelings is “very clear and very true, [whereas] it is not; every 
pleasure and every pain provides… another nail to rivet the soul to the body 
and to weld them together. It makes the soul corporeal, so that it believes that 
truth is what the body says it is….”128 Whereas, reality is a realm of Forms or 
Ideas, and only the soul—not the temporal body—has access to it. Real beauty, 
for example, cannot “take the form of a face, or of hands, or of anything that is 
of the flesh.”129 In the Phaedo, philosophy—reason’s proper activity—gives 
access to the thing-itself/reality, the Forms/Ideas, “reality pure and by itself,”130 
unchanging and perfect.   
Because of this access to the ideal, philosophy can provide a model (or 
paradigm) to follow in one’s actions. In the Republic, following the theoretical 
paradigm of the moral individual and the “theoretical paradigm of a good 
community”131 ends in happiness. This is why unless political leaders become 
                                               
121 Phaedo, 79c, d. 
122 Gorgias, 493a. 
123 Cratylus, 400c. 
124 Republic, 611e-612a. 
125 "[N]either hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave 
of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it" (Phaedo, 65c). 
126 Ibid., 65e-66a. 
127 Ibid., 67a. 
128 Ibid., 83c, d. 
129 Symposium, 221a. 
130 Phaedo, 66a. 
131 Republic. 473a. 
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philosophers or philosophers become political leaders, that is, “unless political 
power and philosophy coincide… there can be no end to political troubles… or 
even to human troubles in general… there is no other way for an individual or 
a community to achieve happiness.”132 Which is to say, unless the intellectual 
part of the soul, which sees reality itself, rules the body of the leader and the 
bodily133 republic, then the body and its appetites will lead to the ruin of the 
republic, causing war, civil discord, battles,134 and in general the unhappiness of 
the republic – as in the Athenian democracy that kills Socrates; democracy’s 
rule by appetite/the body leads to its disharmony and destruction. 
If the soul “gather[s] itself together by itself," and in practicing 
philosophy willingly dissociates from and avoids the body – its "confusion, 
ignorance, fear, violent desires and the other human ills"135 – then the soul will 
be "completely pure"136 and travel to and be happy with the gods in the realm of 
the "invisible, which is like itself, the divine and immortal and wise."137 But 
if the soul is polluted and impure when it leaves the body, having always 
been associated with it and served it, bewitched by physical desires and 
pleasures to the point at which nothing seems to exist for it but the physical, 
which one can touch and see or eat and drink or make use of for sexual 
enjoyment… accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is dim and 
invisible to the eyes but intelligible and to be grasped by philosophy… 
[then] such a soul… is no doubt permeated by the physical, which constant 
                                               
132 Ibid., 473d-e. 
133 Bodily because its majority are “constitutionally incapable” of seeing with the soul alone 
(Republic, 476b). 
134 Phaedo, 66c. 
135 Ibid., 80e-81c. 
136 Ibid., 72b-c. 
137 Ibid., 80e-81c. 
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intercourse and association with the body, as well as considerable practice, 
has caused to become ingrained in it….138 
In the afterlife, these souls of inferior men “wander until their longing for… the 
physical again imprisons them in a body,”139 the body of characters resembling 
those characters they practiced in their life: donkeys if they were gluttonous, 
violent and drunk; wolves, hawks or kites if they were unjust, tyrannical or 
plunderous. In Laws Book VIII, Plato warns that the legislators and all citizens 
“must not confuse the cult of the gods of the underworld with that of the 
‘heavenly’ gods… They are to keep the two kinds of celebration separate… The 
union of body and soul, you see, can never be superior to their separation (and I 
mean that quite seriously).”140 
 
 It would appear from this account that Elizabeth Spelman, for example, 
was right in claiming that “What we learn from Plato” is that “the body, or the 
irrational part of the soul, is seen as an enormous and annoying obstacle to the 
possession of… knowledge, reality, goodness, beauty, love, and statehood.”141 
Or as E.R. Dodds put it, Plato accepted the dualism that “attributed all the sins 
and sufferings of the psyche to the pollution arising from contact with the mortal 
body;”142 “[O]nly when by death or by self-discipline the rational self is purged 
of ‘the folly of the body’ can it resume its true nature which is divine and 
                                               
138 Ibid., 80e-81c. Italics mine. 
139 Ibid., 81e. 
140 Laws, 828cd. 
141 Elizabeth Spelman, “Woman as Body: Ancient and Contemporary Views,” Feminist Studies 8, 
no. 1 (Spring 1982), 113. 
142 The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 212. Plato 
identifies “the detachable ‘occult’ self which is the carrier of guilt-feelings and potentially 
divine with the rational Socratic psyche whose virtue is a kind of knowledge.” But, Dodds points 
out, “the old shamanistic culture-pattern kept its vitality, and its main features are still 
recognizable in Plato” (210). For example, reincarnation. Shamanic trance survives as the 
“practice of mental withdrawal and concentration which purifies the rational soul” (210). 
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sinless; the good life is the practice of that purgation.”143 As we will see, 
however, this reading is one-sided and misleading. 
  
Contradiction and Deconstruction 
According to some critics, Plato fails to realize his intentions and 
contradicts himself. He undermines the system of dualisms he wants to set up, 
and therefore, they argue, delegitimates the elitist authoritarianism he uses this 
system to justify. 
E.R. Dodds writes that Plato contradicts himself when he contends that 
the soul itself feels sensations and emotions he associates with the body. In 
Phaedo, as we have seen already, Socrates says that “the soul... feels violent 
pleasure or pain,” and that this “makes the soul corporeal.”144 Even the rational 
part of the soul is explicitly motivated by desire and the emotion of love. In 
Phaedo, the philosopher does not simply relate intellectually to wisdom; he 
“yearns” for it; he is a “lover” of it; he does not fear death because he loves 
wisdom above life itself.145 Plato, as we know, seems in other places clear that 
the philosophical activity of the soul requires its separation from the body, its 
sensations and passions; philosophical activity depends on recollection of its 
pre-terrestrial journey outside the top of the circuit through the heavens to the 
“colorless, formless, intangible, truly existing essence”146 — what it comes to 
know as general concepts, in its dialectical unification and transcendence of 
particulars.147 All this notwithstanding, Plato also holds that the philosopher's 
                                               
143 Ibid., 212-13. 
144 Phaedo, 83c, d. 
145 Ibid., 68a. 
146 Phaedrus. 247c. 
147 Ibid., 249b. The place beyond the heavens is “occupied by the being that really is, which is 
intangible and without color or shape. It is perceived only by the intellect, the pilot of the soul, 
and is the object of the true kind of knowledge” (Phaedrus, 247c). Whereas the gods have evenly 
balanced chariots with good horses, mortals have one good and one bad horse, and the one bad 
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motivation is precisely eros148 –  which Plato held to be a kind of "madness." 
Eros within the soul provides the desire for beautiful bodies, but it is also the 
motive force behind the love of laws and customs, and branches of learning, 
including philosophy.  For Plato, says Dodds, eros “was the best kind of 
madness,” divine madness, and the one mode of experience bringing together 
the “two natures of man, the divine self and the tethered beast.”149 Eros is based 
in “the physiological impulse of sex” but also “supplies the dynamic impulse 
which drives the soul forward in its quest of a satisfaction transcending earthly 
experience.”150 In the Symposium, Plato says that Love needs/wants beautiful 
things, and is between being a god and being a mortal. Love can be poor, ugly, 
always in need, but it can also be a philosopher. Love’s progress decides which 
it approximates more; it can remain obsessed with beautiful particular things, 
or it can progress from its initial obsession with beautiful bodies to souls, to 
beautiful activities and laws (i.e., customs), and then to knowledge, not of 
particulars but of ideas and theories, until it comes to see the beautiful itself. 
The “mystery of Love” is that those who are oriented towards the soul always 
go “upwards for the sake of… beauty, starting out from beautiful things and 
                                               
pulls them down toward “the earth, where hard toil and an arduous testing await the soul” 
(247b). When it has studied and enjoyed the other things that really are, it returns to the region 
within the heavens and goes home. When it arrives there, the charioteer stations his horses at 
their feeding trough, puts ambrosia before them, and gives them nectar to drink. Such is the life 
of the gods (248a). “The reason for the great eagerness to see the plain of truth is that the 
meadow there provides the pasturage that is appropriate for the best part of the soul and the 
nature of the wing that carries the soul aloft is nourished by this” (248c). 
148 Dodds’ student A.W.H. Adkins notes, in addition, that in the Phaedrus, it is eros that drives 
the soul in its cycle through the heavens, and that even the best souls’ intellect are so troubled 
by spirit and desire that it hardly glimpses reality – outside the vault of heaven – “colorless, 
formless, intangible, truly existing existence” (Phaedrus, 247c). To be human, the soul (before 
earthly life) must have perceived some degree of ultimate reality, and the various gradations of 
human are based upon how much they have perceived (From the Many to the One: A study of 
personality and views of human nature in the context of ancient Greek society, values and beliefs 
(London: Constable, 1970), 131-4). 
149 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 218. 
150 Ibid. 
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using them like rising stairs.”151 The basis for transcending limitations imposed 
by physiological impulse is thus physiological impulse itself. The soul’s 
rationality, contradictorily, seems like it has its source in the body’s 
irrationality. Dodds’ student, A.W.H. Adkins writes: “The psuche [soul] seems 
to be entangled in a nexus of causes over which it has no control.”152 
In Dodds’ interpretation, Plato’s real intention was to establish the soul's 
pure autonomy, distinguishing it absolutely from the body. Plato would not 
systematize the soul’s irrationality because this would undermine his attempts 
to absolutize the opposition of soul and body, and the whole system of 
oppositions that rested upon them. In the end, even though he has Eros 
bringing soul and body together, and "in fact comes very close to… the 
Freudian concept of libido and sublimation,” Plato never “fully integrated this 
line of thought with the rest of his philosophy; had he done so, the notion of the 
intellect as a self-sufficient entity independent of the body might have been 
imperiled, and Plato was not going to risk that.”153 
 
Dodds concludes that Plato's apparent ambivalence over the relationship 
of the soul/intellect to the body thus threatens to undermine the legitimacy of 
the philosopher and his hierarchical position over the bodily, appetitive demos. 
Jacques Derrida finds an equally threatening and related ambivalence in Plato's 
treatment of logos – i.e., "‘discourse’… argument, line of reasoning, guiding 
thread animating the spoken discussion.”154 
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Plato opposes logos as speech to mere writing. The philosopher speaks, 
rather than writes, the truth. Speech is "the living, breathing discourse of the 
man who knows."155 Socrates says that "the nature of speech is to direct the 
soul."156 The philosopher, or  
dialectician[,] chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse 
accompanied by knowledge – discourse capable of helping itself as well as 
the man who planted it, which is not barren but produces a seed from which 
more discourse grows in the character of others. Such discourse makes the 
seed forever immortal and renders the man who has it as happy as any 
human can be.157 
Speech "can defend itself, and it knows for whom it should speak and for 
whom it should remain silent."158 Speech can control its effects; it knows the 
souls of its audience and addresses each type of soul appropriately. 
Plato establishes the superiority of speech to writing on the basis of 
speech's attendance by the one who knows, i.e., its father. In Socrates' 
recollection in the Phaedrus of the myth of Theuth – the god of writing, Thamus, 
the god of gods – who speaks and does not write, says that writing is a 
pharmakon (the word for both remedy and poison), not, as Theuth claims, good 
"for memory and for wisdom,"159 but rather one that "will introduce 
forgetfulness" into the soul, whose trust will now depend on something 
"external," "on signs that belong to others." Writing, and the soul that trusts in 
it, will merely appear wise, like sophistry. The pharmakon of writing "produces a 
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play of appearances that enable it to pass for truth.”160 It is therefore seductive. 
In Phaedrus, Socrates compares the "leaves" of the book Phaedrus has brought 
with him to a "potion," or pharmakon, that "charm[s]" Socrates into the 
countryside, like "a hungry animal… driven by dangling a carrot or a bit of 
greenstuff in front of it."161 away from the "logos"162 of living speech in the city. 
The pharmakon – "leaves of a book containing a speech"163 (logoi en biblios) – 
seduces because it defers speech, but it never delivers the goods (i.e., 
truth/knowledge/wisdom) that speech conveys. Writing "know[s] nothing;"164 
it will always need/lack its father's support. Thamus condemns it as practically 
worthless; while writing “is good for hypomnesis (re-memoration, recollection, 
consignation)," it is bad "for the mneme (living, knowing memory)."165 Speech 
and writing are brothers, but only speech is "legitimate." Writing, the bastard 
brother, "can neither defend itself nor come to its own support."166 Written 
words "are as incapable of speaking in their own defense as they are of teaching 
the truth adequately."167 "[W]ords that have been written down can do [no] 
more than remind those who already know what the writing is about."168 Like 
myth, writing "repeats without knowing."169 It threatens, since it is not attended 
by the one who knows, to get out of control and go astray: "When once it has 
been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching 
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indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no 
business with it, and it doesn't know to whom it should speak and to whom it 
should not."170 Writing mindlessly repeats: "You’d think [written words] were 
speaking as if they had some understanding, but if you question anything that 
has been said because you want to learn more, it continues to signify just that 
very same thing forever."171 Writing, writes Derrida, "being nobody's son at the 
instant it reaches inscription, scarcely remains a son at all and no longer 
recognizes its origins, whether legally or morally."172  
Derrida indicates that Plato's opposition and hierarchical ordering of 
speech and writing constitutes a decision and departure from the preceding and 
surrounding tradition.173 "Plato is bent on presenting writing as an occult, and 
therefore suspect, power… His mistrust of mantic and magic… is well 
attested.”174 In the mythological precedents to Plato’s brief recounting in the 
Phaedrus, writing and speech are ambiguously defined, even though the same 
oppositional binaries that preoccupy Plato’s books also preoccupy his sources: 
“Plato had to make his tale conform to structural laws. The most general of 
these, those that govern and articulate the oppositions speech/writing… 
soul/body… good/evil... also govern, and according to the same 
                                               
170 Phaedrus, 275e. 
171 Ibid., 275d-e. 
172 Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination, tr. B. Johnson (Chicago: University 
Press, 1981), 77. 
173 "We hope to display in the most striking manner the regular, ordered polysemy that has, 
through skewing, indetermination, or overdetermination, but without mistranslation, permitted 
the rendering of the same word by 'remedy,' 'recipe,' 'poison,' 'drug,' 'philter,' etc. It will also be 
seen to what extent the malleable unity of this concept, or rather its rules and the strange logic 
that links it with its signifier, has been dispersed, masked, obliterated, and rendered almost 
unreadable not only by the imprudence or empiricism of the translators, but first and foremost 
by the redoubtable, irreducible difficulty of translation. It is a difficulty inherent in its very 
principle, situated less in the passage from one language to another, from one philosophical 
language to another, than already, as we shall see, in the tradition between Greek and Greek; a 
violent difficulty in the transference of a non-philosopheme into a philosopheme. With this 
problem of translation we will thus be dealing with nothing less than the problem of the very 
passage into philosophy" (Ibid., 71-72). 
174 Ibid., 97. See Republic II, 364ff; Letter VII, 333e; Laws X, 909b-c. 
 49 
configurations, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian mythology.”175 In Egyptian 
mythology, Thoth occupies the role of messenger-god, who represents what has 
already been thought by Horus;176 Thoth is the origin of linguistic difference; 
Ra’s replacement, but always scheming to take over the throne.177 
[G]od-doctor-pharmacist-magician… As a substitute capable of doubling for 
the king, the father, the sun, and the word, distinguished from these only by 
dint of representing, repeating, and masquerading, Thoth was naturally also 
capable of totally supplanting them and appropriating all their attributes. 
He is added as the essential attribute of what he is added to, and from 
which almost nothing distinguishes him. He differs from speech or divine 
light only as the revealer from the revealed. Barely.178 
Thoth is the god "of the absolute passage between opposites."179 He "can become 
the god of creative speech."180 What Plato, Derrida writes, on the other hand, is 
novel for is his “Platonic” fervor for legislating strict and hierarchical 
oppositions between Thoth and Thamus, father and son, soul and body… In his 
version of the myth, Thamus quickly passes judgment on Theuth's pharmakon, 
proclaiming its inferiority and subservience to speech. 
According to Derrida, Plato's decision to strictly oppose and order 
speech and writing is momentous.  
The opposition between mneme [living, present memory, or knowledge] and 
hypomnesis [deferred, absent re-presentation of living speech] would thus 
preside over the meaning of writing… [and] form a system with all the great 
structural oppositions [life/death, father/son, master/servant, first/second, 
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legitimate-son/orphan-bastard, soul/body, inside/outside, good/evil, 
seriousness/play, day/night, sun/moon, etc.181] of Platonism.182 
Plato thus establishes the legitimacy and authority of philosophy and the 
philosopher – as opposed to sophistry or myth and the demos – as the one who 
knows, the soul – as opposed to the body – as the source of truth. "What is 
played out at the boundary line between these two concepts is consequently 
something like the major decision of philosophy, the one through which it 
institutes itself, maintains itself, and contains its adverse steps.”183  
Plato’s motivating fear is of, precisely, democracy, says Derrida: “At the 
disposal of each and of all, available on the sidewalks, isn’t writing thus 
essentially democratic?”184 Philosophers know that composed speeches, poetry, 
and political documents are "of little worth,"185 are "recited in public without 
questioning and explanation… only in order to produce conviction" – i.e., mere 
belief and opinion.186 But the democrat is “ready to do anything, lend himself to 
anyone… even to politics and philosophy… he belongs to the masses… has no 
essence, no truth, no patronym, no constitution of his own.”187 He is ruled by 
desire. And like writing, “[d]esires, says Plato, should be raised like sons,”188 
kept in their place, in order. At stake in Plato's decision is precisely the choice of 
authoritarianism over democracy – that is, the speech of the father, the authority 
over politics, over philosophy, over truth. “Platonism” is not alone in assigning 
“the origin and power of speech, precisely of logos, to the paternal position,” 
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but given that it is Platonism that “sets up the whole of Western metaphysics in 
its conceptuality,”189 there is much at stake for Derrida in Plato’s method of 
guarding and managing the boundaries of the soul, philosophy, and the polis.  
 
 But, Derrida argues, despite Plato's attempts to fix their boundaries and 
order, he has difficulty guarding speech from writing, philosophy from 
sophistry, and so on. How does one know philosophy from sophistry, the 
philosopher from the demos, when a speech is given as opposed to written, 
"said for the sake of understanding and learning" instead of given only to 
"produce conviction"190 (and, of course we can add, the product of reason/the 
intellectual soul as opposed to mere habitual desire)? How does one know the 
legitimate from the bastard son? One knows, Plato writes, by consulting "what 
is truly written in the soul concerning what is just, noble, and good."191 One 
must search precisely for signs or inscriptions of knowledge.192   
That Socrates must use a metaphor – substitution of a mere sign for the 
real thing/essence – at the very moment of trying to help Phaedrus, a 
philosopher (i.e., the "man who knows"),193 "understand… and learn…" the 
difference between a mere sign/substitute and the real thing/essence indicates 
the ultimate indistinguishability of essence and signification/substitution; the 
essence of essence turns out to be signification/substitution (a fact with which 
the preceding mythological tradition was more at ease; Thamus/speech now 
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appears to be a manifestation of Thoth/writing, rather than the other way 
around). Speech in the Phaedrus is ultimately a kind of writing, and so its 
distinction as "knowing" must have recourse to basing itself on another 
opposition; philosophy is now good, fertile writing, while sophistry is bad, 
sterile writing: 
According to a pattern that will dominate all of Western philosophy, good 
writing (natural, living, knowledgeable, intelligible, internal, speaking) is 
opposed to bad writing (a moribund, ignorant, external, mute artifice for the 
senses). And the good one can be designated only through the metaphor of 
the bad one. Metaphoricity is the logic  of contamination and the 
contamination of logic. Bad writing is for good a model of linguistic 
designation and a simulacrum of essence. And if the network of opposing 
predicates that link one type of writing to the other contains in its meshes all 
the conceptual oppositions of ‘Platonism’—here considered the dominant 
structure of the history of metaphysics—then it can be said that philosophy 
is played out in the play between two kinds of writing. Whereas all it 
wanted to do was distinguish between writing and speech… the conclusion 
of the Phaedrus is… a preference for one sort of writing over another, for the 
fertile trace over the sterile trace….194 
 
Derrida's argument leads us to conclude that the boundaries of 
philosophy, of truth (intelligibility, as opposed to mere visibility), and therefore 
of authority (i.e., a monopoly of dictation) over the souls of the republic, not 
just the demos but also its "guardians proper" –  its philosophers, must be 
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established through their (i.e., philosophy's, truth's, authority's) repeated 
metaphorical alignment/association with other established oppositions (e.g., 
good/bad, fertile/sterile, soul/body). We might add that these oppositions 
must be precisely, as when the pharmakon of writing is administered, "recited… 
without questioning" so as to "produce conviction." Where this doesn't work, 
they can be ensured with direct physical force. The law, written by the 
legislator, provides the standard to which subjects must make themselves 
conform (i.e., it is the source of correct political subjectivity), or be made to 
conform, even where this involves death. To the extent that the subject errs in 
self-legislation against “bad” writing, writing that is the product of the mere 
senses and passions of the poor judge of his own well-being, the legislator must 
provide correction through the violent application of the law. One way or the 
other, the republic's citizen must be convinced that his writing “always needs its 
father to attend to it, being quite unable to defend itself or attend to its own 
needs,”195 even if this attendance means precisely more writing. In this regard, 
Derrida cites Plato: “The one certain touchstone of all is the writings of the 
legislator,” which are supposed to assure the well-being of the souls of the city;  
The good judge will possess those writings within his own soul as antidotes 
against other discourse, and thus he will be the state’s preserver as well as 
his own. He will secure in the good the retention and increase of their 
rectitude, and in the evil, or those of them whose vicious principles admit 
remedy, will promote, so far as he can, conversion from folly, from 
profligacy, from cowardice, in a word, from all forms of wrong. As for those 
who are fatally attached to such principles, if our judges and their superiors 
prescribe death as a cure for a soul in that state, they will, as has been more 
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than once said already, deserve the praise of the community for their 
conduct.196 
The pharmakon of writing can only be guarded against with precisely another 
pharmakon. Authority in the ideal republic must be continually rewritten on the 
soul/body of the demos. Specifically, the legislator must exclude – i.e., write 
out of existence – those practices (what Derrida would call "democratic 
impulses" in writing) that might undermine his authority. The legislator’s rule 
must be “one topic, one doctrine;”197 “one of the best regulations you have is the 
one which forbids any young man to inquire into the relative merits of the laws; 
everyone has to agree, with one heart and voice, that they are all excellent and 
exist by divine fiat; if anyone says differently, the citizens must absolutely 
refuse to listen to him.”198 
 
The (Legislator's) Psycho-Physiological Project 
Dodds was right that Plato could not integrate the two lines of his 
thought (one that made eros the ultimate source of intellect and another that 
made the soul superior to and autonomous from eros).199 Derrida's careful 
documentation demonstrates at least implicitly how such an integration would 
have threatened Plato's legislative aspirations. In spite of his intentions Plato 
delegitimates the dominion of speech over writing, of philosophy over 
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sophistry, as well as the political domination that is premised on these 
oppositions.  
But Plato's explicit attention to the management of eros and impulse 
seems to be more than just a self-contradicting concession to the mythologically 
inflected context that still held the consciousness of those readers he wished to 
convert. While Plato did intend to establish the superiority of the soul, 
philosophy, and the philosopher (on the one hand) and the inferiority of the 
body, sophistry, and the demos (on the other), he also addressed the question of 
how, through specific techniques, to achieve a subjectivity, a specific 
psychophysiology, that would acquiesce to and support his system. Derrida's 
and Dodd's analyses, though instructive, remain on the surface of a psycho-
physiological project that Plato's legislator is instructed to execute, a project that 
is even broader than (but includes) the system of philosophical oppositions that 
Dodds and Derrida examine. If we are to take seriously Derrida's assertion that 
Plato "sets up the whole of western metaphysics in its conceptuality"200 (and this 
conceptuality provides legitimating force to relations of political domination), 
then we need to understand how this conceptuality is achieved. Derrida is right 
that Plato resorts to metaphor to establish the superiority of the soul, and the 
whole project of subjectivation relies on signification. But the process by which 
signification achieves subjectivation needs also to be understood as a 
physiological process, one disciplinary technique among many Plato says the 
legislator must apply to the subject not just in the moments when he 
contemplates strictly "political" decisions, but also in his seemingly apolitical 
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and insignificant activities to achieve the conditioning of the subject's habit, so 
that he "instinctively" thinks and acts so as to "bind the state together.” 
 
In Laws, Plato notes that though the legislator provides laws that are 
"backed by legal sanctions,"201 the everyday customs and habits that he "regards 
as respectable" should be just as binding upon the citizen. But this is not just 
because they are the completion of the more fundamental work done by the 
laws proper. These habitual practices are the very foundation of the state; they 
do nothing less than hold the republic together: 
all the rules we are now working through are what people generally call 
"unwritten customs"… "ancestral law"… although "laws" is the wrong term 
for these things, we can't afford to say nothing about them, because they are 
the bonds of the entire social framework,202 linking all written and established 
laws with those yet to be passed. They act in the same way as ancestral 
customs dating from time immemorial, which by virtue of being soundly 
established and instinctively observed,203 shield and protect existing written 
law… this is what we have to bear in mind in thoroughly binding your state 
together while it is still a new foundation; we must do our best not to omit 
anything, great or small, whether "laws,” "habits" or "institutions,” because 
they are all needed to bind a state together, and the permanence of the one 
kind of norm depends on that of the other. So we ought not to be surprised 
to see a flood of apparently unimportant customs or usages making our 
legal code a bit on the long side.204 
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Plato, therefore, prescribes disciplinary techniques, and guidelines for 
techniques of the self, that are meant to condition the people's dispositions to 
habitually obey the laws, and the customs – habitual practices – that maintain 
obedience. These techniques are meant for all the people, regardless of their 
nature. The vast majority of the population is capable only of opinion and 
common virtues,205 but all souls at least ultimately desire perfection, and even 
our most appetitive desires are just misdirections of the soul's proper 
development206; "No one is willfully evil. A man becomes evil, rather, as a result 
of one or another corrupt condition of his body and an uneducated upbringing" 
(Timaeus 86e). Education, therefore, must as far as possible direct those desires 
so that all subjects are disposed towards order.207 A habit of order is the basis of 
not just an obedient population in a "well-ordered city,"208 but the further love 
of order and eventual "turning of the eye"209 (towards reality) in the future 
guardian's philosophical study – the turning that, Plato says, makes possible the 
proper ordering and education of the city in the first place. 
 
 The conditioning of the citizen should occur according to a general 
regimen of repeated, rhythmic, traditional/choreographed, moderate activity – 
aimed at producing an orderly disposition, characterized by rhythm, tradition, 
and moderation. It is accompanied by sanctions that effect pain and pleasure in 
the subject, from early on. Since the child's "earliest sensations… are of pleasure 
of pain," they are "the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul." 
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Education is the process of channeling "the feelings of pleasure and affection, 
pain and hatred that well up in his soul… in the right courses before he can 
understand the reason why."210  
Once the long process of education is finished (i.e., in rational man), then 
his "reason and his emotions agree in telling him that he has been properly 
trained by inculcation of appropriate habits."211 But in the meantime, because 
uneducated emotion is unstable and can easily be mislead and deformed, the 
education and training of children is “not something we can leave on one side: 
that would be out of the question."212 Just as "flocks and herds" cannot be left 
unattended, "children must not be left without teachers… Of all wild things, the 
child is the most unmanageable: an unusually powerful spring of reason, whose 
waters are not yet canalized in the right direction, makes him sharp and sly, the 
most unruly animal there is. That's why he has to be curbed by a great many 
'bridles,' so to speak." When he misbehaves, he must be treated "as if he were a 
slave"213. 
The dangers posed to the soul by "excessive pleasures and pains" are the 
"gravest." When we experience too much pleasure or pain, we go to extremes to 
"seize the one or avoid the other," and are unable to "see or hear anything 
right," incapable of "rational thought."214 The "correct formation of our feelings 
of pleasure and pain" makes us "hate what we ought to hate from first to last, 
and love what we ought to love."215 The educational process therefore associates 
pain with wrong acts and (moderate) pleasure with right – by means of the 
regimen of activities (i.e., their effect on the body/soul), but also sanctions that 
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enforce it. This regimen and sanctions form a moderate disposition, which 
instinctively avoids excess (now associated with pain), a disposition amenable 
to orderly life in the polis. Thus, the restraint or moderation of the passions 
should characterize everything, even the child's conception. The Athenian’s first 
consideration is to provide instructions for the physical care of the individual, 
from the very beginning of life. 
Children should not be conceived when their parents are in a state of 
drunken relaxation, since “when he’s drunk a man reels about all over the place 
and bumps into things, and a raging passion invades his body and soul; this 
means that as a sower of his seed he is clumsy and inefficient, and he’ll produce 
unbalanced children who are not to be trusted, with devious characters, and in 
all probability with misshapen bodies too.”216 Plato’s “athletics of the 
embryo”217 begins with the mother’s avoidance of extremes of either pleasure or 
pain218; “An expectant mother should think it important to keep calm and 
cheerful and sweet-tempered throughout her pregnancy.”219 
 The child should be given predictable, rhythmic "perpetual" motion – the 
Corybantic cure –  and harmonious sound220 to calm its emotions. The mother 
calms the child’s fear (which results from "some inadequacy in the 
personality”)221 by rocking it “constantly in her arms, not silently but humming 
a kind of tune. The cure consists of movement, to the rhythms of dance and song; 
the mother makes her child ‘pipe down’ just as surely as the music of the pipes 
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bewitches the frenzied Bacchic reveler."222 The condition of the frenzied reveler 
and the child can be treated “by vigorous movement. [T]his external motion, by 
canceling out the internal agitation that gives rise to fear and frenzy, induces a 
feeling of calm and peace in the soul, in spite of the painful thumping of the 
heart experienced by each patient.”223 Thus, “exercising very young children by 
keeping them in motion contributes a great deal towards the perfection of one 
aspect of the soul’s virtue.”224 
 The child's environment should be relatively predictable, and adjusted if 
the child is easily upset; shocks are to be avoided. Cries and moans are the 
“child’s way of signaling his likes and dislikes,” and must be taken seriously, 
“because this stage lasts at least three years… quite a large part of one’s life to 
spend badly (or well);” the “moaning and grumbling” child should be sheltered 
from “distress and fright and any kind of pain at all” so as to be “educated into 
a more cheerful and genial disposition.” But this does not mean the child will 
be spoiled; the object of this strategy is predictability, not pleasure. He is not 
allowed to pursue pleasure unchecked. Rather, “the right way of life is neither a 
single-minded pursuit of pleasure nor an absolute avoidance of pain, but a 
genial… contentment with the state between those extremes.”225 
Music, dance, and games must be entirely canonical, pre-choreographed, 
traditional, and harmonious, so as not to excite the organism to new ideas or 
unruliness: Music226 and dancing are crucial, according to Plato's Athenian, 
because together they  amount "in a sense, to education as a whole"227 – music 
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and dance are both the teaching or recollection of rhythm, the measured flow of 
movement. The state should control both "by a set of rules and use [them] to 
cultivate moderate habits."228 Therefore, "no one shall sing a note, or perform 
any dance-movement, other than those in the canon of public songs, sacred 
music, and the general body of chorus performances of the young… If a man 
obeys, he shall go unmolested by the law; but if he disobeys, the Guardians of 
the Laws and the priests and priestesses must punish him."229 Musical melodies 
must not be improvised, have harmonious intervals, and simple and 
predictable rhythms. In this way, learning is assisted.230 In Timaeus, Socrates 
says that when the motions of sounds "conform" – slower sounds with faster – 
they produce "a single effect – a mixture of high and low. Hence the pleasure 
they bring to fools and the delight they afford – by their expression of divine 
harmony in mortal movement – to the wise."231  
Children should not be taught Bacchic dances where the dancers 
represent "drunken persons they call Nymphs and Pans and Sileni and 
Satyrs."232 Instead they are to learn "gestures that express what one is saying… 
gestures that are invariably in harmony with our words"233 – "dances performed 
by those who enjoy prosperity and seek only moderate pleasures;"234 moderate 
dances teach the temperament to be "more composed" and, therefore, the 
movement "more deliberate," whereas unrestrained dances teach violently 
                                               
228 Ibid., 673e. 
229 Ibid., 800a. 
230 “[T]he lyre should not be used to play an elaborate independent melody: that is, its strings 
must produce no notes except those of the composer of the melody being played; small 
intervals should not be combined with large, nor quick temp with slow, nor low notes with 
high. Similarly, the rhythms must not be tricked out with all sorts of frills and adornments… 
conflict and confusion makes learning difficult…” (Laws, 812d, e). 
231 Timaeus, 80b. Italics mine. 
232 Laws VII, 815c. 
233 Laws, 816a. 
234 Ibid., 816b. 
 62 
changing and wild movement. 235 Because young people are already 
distractible,236 and novel things excite immoderate desires, the Athenian insists 
that "we must do everything we possibly can to distract" them from 
presenting/performing "new subjects, either in dance or song" and from those 
"pleasure-mongers" who try to seduce them into it.237 When dance is instead the 
systematically training rhythm in the body, it is called "gymnastics."238 
Even games should be standardized, traditional, and unimprovised:  
“I maintain that no one in any state has really grasped that children’s games 
affect legislation so crucially as to determine whether the laws that are passed 
will survive or not;”239 introducing new elements into games "inevitably" 
changes children profoundly, prompting them to “demand a different kind of 
life" – including "new institutions" that damage the polis – "but not a single 
legislator takes fright at the prospect.”240 "Change… except in something evil, is 
extremely dangerous. This is true of seasons and winds, the regimen of the 
body and the character of the soul…" (Laws, 797d-e). 
This conditioning of habit in childhood is merely the beginning of 
establishing a moderate, orderly subjectivity. Once childhood education is over, 
men must take charge of their own education. This also included their sexual 
activity, as Michel Foucault demonstrates, in an analysis that underscores 
Plato's concerns with the cultivation of dispositions, and treats Plato's 
metaphysical-conceptual oppositions as just one part of this larger, more 
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consequential project – rather than, as Derrida does, the "major decision" 
through which philosophy institutes and maintains its authority, or, as Dodds 
does, constituting intractable and delegitimizing problems for Plato's system. 
As opposed to Dodds' assumption that Plato could not systematize his 
valorization of philosophy with his observations on eros, Plato, Foucault 
indicates, saw the desires leading to aphrodesia (pleasurable acts) as “among the 
most natural and necessary,”241 but in need of control. Lust was not the mere 
experience of pleasure, but rather of being “driven to distraction” by 
“‘pleasures and pains in excess.’”242 In classical Greek thought, “sexual activity 
was associated with a force, an energeia… that was potentially excessive by 
nature, and the moral question was how to confront this force, how to control it 
and regulate its economy in a suitable way.”243 The education of the guardians, 
in the Republic, aims at moderation (sophrosyne) – mastery of the pleasures of 
drink, sex, and food. Moderation rather than mere health was what the 
judicious man aimed at. Physical regimen was not to be cultivated for its own 
sake, but rather for his soul’s consonance.244 To become moderate, the Athenian 
says, one must assume an agonistic relation, exert effort (through “‘speech, 
deed and art [logos, ergon, techne] in games and serious pursuits’”245) aimed at 
the domination of oneself by oneself (enkrateia). The tyrannical man was one 
“’in whose soul dwells the tyrant Eros who directs everything,’”246 whereas the 
self-controlled man can abstain from sexual relations with boys and women 
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alike.247 Similarly, the moral problematization of relations with boys was 
preoccupied with the question of moderation248 – whether one could transform 
“ephemeral love into a mutual, egalitarian, and lasting friendship,”249 which 
carries both lovers towards truth. 
Foucault indicates that the care of the self (epimeleia heautou) – i.e., proper 
self-government – was prerequisite to caring for or governing others. And this 
self-government required exercise/practice (askesis)250 – an “aesthetics of the 
self.” Self-government had to be contained in the free man’s thought, 
deliberation and prudence. The free man’s doctor did not merely prescribe 
without explanation; he instructed and persuaded his patient, providing him 
with nothing less than a “rational framework for the whole of his existence.”251 
Not all in the state can be equally self-controlled; sophrosyne would characterize 
“’but few people who are the best by nature and the best educated’”252 whose 
desires are “’simple and measured and directed by reasoning with intelligence 
and right belief.’"253 In the moderate state/city, these few who ruled themselves 
would also have to rule the passions of the unprincipled children, women, 
slaves, and inferior majority. The moderation that is achieved through self-
government involves a harmonization. While Plato clearly did not aim at the 
annihilation of eros, the body, writing, the demos, neither did he prescribe a 
simple balancing of forces. His harmonization involves the agonistic 
subordination of what he designates as eros, body, writing, demos, to what he 
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claims to be reason, soul, speech, philosopher. The desires, like the lowborn, 
must be kept in check to avoid their agitation and rebellion.254 The craftsman, 
for example, since the best part of his soul “’is naturally weak and cannot rule 
the animals within but pampers them and can learn nothing but ways to flatter 
them… he must be enslaved to the best man, who has a divine ruler within 
himself.’”255 “Individual virtue," writes Foucault, "needed to be structured like a 
city.”256 
 
In fact, however, Plato indicates that it is the individual himself – his 
body – that is structured like a city. Virtue – the agonistic relationship of the 
individual with himself – was a physiological relationship and condition. The 
immortal soul is located in the head, which rides upon the body, but in the 
body there is "another kind of soul" – mortal, containing "those dreadful but 
necessary disturbances: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most powerful lure; then 
pains, that make us run away from what is good;” boldness and fear, "foolish 
counselors both;” anger, "hard to assuage;” and expectation, "easily led 
astray,"257 which are "fused with unreasoning sense-perception and all-
venturing lust, and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of 
soul."258 The divine soul is therefore given a different home from this mortal 
soul, because of the latter's desires.  The mortal soul is further subdivided: the 
ambitious, manly, spirited part sits in the heart (the "guardhouse"), “so that it 
might listen to reason and together with it restrain by force the part consisting 
of appetites, should the latter at any time refuse outright to obey the dictates of 
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reason coming down from the citadel;"259 in that case, spirit will "boil over" and 
"every bodily part that is sensitive may be keenly sensitized, through all the 
narrow vessels," so it can hear and follow reason's "exhortations or threats."260 
This physiological relation between the immortal and mortal soul, which 
Dodds' account neglects, would allow the immortal soul – "the best part among 
them all" – to "be left in charge.”261 If the mortal soul's courageous part reacts 
excessively (pounding of heart with fearful expectation or arousal of spirit), the 
lungs can also calm it; soft and without blood, porous, by breath they can drink 
and cool the heart's fire, “bringing it respite and relaxation in the heat.”262  
The appetitive soul is located above the pubis, where it is "tied… down 
like a beast," a wild but necessary one, "as far as possible" from the immortal 
soul/reason –  in the head. The appetitive soul (with which the liver is 
associated),263 is "enticed by images and phantoms night and day," and has no 
innate regard for reason's "deliverances."264 When the body, especially this 
appetitive part, is poorly cared for in the present or in the past, because of poor 
education, it affects the soul;265 it can cause the excessive pursuit of pleasure or 
extreme avoidance of pain; in this condition, the body's "acid and briny 
phlegms… bitter and bilious humors wander up and down" with no vent, 
instead mixing their vapor with and confounding the soul.266 Excesses of the 
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body thus infect all three regions of the soul,267 and in each region creates a 
variety of “bad temper and melancholy... recklessness and cowardice... 
forgetfulness and stupidity.”268 
 
Given the soul's location and subdivision within the body, its 
dependence for its proper operation on the condition of the body, it should not 
be surprising that Plato recommends caring for the body as part of caring for 
the soul, and vice versa: a proper balance of exercise of the body (as home of the 
immortal soul) and exercise of the soul (in the head, connected with the mortal 
soul through neck) – a moderation of each to achieve the right proportion; "In 
determining health and disease or virtue and vice no proportion or lack of it is 
more important than that between soul and body."269 Diseases of the body affect 
the soul,270 but the soul also affects the body; this mutual dependence means 
that one should deal moderately with each. A "vigorous and excellent soul" 
attached to "a too frail and puny frame" is out of proportion: 
When within... that combination of soul and body which we call a living 
thing... there is a soul more powerful than the body and this soul gets 
excited, it churns out the whole being and fills it from inside with diseases, 
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and when it concentrates on one or another course of study or inquiry, it 
wears the body out....271 
The soul engaged in "disputes and contentions" when teaching or debating 
"fire[s] the body up and rock[s] it back and forth," causing discharges that 
prompt medical misdiagnosis; conversely, a large body attached to a "puny and 
feeble mind" makes the soul's functions forgetful, stupid, dull, and ignorant. 
Measured exercise of each is necessary for the balance of each by the other; the 
mathematician and intellectuals generally should do gymnastics, and the 
athlete should do "exercises of the soul" – "the arts and… every pursuit of 
wisdom."272 
 This is especially important, as Foucault has noted, for the "free man" in 
the leading classes, where too much physical training creates "savagery and 
toughness," while too much music and poetry creates "softness and 
overcultivation."273 This self-cultivation requires constant vigilance – "a life 
devoted to the cultivation of every physical perfection and every moral virtue 
(the only life worth the name)."274 One must always "take the proper food and 
exercise" and be engaged in "mental and moral training;” "To follow this 
regimen and to get the maximum benefit from it, the whole day and the whole 
night is scarcely time enough;"275 "[E]very gentleman must have a timetable 
prescribing what he is to do every minute of his life, which he should follow at 
all times from the dawn of the day until the sun comes up at the dawn of the 
next."276 This constant self-surveillance, then, is a persistent refusal to rest, a 
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continual and measured agitation of the entire body (and soul), which brings 
"order and regularity" to the individual's "disturbances and elemental parts."277 
 
 The leading classes' self-cultivation is nevertheless not an open 
experiment or exercise in spontaneity, Foucault's interpretation 
notwithstanding.278 The guardians' constant vigilance in all things are intended 
to establish a particular, moderate (measured) disposition, one that could 
continue restraining itself, limiting its diet, sexual activity, and thought to the 
proper, conventional activities and arts (even if Plato often justifies these 
guardians' authority by opposing their rational soul's autonomy279 from merely 
cultivated/persuaded morality to the demos' merely cultivated/persuaded 
morality – their mere "habit" of obedience, which relies ultimately on the 
guardian's good laws).280 Thus, the legislator's instructions apply both to 
guardians and the people, the former expected to regulate themselves 
according to existing law and tradition, creating their own habits, but also to 
regulate others, establishing habitual obedience. 
In the privacy of family life, you see, a great many trivial activities never get 
publicity, and under the stimulus of feelings of pleasure or pain or desire 
they can all too easily fly in the face of the lawgiver’s recommendations and 
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produce citizens whose characters are varied and conflicting, which is a 
social evil. Now although these activities are so trivial and so common that 
one cannot decently arrange to punish them by law, they do tend to 
undermine the written statutes, because men get into the habit of repeatedly 
breaking rules in small matters.281 
This technique of continual and measured agitation produces an ordered and 
regular subject, one who will observe – whether he understands the reality and 
reason behind it or not – the rhythm and moderation of tradition, as established 
in the laws and everyday practices. 
 
What will establish acceptance of, or acquiescence to, Platonic 
conceptuality and authority, then, even according to Plato, is an extensive 
psycho-physiological project of conditioning the subject – the strict confinement 
of everyday activity to produce moderation and obedience, a subjectivity that 
habitually "harmonizes" one's gestures/actions with the laws of the legislator. 
To be sure, in the case of the philosopher this includes formal training in 
dialectical reasoning, in which the subject, as Derrida indicates, will be 
introduced to all the metaphors that are supposed to establish the superiority of 
the soul/speech/philosopher and the inferiority of the body/writing/demos. 
But this dialectical training, though it does reinforce a subjectivity that is 
habituated to harmonization is nevertheless only a part of a much broader 
cultivation project in which the subject learns from the start to hate what he 
ought to and love what he ought to. Plato maintains both: a) that knowing good 
laws and practices is a rational rediscovery, thus legitimizing the philosopher's 
authority to prescribe and survey the observance of good laws and practices to 
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achieve good habits – in himself and in the people; and b) that the foundation of 
knowing is established in the first place through the obedience of good laws and 
practices. The ultimate measure of the citizen is, then, his observance of good 
laws and practices – i.e., his measured and moderate observance of tradition in 
his relations with himself and others.282 
The psycho-physiological project in Plato that is much broader than (but 
includes) the system of philosophical oppositions that Dodds and Derrida 
examine and deconstruct. Derrida is right that Plato resorts to metaphor to 
establish the superiority of speech and all its allied terms. Moreover, it is true 
that the whole project of subjectivation relies on signification. But the process 
by which signification achieves subjectivation needs also to be understood as a 
physiological process, of the effect of specific practices – in the metaphors of 
philosophical discourse, but also in childrearing, music, movement, and the 
general measured observation of tradition in all things, big and small. Insofar as 
Derrida's analysis remains tied to his own metaphor-ization – as "play" and 
"writing" – of real humans' material practices, he reinforces existing Platonic 
tendencies in our "philosophical" thought. Like Plato, Derrida, for the appeal of 
his argument, relies on the "instinctive" or conditioned, habitual, affective 
evaluation and identification of the good and the bad, of what one ought to 
love, and hate – in Derrida's case, the love of "democracy," the hate of 
"authoritarianism," and the evaluation of other terms by their association or 
dissociation with these in our own acculturation. 
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If Derrida is right that Plato (or Platonism) has set the terms of a western 
metaphysical consciousness that must violently subject the "bad," the "demos," 
the "body," "sophistry" and so on to the rule of the "good," the "philosopher," 
the "soul," "philosophy," and if this subjection is not legitimate but rather 
legitimized, as Foucault argues (and even Plato admits), through an 
acculturation of the subject, by means of pleasure and pain attached to "the 
good" and "the bad," what one ought to love and hate, then – if we want to 
change this consciousness – we must attend in our time to the 
psychophysiological project/techniques that condition us. Techniques that 
condition us to habitually maintain traditional arrangements of power, in part 
by directing our attention to mere metaphors and away from the everyday 
practices that establish and sustain forms of authoritarianism in our day, in our 
own subjectivation – the moments in which perception, judgment, and behavior 
occurs and is reinforced or transformed in our daily techniques.
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4. Kant’s Dispositional Techniques: Chains in the Limbs 
Affect produces a momentary loss of freedom 
and self-control.  Passion surrenders both, 
and finds pleasure and satisfaction in a 
servile disposition.  But because reason does 
not desist from its summons to inner 
freedom, the unfortunate victim is suffering 
under the chains from which he cannot free 
himself, because they have already grown 
into his limbs, so to speak.283 
 
Kant proclaimed the purpose of his critical philosophy in “What is 
Enlightenment?” as the development of a system of human freedom, in theory 
and in practice. The key to the realization of this freedom was reason’s 
autonomous action. Indeed, rationality is only valuable because it is our means 
of achieving freedom. Though his opus is far from consistent, Kant devotes a 
great deal of energy to establishing the purity of reason’s “legislative” control 
over the passions of the body. Moreover, Kant establishes techniques (without 
calling them that) that are supposed to produce reason’s autonomy – the 
autonomy necessary for creating a universally legitimate morality, which 
would realize the freedom of all humans in society. 
 Much of mainstream democratic theory is consciously indebted to Kant, 
employing Kantian formulations of, and means for obtaining, justice. This is 
especially evident in Kant’s most famous and influential recent heirs – John 
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Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Though Kant, Rawls and Habermas rely upon 
and employ Kantian techniques to encourage acceptance of a Kantian 
conception of justice, these techniques succeed in large part by disguising 
themselves – as accomplishments issuing from practical reason itself – in its 
respective formulations: pure practical reason, reasonableness, and 
communicative rationality. 
But Kant’s assertion of reason’s autonomy from bodily passion and affect 
is untenable, even in terms of Kant's own theory. Kant's techniques, and their 
adaptations in Rawls and Habermas, accomplish not Kantian rational 
autonomy and universal human freedom but what in Kantian terms is a 
disposition of "passions“ to the "uncritical" acceptance of a Kantian version of 
justice. In the effort to establish a subject free from the “irrationality“ of 
“passion,” Kant prescribes techniques that rely upon and cultivate this very 
“passion… into his limbs,” as his habitual and automatic allegiance to an 
allegedly universal but actually particular traditional morality. If these 
techniques continue to be employed in our institutions and relations of political 
power to achieve our acquiescence, then it is incumbent on us to recognize 
them and their means of operation. 
This chapter therefore proceeds by analyzing Kant’s, and the next 
chapter Rawls’s and Habermas’s assumptions about reason, calling attention to 
the unavowed techniques – in the form of both sedimented, acculturated habits 
and their own reformative exercises – each relies on and prescribes for 
obtaining a universally legitimated moral disposition. I then turn to examine 
the consequences of their techniques. First, Kant. 
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Enlightenment, says Kant, is what differentiates and frees human beings 
from mere animal nature. This freedom has its source in reason. Kant attempts 
to establish the limits and freedom of man’s reason, what kind of access it has to 
truth and what legitimate moral principles it can establish to govern our action. 
Reason’s freedom and moral law are opposed to natural inclinations and 
sensation – the phenomemal world, which is the source of our self-deception, 
error, and leads us to immorality and unfreedom/self-imposed immaturity. 
Kant sets out to establish reason’s autonomy theoretically – its absolute 
separability from the heteronomy of nature – as a basis for demonstrating the 
validity of the subjection of all maxims to the categorical imperative, which is 
for Kant the only valid method of determining universally legitimate forms of 
justice/morality. 
 
Sensibility, Understanding, Reason 
 According to Kant, the human mind is composed of sensibility, the 
understanding, and reason. Our minds do not know objects-in-themselves, but 
rather representations of them. Sense/sensibility imposes its own a priori form 
(specifically, space and time) on the matter of experience. Things-in-themselves 
are not, therefore, given to us in themselves but rather as representations, as 
“sensation“ – i.e., syntheses/intuitions of things-in-themselves.284 By applying 
its own a priori categories/concepts, the understanding further synthesizes the 
data of sense intuition, unifying the different sensations into objects of 
knowledge. These two syntheses of things-in-themselves into sensations and 
objects of knowledge take place automatically; the object about which we reflect 
                                               
284 “The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the 
object, is sensation” (Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: St. Martin’s, 1965), 65). 
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is already given and thought in a particular form through its prior subjection to 
the structure of the sensibility and the understanding. And there can be no 
object of thought without unifying sensibility and the understanding. “Without 
sensibility no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no 
object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions 
without concepts are blind…. These two powers or faculties cannot exchange 
their functions. The understanding is incapable of intuiting, and the senses are 
incapable of thinking. It is only from the united co-operation of the two that 
knowledge can arise.”285 
Kant defines pure reason in its theoretical application as the faculty of 
syllogistic reasoning/deduction. Its logical maxim is to unify more and more 
knowledge, moving always towards the unconditioned. Accepting the concepts 
and judgments of the understanding, theoretical reason seeks to unify them 
under the aegis of a higher principle. It thus unifies a wider and wider range of 
judgments under other judgments that are themselves conditioned and can be 
confirmed by experience.286 
But theoretical reason does not stop with conditions that can be 
confirmed by the understanding and sensation – i.e., experience. Theoretical 
reason seeks an unconditioned – a noumena (thing-in-itself). It seeks a 
transcendental Idea, which cannot be confirmed by experience. At the same 
time, the transcendental Idea cannot be disconfirmed by experience. Noumena 
remain an “unknowable something”287 – nonparticular, nonphenomenal. Pure 
reason in its theoretical application cannot say that what it concludes is 
                                               
285 Ibid., 93. 
286 “[T]he understanding is an object for reason, as sensibility is for the understanding. To 
produce a systematic unity in all possible empirical operations of the understanding is the 
business of reason, just as the understanding unites the manifold of phenomena by means of 
concepts and brings them under empirical laws” (Ibid., B 672). 
287 Ibid., B 312. 
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unconditioned actually exists. Noumena are thus a possibility. We can neither 
rule them out nor conclude that they exist. 
 
In thus seeking the unconditioned, pure reason concludes that in order 
for the representation to exist as an object, it must exist as an object for me, and 
therefore must be accompanied by a unified consciousness, an I think.288 This 
unified consciousness is a permanent, a priori condition of all 
experience/objects of knowledge; it is therefore a transcendental unity of 
consciousness/ego (as opposed to a merely empirical ego, which is as disunited 
and manifold as the representations it accompanies). Thus, theoretical reason 
infers a transcendental ego, an unconditioned thinking self/subject.  
Pure reason also works back from all particular causes, inferring behind 
them an unconditioned/uncaused (noumenal) cause responsible for the 
conditioned phenomena of the world. It infers spontaneous causality, or 
freedom. And like the transcendental ego, while we cannot prove that the free 
will of the transcendental ego exists, neither can we prove its impossibility, 
since it is not phenomenal. The laws of nature apply only to phenomenal 
appearances; reason is not bound by the laws of nature,289 and therefore as 
rational beings, that is, as transcendental egos/subjects, we are free. But reason 
can only express its freedom by providing general maxims/laws that do not 
                                               
288 “The I think must be capable of accompanying all my representations. For otherwise, 
something could be represented in me which could not be thought at all. And this is equivalent 
to saying that the representation would be impossible or at least would be nothing to me…. 
Therefore every manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject 
in which this manifold is found” (Ibid., B 132). 
289 “Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the form of time, nor 
consequently to the conditions of succession in time. The causality of reason in its intelligible 
character does not, in producing an effect, arise or begin to be at a certain time. For in that case it 
would itself be subject to the natural law of appearances, in accordance with which causal series 
are determined in time; and its causality would then be nature, not freedom.” Immanuel Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965) B (2nd ed.), 551-
2. 
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depend on natural causality – the particularity of experience in the phenomenal 
world of appearances. 
Kant thus establishes the possibility of the freedom of the transcendental 
rational ego/will, and this is the basis of reason in its practical application. 
Practical reason, or the rational will, is the source of moral principles/laws that 
are not subject to the heteronomous, empirical/phenomenal will which is 
under the influence of nature;290 it is the source of an “ought” to our action, 
what we should do (as opposed to gaining knowledge of what is). “[T]he ground 
of obligation here is to be sought not in the nature of the human being or the 
circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori solely in concepts 
of pure reason.”291 Kant’s pure ethics “borrows not the least bit from knowledge about 
him (anthropology), but it gives him as a rational being [transcendental ego] laws a priori.”292 
The study of the subjective conditions for realizing moral principles is called 
moral/practical anthropology – empirical truths about natural human 
inclinations based on experience. Kant’s moral principles, on the other hand, 
are provided by pure practical reason. They are in fact capable of providing an 
ought precisely because they fall outside of the phenomenal world, outside of 
the anthropology of what is. The metaphysics of morals, the ought, is meant to 
be applied to anthropology, what is. As Kant writes in "Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Intent:” 
                                               
290 “Moral philosophy… cannot commence with the ends man may design, and from them 
determine… the maxims he has to take; for in this latter event the grounds of his maxims would 
be experimental, which we know beget no obligation, the idea Duty and its categorical 
imperative taking their rise in pure reason only. Nor could we even talk of duty, were the will’s 
inward principles based on tentative and experimental ends, these being all selfish and 
egotistical” (Immanuel Kant, “Book IV.: The Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Virtue” 
in The Metaphysics of Ethics, tr. J.W. Semple, ed. Rev. Henry Calderwood (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1886) (3rd edition), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1443/56222). 
291 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Allen Wood (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 5. 
292 Ibid. 
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Man is an animal that . . . has need of a master. For he certainly abuses his 
freedom in relation to his equals, and although as a rational creature he 
desires a law that establishes boundaries for everyone's freedom, his selfish 
animal propensities induce him to except himself from them wherever he 
can. He thus requires a master who will break his self-will and force him to 
obey a universally valid will, whereby everyone can be free. Where is he to 
find this master? ... The supreme guarantor should be just in himself and 
still be a man.293  
Reason discovers the unifying/universal maxim/principle (the a priori element) 
that lies behind the moral choices of a rational being294 – “the supreme principle 
of morality,”295 that is, “the source of the practical principles lying a priori in our 
reason.”296 Kant concludes in the Grounding that only a will/rational freedom 
that acts for the sake of duty, out of reverence for this supreme/universal 
principle (as opposed to merely following his natural inclinations/desires, 
which are not motivated by law even if they happen to lead one to do good) is 
good.297 This principle can only be supreme if it admits of no particular 
exceptions, if it can act universally – in other words, if it is categorical. “Since I 
                                               
293 Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," in Perpetual Peace 
and Other Essays, tr. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 33-4. 
294 The moral philosopher’s task, then, is to expose the a priori and universal element in moral 
law (by inferring from common moral law), that element which can be said to characterize the 
morality of all noumenal/rational beings, extracting it from the phenomenal and therefore 
conditioned, experiential element, so that it can act as a regulative/guiding principle for all 
rational beings in all situations. “[T]he necessity of my actions from pure respect for the 
practical law is what constitutes duty, before which every other motive must give way because 
it is the condition of a will that is good in itself, whose worth surpasses everything. Thus in the 
moral cognition of common human reason we have attained to its principle” (Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Allen Wood (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002), 19. 
295 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Allen Wood (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 8. 
296 Ibid., 5. 
297 “There is nothing it is possible to think of anywhere in the world, or indeed anything at all 
outside it, that can be held to be good without limitation, excepting only a good will” (Ibid., 9). 
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have robbed the will of every impulse that could have arisen from the 
obedience to any law, there is nothing left over except the universal lawfulness 
of the action in general which alone is to serve the will as its principle, i.e., I 
ought never to conduct myself except so that I could also will that my maxim 
become a universal law.”298 Because our subjective wills as 
empirical/phenomenal subjects can be inconsistent with universality, which is 
the objective principle of morality, universality presents itself as an 
imperative/obligation, by which we may judge our particular maxims. Since 
this principle comes from reason alone, it is valid and binding for the will of all 
rational beings. When the categorical imperative is followed it leads to Kant’s 
ideal community, his “kingdom of ends” – a “systematic combination of 
rational beings through communal objective laws,”299 a kingdom that “would 
actually be brought about through maxims, the rule of which is prescribed by 
the categorical imperatives of all rational beings, if they were universally 
followed.”300  
The categorical imperative is thus an expression of our 
freedom/autonomy as rational wills; the autonomy of the will is, for Kant, “the 
supreme principle of morality,”301 “sole principle of all moral laws and of duties 
in keeping with them.”302 The rational will must “be regarded by itself as free, 
i.e., the will of a rational being can be a will of its own only under the idea of 
freedom and must therefore with a practical aim be attributed to all rational 
beings.”303 The phenomenal sphere is thus left under the law of nature, of 
                                               
298 Ibid., 18. 
299 Ibid., 51. 
300 Ibid., 56. 
301 Ibid., 58. 
302 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 30. 
303 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Allen Wood (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 65. 
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causality. Freedom on the other hand applies only to the intelligible world, 
things in themselves. The subject is both conscious of himself as determined in 
the time conditions of the mechanical system of nature and “conscious of 
himself as a thing in itself, also views his existence also insofaras it does not stand 
under conditions of time and himself as determinable only through laws that he 
gives himself by reason.”304 The empirical, heteronomous will, on the other 
hand, is “opposed to the principle of obligation”305 and “the source of all 
ungenuine principles of morality.”306 In other words, because freedom of the 
will/practical reason’s ability to give a law to itself is precisely noumenal and 
not phenomenal, morality (acting according to a principle provided by pure 
practical reason) must be derived from the general (abstract, negative, limit) 
concept of a free rational being, and not from consideration of actual 
phenomenological, “anthropological” persons. Kant says in The Metaphysical 
Elements of the Doctrine of Virtue, “the instincts of man’s physical nature give 
birth to obstacles which hinder and impede him in the execution of his duty.”307 
Likewise all particular differences; pure reason is universal and can therefore 
provide a principle of morality that is universally valid; it is what every one, 
employing his pure reason, should arrive at. Even the critique that Kant carries 
out is therefore not the product of his own particular and situated mind – the 
phenomenological, physical person, Immanuel Kant, but rather what universal 
pure reason in everyone should produce. “Reason” itself dictates a categorical 
imperative for moral action, an imperative that identifies the operation of pure 
                                               
304 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 82. 
305 Ibid., 30. 
306 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Allen Wood (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 58. 
307 Immanuel Kant, “Book IV: The Metaphysical Elements Of The Doctrine Of Virtue” in The 
Metaphysics of Ethics, tr. J.W. Semple, ed. Rev. Henry Calderwood (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1886) (3rd edition), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1443/56222. 
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reason as the same in everyone: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”308 
 
 The individual rational being’s abstraction from his own and others’ 
particularity thus guarantees, for Kant, that he will adopt principles and laws 
that are valid for every rational being – defined in terms of his universal 
rational quality and not in the phenomenal particularity of his own body and 
environment. The individual can legitimately assume that any maxim that he 
would will to be a universal law is valid for everyone, since that is what he as  a 
rational being would have arrived at himself. 
 
In fact, however, despite Kant’s claims that morality can only 
legitimately be founded on reason’s autonomy, he admits that reason needs 
help from outside, that it is not in fact autonomous. It has its prerequisite 
techniques. Paul Saurette, in The Kantian Imperative, discusses how in his 
lectures on education Kant treats education not as the discovery of the inherent 
rationality of beings, and therefore of a priori knowledge, as the rest of his 
critical project would lead us to expect, but rather “a process of experimentation 
in modes of cultivation and learning.”309 Man, Kant writes, is “not by nature a 
moral being. He only becomes a moral being when his reason has developed 
ideas of duty and law.”310 But this development is not a question of 
“recognition” by reason, but a process of cultivation so that these ideas become 
second nature, automatic. According to Kant, “Providence has not placed 
                                               
308 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. Allen Wood (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 37. 
309 Paul Saurette, The Kantian Imperative: Humiliation, Common Sense, Politics (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2005), 126-7. 
310 Immanuel Kant, Education, tr. Annette Churton (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 
2004), 89. 
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goodness ready formed in [children], but merely as a tendency and without the 
distinction of the moral law.”311 Since children do not automatically recognize 
the moral law, the teacher must guide the student, framing the terms of the 
dialogue – supplying both the questions and the answers, which must be 
“committed to the pupil’s memory.”312 Not only does the student not 
automatically recognize the moral law, the fact that the student does not know 
what questions to ask to discover it makes Socratic dialogue insufficient as a 
pedagogy of this law.313 Virtue, Kant admits, “cannot be taught merely by 
concepts of duty or by exhortations… but must instead be exercised and 
cultivated by efforts to combat the inner enemy [of inclinations].”314 
 
Cultivating the Disposition 
But Kantian cultivation combats the inner enemy of inclinations not by 
means of autonomous reason but through other inclinations, as Saurette points 
out. Cultivation, according to Kant, is only permanently effective – only creates 
a second nature – when it uses affective forces in particular, the “child’s desire 
to be loved and respected.”315 Here, humiliation is a particularly effective 
technique for cultivating the child’s habit/memory: “for instance, when we 
humiliate the child by treating him coldly and distantly.”316 For Kant, there is 
                                               
311 Ibid., 11. 
312 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 222. 
313 In addition to the evidence of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Lectures on Education, we must 
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(“Book IV: The Metaphysical Elements Of The Doctrine Of Virtue” in The Metaphysics of Ethics, 
tr. J.W. Semple, ed. Rev. Henry Calderwood (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886) (3rd edition), 
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not in children a “pre-existing recognition of the moral law that necessarily 
humiliates them and inspires the moral will.”317 Only by taking advantage of 
the child’s affective forces, that is, by taking advantage of the parent’s and then 
teacher’s phenomenal/empirical position of authority over the child, can one 
transform the child’s undisciplined and wanton desire into the stable 
recognition of the moral law required for humiliation to function automatically 
in adult society. 
Besides coldness and distance from parent to child, Saurette indicates how 
for Kant the practice of Christian prayer is particularly useful in cultivating 
humiliation. In general the practices of Christianity are related “to dispositions 
conformable to” the moral concepts of practical reason.318 Prayer as a means of 
informing the omniscient of one’s inner condition is of course useless; God 
knows everything already. Instead, what is important is 
the heartfelt wish which is the spirit of prayer… [that is, in] the 
contemplation of the profound wisdom of the divine creation in the smallest 
things, and of its majesty in the great… this contemplation is a power which 
cannot only transport the mind into that sinking mood, called adoration, 
annihilating men, as it were, in their own eyes; it is also, in respect of its own 
moral determination, so soul-elevating a power….319 
In prayer, as in education, children should be taught to memorize set forms – in 
specific language that will aid the imagination in “quickening” the disposition 
to humility: 
[I]t is therefore the more necessary to inculcate set forms of prayer in 
children (who still stand in need of the letter) even in their earliest years, so 
                                               
317 Paul Saurette, The Kantian Imperative: Humiliation, Common Sense, Politics (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2005), 128. 
318 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (New York: Harper, 1960), 182. 
319 Ibid., 183. 
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that the language (even the language spoken inwardly, yea, even the 
attempts to attune the mind to the comprehension of God, which is to be 
brought nearer to intuition) may possess here no value in itself, but may be 
used to quicken the disposition to a course of life well-pleasing to God, those 
words being but an aid to the imagination.320 
This quickening of the mind occurs by means of affects (in this case, pleasure) 
consonant with the sensations produced in the contemplation of an object 
connected to a rational/moral idea.321 Kant alleges that the object, here God, of 
contemplation affects the imagination to bring up a wealth of thoughts 
associated with the rational idea of God. But Kant also makes clear that these 
thoughts are first circumscribed by and associated with each other by the 
"cultivation” (i.e., mechanical memorization) of specific language in memory – 
even though memory is, being heteronomous and not purely rational, one of 
"the inferior mental faculties… the inferior powers of the understanding."322 As 
opposed to the wealth of thoughts that Kant says are supposed to be 
"quickened“ in the imagination by the moral/rational idea, the "very lively” 
imagination of children is to be "curbed and brought under rule, ” "confine 
itself to certain figures," and precisely not be "expanded or made more 
intense."323  
                                               
320 Ibid.,182. Italics mine. 
321 The non-beautiful (i.e., immoral) object, on the other hand, "leaves nothing behind as an 
[I]dea and makes the spirit dull, the object gradually disgusting, and the mind dissatisfied with 
itself and moody because it is conscious that in reason’s judgment its attunement is 
contrapurposive” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, tr. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett, 1987), 196). 
322 Immanuel Kant, Education, tr. Annette Churton (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 
2004), 78. Memory, which preserves the mental impressions that first guide the understanding, 
has best retention when things are learned mechanically, and so language should be learned 
mechanically (Ibid., 72). 
323 Ibid., 78. 
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Thus, the moral/rational disposition is accomplished not by the 
autonomous action of reason, but by the fear-motivated mechanical 
memorization of set forms with specific language involved in prayer and 
education in general – specific linguistic signs that evoke a passion that 
humiliates men (children and adults) to the point of “annihilation” as 
particular, phenomenal men, while "elevating" them as noumenal souls, as 
rational beings. 
 Kant argues that once these techniques have taken hold in the subject, 
once the subject has been attracted "by means of its own advantage or to alarm 
it by fear of harm,“ then the soul may be motivated by the "pure moral motive“ 
– "the motive which – not only because it is the only one that can ground a 
character (a consistent practical cast of mind in accordance with unchangeable 
maxims) but also because it teaches the human being to feel his own dignity – 
gives his mind power, unexpected even by himself, to tear himself away from 
all sensible attachments so far as they want to rule over him.“324 Saurette makes 
the plausible argument that what Kant here, in the Critique of Practical Reason, 
defines as a pure moral incentive so as to make it fit within the Kantian moral 
system is in fact merely a "semi-conceptualization“ of the cultivated/coerced 
feeling of humiliation – now conditioned to habitually/automatically recognize 
the moral law, and in addition moral exemplars, as a reference for evaluating 
our own actions, and ultimately the source of a feeling of "respect for 
ourselves“ as rational beings. Thus when Kant writes that in the young pupil’s 
catechism, "it is of the most vital moment that the behests of duty be not based 
on any advantages or inconveniences springing from their observance… no, not 
                                               
324 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 126.  
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even on the good results accruing to others; but that abstraction being made 
from all such, those behests be immediately grounded on the pure moral law 
itself,” he immediately adds that "It is the shame… that is at all points to be 
insisted on.”325 (Perhaps, for example, in the manner in which that professor I 
discuss in the "Introduction" above seemed to insist upon it for those 300 or so 
students, some of whom I was teaching assistant to.) 
 
Thus, humiliation (on the basis of fear) does not cease to play a role in 
the cultivation of morality with the end of childhood. The uncultivated mind in 
general needs “some preparatory guidance… to attract it by means of its own 
advantage or to alarm it by fear of harm.”326 Even once the feeling of “respect 
for ourselves” – the moral feeling – has become second nature (by conditioning 
through Kantian techniques of humiliation), it continues to operate on the basis 
of fear: “when a human being dreads nothing more than to find, on self-
examination, that he is worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every 
good moral disposition can be grafted onto it because this is the best, and 
indeed the sole, guard to prevent ignoble and corrupting impulses from 
breaking into the mind.”327 According to Saurette, in Kantian cultivation, “since 
respect for ourselves relies on a disciplined and cultivated fear of humiliation, it 
is intimately connected with the force of humiliation not only for its conditions 
of possibility, but for its motivational force every time it is called forth.”328 Fear as 
humiliation is thus ubiquitous – in its direct, coercive application from outside, 
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as a cultivated second nature, or as signs applied to this second nature to elicit 
its habitual "moral" passions – in the creation and maintenance of Kantian 
morality. Though Kant differentiates between them, his catechetic didactics 
(which "interrogat[es] out of the pupil notions of duty… from his memory, 
when he has been previously taught how to answer“) – established ultimately 
in defenseless fear (turned into mechanical memory) – appears to supply the 
notions of duty that are supposed in Kant’s dialogic/Socratic didactics to be 
merely “developed“ from their already “latent“ presence in the pupil’s mind. 
 
The Imperative 
Kantian techniques of humiliation/respect (catalogued by Saurette 
above), then, achieve the cultivation of what in Kant’s schema are certain 
sensations, impulses, inclinations, redefined by Kant as noumenally/purely 
morally motivated (on the one hand) and the repression of other inclinations, 
defined by Kant as the particular and phenomenal – "ignoble and corrupting 
impulses." Beginning from childhood, Kant's techniques are meant to cultivate 
a will to obey, a disposition of docility. In this sense, Kantian techniques are 
fundamentally conservative (and amenable to authoritarian systems of power) 
– they, as Kant says of prayerful adoration, work by “annihilating men,” or, 
more precisely, annihilating those parts of men that would question existing 
authority and therefore power relations. The lesson of humiliation is that if one 
wants to exercise power, it is only legitimate to exercise it as would a 
noumenal/rational being – repressing those particular phenomenal 
desires/concerns that might undermine existing relations of power. Thus, at the 
very moment power relations are to be determined, the subject is humiliated, or 
humiliates himself, adopting an attitude that automatically (i.e., autonomically, 
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through fear) delegitimates consideration/expression of particular desires that 
might undermine existing relations of power – between parent and child, and 
in general between whatever can be made to appear as the form of universality 
and rationality (on the one hand) and whatever can be made to seem by 
juxtaposition mere particular inclination and desire (on the other).  
Man, as part of a physical system (homo phenomenon, animal rationale), is 
an animal of very little moment, and has but a common value with beasts, 
and the other products of the soil. Even that he is superior to those by force 
of his understanding, gives him only a higher external value in exchange, 
when brought to the market along with other cattle, and sold as wares. But 
man considered as a person, i.e., as a the subject of ethico-active reason, is 
exalted beyond all price… he is invested with an internal dignity… in name 
of which he extorts reverence for his person from every other finite 
Intelligent throughout the universe, and is entitled to compare himself with 
all such, and to deem himself their equal… The consciousness and feeling of 
one’s little worth, when compared with the law, is ethical humility.329 
The invocation of the categorical imperative works in the same way as 
humiliation and prayer, reinforcing the subject’s conditioning to habitual 
docility. Rather than being the action of autonomous reason, it is another 
technique of humiliation. Kant ends up founding the moral disposition 
consonant with the categorical imperative and rational subjectivity through 
what in his terminology must be defined as heteronomic technique – i.e., by 
relying on fear invested in techniques of self-humiliation as the foundation of 
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what was supposed to issue from pure practical reason.330 The "pure moral 
motivation"331 that was to issue from noumenal selfhood as the ground of 
practical rational autonomy – and Kant is emphatic on this point332 – remains 
forever elusive. And this appears to undermine the legitimacy of the Kantian 
moral-ethical project of achieving rational autonomy – i.e., the realization of 
human freedom, man’s emergence from his own self-imposed immaturity. Kant 
clearly states that when readiness to act virtuously "degenerates into habit, i.e., 
when the uniformity of custom slides into mechanical necessity, by the too 
frequent iteration of an act, such inveterate aptitude is no product of freedom, 
and is by consequence no ethical facility;"333 "were the exercise of virtue to 
become habit, the agent would thereby undergo the loss of freedom."334 Indeed, 
Kant’s reliance on heteronomic techniques that make habitual a deferential 
relationship to authority strikes an odd and contradictory figure when held up 
                                               
330 Compare Kant’s words in “Book IV: The Metaphysical Elements Of The Doctrine Of Virtue”: 
“Ethics must comprehend duty, to observe which, no one can be constrained physically by 
others… it being absurd to talk of force, when question is made of the practical autonomy of the 
agent himself” (Ibid.). 
331 “THE MORAL SENSE. This feeling is the susceptibility for pleasure or displacency, upon the 
bare consciousness of the harmony or of the discrepancy of our actions with the law. Now there 
can be no duty either to have or to acquire any such feeling; for all consciousness of obligation 
presupposes it… and everyone must, as a moral being, have such originarily within him: an 
obligement in regard to it can only ordain that this sensible effect of the law be cultivated and 
invigorated by the admiration of its unknown and inscrutable original, which can be effected by 
showing that this emotion, when separated from all admixture of pathognomic attractions, is 
then most enlivened by the naked energies of reason” (Ibid.); The “duty owed by man to 
himself of advancing his ethical perfection… consists… in the purity of his moral sentiments, 
where, freed from all admixture of sensitive excitement, the law is itself alone the spring of 
conduct…” (Ibid.). 
332 “It is, then, a duty incumbent upon mankind… to develop himself more and more from the 
animal characters stamped upon him by his brute nature… to carry the culture of his will to the 
purest grade of ethic sentiment, a state and tone of soul where the law itself is the immediate 
mobile of the will, and where duty is discharged because it is so. And this state and tone of the 
soul is an inward ethical perfection, and is called THE MORAL SENSE, because it is a feeling of 
the effect wrought by legislative reason upon man’s active power of conforming to the law” 
(Ibid.). And, further, “man is under an obligement to virtue, AS ETHIC STRENGTH; for 
although the power of mastering every opposing excitement of the sensory may, and indeed 
must, be absolutely postulated – the will’s causality being free – nevertheless this power is in its 
strength a matter of acquisition, viz., where the force of the ethical spring has been advanced by 
the contemplation of the dignity of our pure rational law…” (Ibid.). 
333 Ibid. 
334 Ibid. 
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beside his entirely negative discussion of the dogmatic and formulaic 
restrictions of man’s reason.  
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, 
long after nature has released them from alien guidance (naturaliter 
maiorennes), nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is 
so easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians… The 
guardians who have so benevolently taken taken over the supervision of 
men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the 
entire fair sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous… Thus, 
it is difficult for any individual man to work himself out of the immaturity 
that has all but become his nature.335  
Kant himself thus points to precisely the danger involved in habitual 
techniques that aim to create in the subject a permanent state of humiliation and 
shame. "Habit," he writes in The Metaphysical Elements of the Doctrine of Virtue, 
"is the establishment of a continual and permanent appetite, apart from any 
maxim, and springs from abandonment to repeated gratification, and is merely 
a mechanism of the sensory, and not any principle of cogitation; and to wean 
one’s self from it, is usually more difficult than to bring it forth."336 Further, 
Kant says that while "affect" (e.g., shock or rage) is passing, immediate, and 
indicates merely a lack of virtue, "passion" is conditioning to habitually act 
                                               
335 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in Perpetual Peace and 
Other Essays, tr. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1983), 41. 
336 “Book IV: The Metaphysical Elements Of The Doctrine Of Virtue” in The Metaphysics of Ethics, 
tr. J.W. Semple, ed. Rev. Henry Calderwood (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886) (3rd edition), 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1443/56222. 
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"according to a purpose prescribed… by… inclination,"337 and thus "properly 
evil:”338 
If affect is a delirium, then passion is an illness that abhors all medication.  
Therefore, passion is by far worse than all those transitory affects, which stir 
themselves at least to the good intention of improvement; instead passion is 
an enchantment which also rejects improvement…  Passions are cancerous 
sores for pure practical reason, and most of them are incurable because the 
sick person does not want to be cured and avoids the dominion of the 
principles by which alone a cure could be effected.339 
Passion surrenders both "freedom and self-control," and "finds pleasure and 
satisfaction in a servile disposition… the unfortunate victim is suffering under 
the chains from which he cannot free himself, because they have already grown 
into his limbs."340 
But though Kant says passions are evil and along with affect constitute 
an "illness… of mind," the techniques of humiliation that Kant recommends 
appear to aim at precisely the conditioning of feeling into the habitual passions 
that characterize the disposition of a morally lawful subject. Kantian techniques 
of humiliation work by the same route as the conditioning of the passions. 
According to Kant, in the Metaphysics of Morals, the process leading to human 
action takes the following path: The subject experiences a feeling of 
pleasure/pain. Pleasure gives rise via feeling to a "habitual desire" or 
                                               
337 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr. Victor Lyle Dowdell, ed. Hans 
H. Rudnick, (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 173. 
338 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 208. 
339 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr. Victor Lyle Dowdell, ed. Hans 
H. Rudnick, (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 172-3; 7:265-66. 
340 Ibid., 174. 
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inclination341 of desire for that pleasure (i.e., the object associated with 
pleasure). Third, the connection of the pleasure and habitual desire/inclination 
for it (on the basis of the understanding's judgment that the pleasure of the 
object as a rule brings about this desire)342 constitutes an "interest." This interest 
(habitual desire for a particular pleasure-giving object) leads to a consciousness 
of one's power to act or not act according to desire – i.e., choice. Finally, the 
subject can then exercise his human will, his free will; though "affected by 
sensuous impulse or stimulus… [he] is not determined by them… The Freedom of 
the act of volitional Choice, is its independence of being determined by sensuous 
impulses or stimuli."343 In the case of passion, this freedom is barely or perhaps 
not at all exercised; "the inclination that can hardly, or not at all, be controlled 
by reason is passion."344 Passion "hinders the use of reason to compare, at a 
particular moment of choice, a specific inclination against the sum of all 
inclinations."345 Kant maintains that passion involves reason in a sense: because 
"it always presupposes a maxim of the subject, namely to act according to a 
purpose prescribed for him by his inclination, passion is always associated with 
the purposes of reason, and one cannot attribute passions to mere animals any 
more than to purely rational beings."346 But the passionate and therefore not 
purely rational being is the mere conditioning of habit to act according to a 
desire because it achieves a certain pleasure for the empirical ego; the purely 
                                               
341 "Habitual desire… constitutes Inclination," (Immanuel Kant, “Chapter III. Introduction to the 
Metaphysic of Morals; and Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics,” in Kant’s Critique of 
Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, B.D., 
Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin, 4th revised ed. (London: Kongmans, Green and 
Co., 1889), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/360/61860). 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid., 4. 
344 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr. Victor Lyle Dowdell, ed. Hans 
H. Rudnick, (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 155. 
345 Ibid., 172. Italics mine. 
346 Ibid.,173. 
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rational being, on the other hand, chooses according to the principles of 
practical reason. 
But, though Kant insists on the absolute distinction between practical 
reason and passion, the moral disposition he says results from practical reason 
ends up coming from turning inclination into habitual passion. The fact that 
passion provides the motivation that practical reason was supposed to at least 
suggests that practical reason is not autonomous or necessarily distinguishable 
from passion. Passion possesses the stability that was supposed to characterize 
pure practical reason: "since the passions can be coupled with the calmest 
reflection, one can easily see that they must neither be rash like the emotions, 
nor stormy and transitory; instead, they must take roots gradually and even be 
able to coexist with reason."347 (Or, perhaps, even to be reason?) It would seem 
to follow, then, that principles, insofar as they are defined as the creation of 
practical reason, are also not necessarily distinguishable from maxims, which 
were supposed to be the product of mere understanding, rather than reason. 
This interpenetration of reason and passion, principle and maxim, and the 
ultimate reliance of moral dispositions on techniques that create habits in the 
subject, suggests that the Kantian system distracts from and conceals those 
techniques which are the actual ground of our conceptions and practices of 
justice, including the technical work of conditioning habits this system itself 
carries out. 
 
Kant's techniques of humiliation, including the invocation of the 
categorical imperative, create what Kant must call a "passionate," heteronomous 
subject, but a subject who is nevertheless simultaneously (again, in Kant's 
                                               
347 Ibid., 172. 
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terms) precisely Kant's "rational being." These techniques cover the whole life of 
the subject – at first in childhood by means of "the child’s desire to be loved and 
respected,”348 in general on the unformed mind "by means of its own advantage 
or to alarm it by fear of harm,”349 and, at whatever age, by means of specific 
language (for example, in prayer, but also including the language of the 
categorical imperative) associated with – i.e., on the foundation of – this 
primary conditioning in humiliation during childhood. It appears that, from a 
Kantian psychological perspective, the Kantian moral terminology exerts its 
effect by means of habitual inclinations – the understanding's gradual pairing 
of desire with the pleasure (initially of parental love and affection) associated 
with terms such as "duty," "respect," "reason," "soul," "good," and conversely of 
aversion with displeasure with terms such as "inclination," "passion," "affect," 
"body," "evil." The categorical imperative – the command/imperative to 
evaluate and choose one's practices according to preestablished moral 
principles – is just such a series of signs prompting the conditioned behavior 
(aquiescence to authority) associated (through prior conditioning) with these 
signs. The invocation of the principles prompts the habitual 
desire/inclination/passion which guides judgment and therefore choice 
regarding the behavior/practice in question. Insofar as these 
commands/imperatives successfully prompt the conditioned behavior, they 
reinforce it and therefore act as techniques in their own right (even though the 
conditioning they effect is subsequent to and dependent for its effect on prior 
conditioning). 
                                               
348 Immanuel Kant, Education, tr. Annette Churton (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 
2004), 89. 
349 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 126. 
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In other words, by making inclinations into habits, pleasure (the rewards 
that come with love and acceptance; the removal of punishing coldness and 
distance) comes to be associated with a desire for and disposition of humility – 
i.e., with what is called good, with reason, self-respect, universal, obedience. 
Whereas, aversive feelings (punishments) come to be associated with what is 
called evil, passion, self-abuse, merely particular, disobedience. The moral 
sensibility/disposition required by the categorical imperative is thus made into 
habit at a dangerous price – the price of autonomy,350 and thus also of critique – 
the very freedom that was to guard against man's self-imposed immaturity and 
self-enslavement/docility. 
The silence and coldness of Kantian rationalism, as embodied in the 
invocation of the categorical imperative, toward the "particular" concerns of 
"phenomenal" life ensures, at the very moment relations of power are being 
determined, that attention will be turned away from those 
heteronomic/phenomenal (and anthropological) techniques (and the pre-
existing relations of domination, as opposed to our alleged noumenal equality, 
prerequisite to these techniques‘ application) which in fact lay the ground for its 
acceptance. The invocation of the categorical imperative thus achieves its own 
acceptance – its domination of the procedural terms of the determination of 
morality, of the acceptable forms of power relations – by diverting attention 
from both the techniques of humiliation that are its foundation (i.e., that create 
habit in the obedient subject) as well as itself as just such a technique. Just as 
Kantian prayer requires memorization of the supremacy and legitimacy of God, 
                                               
350 That the moral principles and disposition toward them that Kant purports to be the product 
and characteristic of pure practical reason appear to have their foundation rather in the very 
passion that Kant projects as opposed to pure practical reason has deep ramifications for Kant's 
project in general… and suggests a different definition of reason than the one he exerts so much 
energy to retain. (We shall see below whether the same is not true for Rawls' and Habermas' 
iterations of the Kantian project.) 
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the categorical imperative works by memorization of one’s own 
legitimacy/recognizability as a loved and respectable being only as a rational, 
noumenal self, and thus by delegitimation and repression of one’s phenomenal, 
desiring self. In other words, the invocation of the categorical imperative is 
successful to the extent that it conceals the concealment it carries out. 
The Kantian procedure for determining power relations, then, works 
precisely upon the body, harnessing the power of fear to condition its docility, 
its automatic obedience, while at the same time holding out the fantasy of 
power in the form of self-identification with ideal noumenal rationality and 
therefore political autonomy, with absolute control of unacceptable 
“inclinations.” The practice of this identificatory fantasy is the moment of 
“annihilation“ of the particular/phenomenal self, of particular desires that 
might disrupt existing relations of power, particular desires that are identified 
discursively (through techniques of humiliation) with the “body,” “sense,” 
“passion.” Ironically, the Kantian technique relies precisely on palpable fear to 
achieve and perpetuate its own operation in the form of the invocation of the 
categorical imperative. 
The Kantian and neoKantian concealment of its own bodily technique 
does not mean that this technique does not continue to operate, but simply that 
its operation and its effects remain opaque. If we are to judge Kant’s project in 
its own terms, in other words, in terms of its ability to achieve freedom as 
reason’s self-legislation, then it seems clear that it fails to do so. In Kantian 
oppositional terms, reason, it appears, remains rather in the grip of fear. If this 
is true, then Kant’s technique (the practice of self- and other- judgment 
according to the categorical imperative) effects precisely less "critical" self-
legislation, in other words, less of Kant’s goal – human freedom. 
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 If in fact it is techniques that account for the creation of subjects‘ habits 
and their perception, that structure our sensibility and understanding, and even 
our reason (which can no longer therefore be conceived in Kantian terms),351 
then we must come to a different understanding of reason than the one Kant 
provides, one which heeds technique as an important determinant of thought, 
and therefore of our perspective on what is moral, on what arrangement of 
political power is acceptable. 
                                               
351 That is, ruling out ahead of time the reality of and objectivity about the phenomenal realm, 
on the one hand, and simultaneously assuming, on the other, the reality and freedom of an 
inaccessible noumenal realm, thereby subordinating the examination and application of 
techniques to the tyranny of a fantasy of absolute control by pure practical reason. 
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5. Rawls' "Inexplicable Inhibitions“ and Habermas' 
"Motivational Deficit" 
 
Kant‘s admonition to transcend and dominate the heteronomy of bodily 
inclinations and affects with pure and practical reason, in order to achieve 
freedom, is taken up by Rawls and Habermas in their moral/rational projects. 
An examination of each illustrates the way in which mainstream democratic 
theory, still in the hold of the Kantian paradigm, continues to conceal the 
political significance/effect of techniques that work on the body to condition 
the subject’s habits while simultaneously using these techniques to achieve a 
subject who habitually accepts and endorses their theories – theories that 
establish the justice of Kantian arrangements of power, in the name of freedom. 
 
Rawls' "Inexplicable Inhibitions“  
It is probably safe to say that John Rawls’ writing is indicative of and has 
simultaneously helped determine the mainstream in contemporary democratic 
theory. It has, at least since the publication of A Theory of Justice, “come to define 
a substantial portion of the agenda for Anglo-American political philosophy, 
and increasingly influence political philosophy in the rest of the world.”352  
Rawls’ project is self-consciously inspired by Kantian procedures for 
arriving at a conception of justice. Rawls’ writes that his conception of justice is 
“highly Kantian in nature.”353 Like Kant, Rawls believes that to be 
just/legitimate (to achieve democratic freedom and equality), the basic 
                                               
352 Samuel Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 1. 
353 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), viii-xviii. (Hereafter cited as 
TJ.) 
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structure of society354 – must express the basic moral principles (principles of 
justice) of free and equal rational persons. The “starting points” (which are 
commonly accepted by free and equal citizens) of Rawls’ constructivist 
procedure for determining the “substantive principles specifying the content of 
political right and justice” are “the basic conceptions of society and person, the 
principles of practical reason, and the public role of a political conception of 
justice.”355 These all owe their inspiration to Kant's idea of autonomous practical 
reason: "Political constructivism accepts [Kant's] view that the principles of 
practical reason originate… in our moral consciousness as informed by practical 
reason. They derive from nowhere else. Kant is the historical source of the idea 
that reason, both theoretical and practical, is self-originating and self-
authenticating."356  
And, as in Kant, the free, rational being for Rawls is governed by 
autonomous practical reason – i.e., a noumenal self, motivated by the universal 
moral law as evinced in his moral intuitions. It is the autonomy of this reason, 
which can arrive independently at principles to live by, that makes society 
stable, since it is free of "those contingencies which set men at odds and allow 
them to be guided by their prejudice."357 In Theory, "the morality of principles" is 
the proper basis of the principles of justice because of its freedom from the 
contingencies of the moralities of authority and association. In the preceding 
stage of "morality of authority," the child "is not in a position to assess the 
                                               
354 The basic structure includes the constitution, legal and trial procedures, property, laws 
governing markets and economic production and exchange, and the family (as the site of 
reproduction and education. Because the the rules and practices constituting the basic structure 
strongly affect the personality, desires, plans, and future prospects of everyone who lives in 
them and ultimately their capacities to exercise their basic rights and liberties, the basic 
structure is the “primary subject of justice” (TJ, 7/6 rev.). 
355 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 104. (Hereafter 
cited as PL.) 
356 Ibid.,100. 
357 TJ, 19. 
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validity of the precepts and injunctions addressed to him by those in authority, 
in this case his parents."358 His actions are "motivated initially by certain 
instincts and desires, and his aims are regulated (if at all) by rational self-
interest (in a suitably restricted sense)."359 His love of his parents is 
"unconscious and instinctive," based on his attachment to whatever "contributes 
to his preservation."360 He "accepts their judgment of him and he will be 
inclined to judge himself as they do when he violates their injunctions."361  
The "collection of precepts" that constitutes the morality of authority is 
superceded by the "moral standards appropriate to the individual's role in the 
various associations (e.g., family, school, occupational group, society, and 
nation) to which he belongs" and which constitute the "morality of association." 
These standards require "increasingly greater intellectual judgment and finer 
moral discriminations" (e.g., the ability to take another's point of view and 
perspective), involving attachment (and therefore guilt in relation to) other 
association members. But these standards, or ideals (of justice, fairness, trust, 
integrity, etc.), are still, like the precepts of the morality of authority, 
"impressed upon him by the approval or disapproval of those in authority, or 
by the other members of the group."362  
It is when "a person becomes attached to these highest-order principles 
[of justice, fairness and so on] themselves"363 that he displays the morality of 
principles, and is truly morally free. 
Individuals in their role as citizens364 with a full understanding of the content 
of the principles of justice may be moved to act upon them largely because 
                                               
358 Ibid., 463. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid, Fn 9. 
361 Ibid, 465. 
362 Ibid, 467-8. 
363 Ibid, 473. 
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of their bonds to particular persons and an attachment to their own society. 
Once a morality of principles is accepted, however, moral attitudes are no 
longer connected solely with the well-being and approval of particular 
individuals and groups, but are shaped by a conception of right chosen 
irrespective of these contingencies. Our moral sentiments display an 
independence from the accidental circumstances of our world.365 
The morality of principles dictates respecting each other as persons (as in Kant), 
recognizing each other as ruled by autonomous practical reason, which gives a 
universal moral law, and thus avoids the instabilities that plague mere citizens 
– individual consciences motivated by their particular attachments to other 
individuals: "We are not literally to respect the conscience of an individual. 
Rather we are to respect him as a person and we do this by limiting his actions, 
when this proves necessary, only as the principles we would both acknowledge 
permit… There is no violation of our autonomy so long as [the] principles 
[belonging to the conception of justice] are properly followed."366 (Persons are 
predictable, individual citizens are not.) 
Rawls' procedure for arriving at these principles and the corresponding 
perspective of the Kantian noumenal self, or rational being, is called "reflective 
equilibrium."367 In reflective equilibrium, a person as a rational being examines 
his considered judgments – his intuitions/sense of justice (or moral 
                                               
364 Italics mine. 
365 TJ, 475. Italics mine. Rawls continues, "the meaning of this independence being given by the 
description of the original position and its Kantian interpretation" (TJ, 475). 
366 TJ, 519. Italics mine. 
367 See Sharon Krause, “Desiring Justice: Motivation and Justification in Rawls and Habermas,” 
Contemporary Political Theory 4, no. 4 (November 2005), 363-385. Rawls, Sharon Krause notes, 
called Theory a "theory of moral sentiments… setting out the principles governing our moral 
powers, or, more specifically, our sense of justice," which, in the form of "our considered 
judgments," is supposed to provide the reference point against which "conjectured principles 
can be checked" through the practice of "reflective equilibrium“ (TJ 51). 
 103 
consciousness) - to discover the regulative principles and the conception of 
justice368 that lie behind them. The original position realizes this; in it, we all 
have equal power and freedom to realize our interests, and we take the position 
of the Kantian noumenal self, the universal rational being, abstracted from our 
phenomenal particularity; the  
description of the original position interprets the point of view of noumenal 
selves, of what it means to be a free and equal rational being… The original 
position may be viewed… as a procedural interpretation of Kant's 
conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative. The principles 
regulative of the Kingdom of ends are those that would be chosen in this 
position, and the description of this situation enables us to explain the sense 
in which acting from these principles expresses our nature as free and equal 
rational persons.369  
Rawls writes in Political Liberalism that the participants are "rationally 
autonomous representatives of citizens in society," constrained by a "veil of 
ignorance:" "‘[T]he veil of ignorance’ means that the parties do not know the 
social position, or the conception of the good (its particular aims and 
                                               
368 "First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle: Social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. First Priority Rule (The 
Priority of Liberty): The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore 
liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive 
liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all; (b) a less than equal liberty 
must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice 
over Efficiency and Welfare) The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of 
efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the 
difference principle. There are two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the 
opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity; (b) an excessive rate of saving must on 
balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship. General Conception: All social 
primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect – are 
to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the 
advantage of the least favored" (TJ, 302-3). 
369 Ibid., 255-56. 
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attachments), or the realized abilities and psychological propensities, and much 
else, of the persons they represent."370  
In representing the abstract, rationally autonomous being, our self-
interest in the original position is universalized and noumenalized, by 
removing us from the particular interest of our own and others’ lives ("those 
contingencies which set men at odds and allow them to be guided by their 
prejudice"371) and taking on as our goal the abstract interest of all individuals as 
autonomous rational beings, "[u]nencumbered by the singularities of the 
circumstances in which we find ourselves."372  
The veil of ignorance prevents us from shaping our moral view to accord 
with our own particular attachments and interests. We do not look at the 
social order from our situation but take up a point of view that everyone can 
adopt on an equal footing. In this sense we look at our society and our place 
in it objectively: we share a common standpoint along with others and do 
not make our judgments from a personal slant.373  
Rawls writes, "[W]e cannot reasonably expect our views to fall into line when 
they are affected by the contingencies of our different circumstances." We are 
autonomous insofar as we act on the basis of principles that express our 
common nature as free and rational beings, in other words, principles that are 
not based on our particular circumstances, abilities, goals, allegiances, or 
attachments;374 "if knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the outcome is 
biased by arbitrary contingencies."375 By employing our practical reason and 
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abstracting from the specifics of our lives, we “express… our freedom from 
contingency and happenstance.”376 As in Kant, the exercise of practical reason 
thus expresses our rational autonomy. “This sentiment [of justice] reveals what 
the person is, and to compromise it is not to achieve for the self free reign but to 
give way to the contingencies and accidents of the world.”377 
Thus the veil "simplif[ies] political and social questions so that the 
resulting balance of justice, made possible by the greater consensus, outweighs 
what may have been lost by ignoring certain potentially relevant aspects of 
moral situations."378 The mutual disinterestedness – the fact that we treat others 
in terms of their “rights and claims”379 without regard to their particular 
interests – ensures our benevolence; in the original position, we "evaluate 
principles solely on the basis of general considerations."380 We act so as to 
maximize the minimum share of primary goods that any rational being can 
receive in society to put in the service of realizing his freely chosen 
goals/interests; "The agreement of the parties on certain definite principles and 
the conception of the person is represented by the original position. In this way 
the content of fair terms of cooperation for persons so conceived is 
ascertained."381  
Like Kant's a priori moral principles, Rawls' two principles are used to 
guide the discipline of our empirical practices – what Kant called our 
"anthropology." Reflective equilibrium is reached when our intuitions (as 
evinced in our judgments/decisions) and the perspective of the original 
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position – the rationally autonomous person - are harmonized. But the direction 
of this harmonization, once the principles of justice have been reached, is from 
principles to practices. That is, Rawls himself thus carries out the step of 
rational reflection to discover those principles that found our moral intuitions – 
"the point of  view of noumenal selves." The rational being is one motivated by 
a morality of principles, as opposed to a morality of authority or association. 
We do not have to worry about the particular, cultural source of the 
dispositions and moral sentiments that supply our intuitions: "Any doubts that 
its members may entertain about the soundness of their moral sentiments when 
they reflect upon how these dispositions were acquired may be dispelled by seeing 
that their convictions match the principles which would be chosen in the 
original position or, if they do not, by revising their judgments so that they do."382 
 
Rawls maintains his commitment to the original position as the device 
for realizing the point of view of the noumenal self – i.e., for realizing the 
principles of justice that guide the rational being – through both Theory of Justice 
and Political Liberalism. What is new in Political is Rawls' concession that, given 
the pluralism which is supposed to characterize a liberal democracy, it is not 
reasonable to expect that reflective equilibrium will lead all rational beings to a 
comprehensive liberalism – i.e., the Kantian conclusion that they intuitively 
hold rational/moral autonomy as a regulative ideal, recognize each other as 
Kantian "persons" who should and must follow a universal moral law provided 
by practical reason. Given the basic liberties of freedom of thought, conscience, 
and association implicit to a well-ordered society, one should expect instead a 
                                               
382 TJ, 520. Italics mine. This was Kant's stated purpose in the metaphysics of morals—to move 
from anthropological observation to the principles of pure reason in its theoretical application 
and then to legislate from these principles. 
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variety of comprehensive doctrines – for example, utilitarianism, perfectionism, 
pluralism, moral relativism – many of which have their own non-liberal 
conceptions of justice, the ideal person and society. These persons are unlikely 
to be motivated by the ideal of rational autonomy that Rawls had made 
prerequisite to the exercise of reflective equilibrium, as embodied in the original 
position. To the degree that Rawls had made acceptance of the principles of 
justice contingent upon a Kantian "comprehensive moral view in which the 
ideal of autonomy has a regulative role for all of life,"383 he risked alienating 
potential adherents384 from the original position and the principles of justice it 
arrives at, thus undermining the stability of the principles. In Political, therefore, 
the conception of justice does not follow from a comprehensive liberalism's 
belief in moral and rational autonomy as a regulative ideal, but rather we 
“begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in 
the hope of developing from them a political conception that can gain free and 
reasoned agreement in judgment, this agreement being stable in virtue of its 
gaining the support of a consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”385  
This political conception of justice is "freestanding" in that, even though 
it achieves the "overlapping consensus" of all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, it is "expounded apart from, or without reference to"386 any of them. 
We do not, says Rawls, have to rely upon the comprehensive liberal ideal of the 
(Kantian) moral person or any particular comprehensive doctrine's version of 
the person; the political conception of justice as fairness is grounded rather in 
our role as "citizens." Citizens "engage, not merely in activities coordinated by 
orders from a central authority, but in activities guided by publicly recognized 
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384 Represented by his critics, notably Michael Sandel. 
385 PL, 100-1. Italics mine. 
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rules and procedures that those cooperating accept and regard as properly 
regulating their conduct.”387 In this way, regardless of which reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine they hold, citizens demonstrate their moral-rational 
autonomy – i.e., their possession of the two Kantian moral powers,388 their 
capacity for self-government by principle- and concept-dependent desires – to 
the degree required389 to achieve an overlapping consensus on the political 
conception of justice. “Citizens who affirm the political conception, and who 
have been raised in and are familiar with the fundamental ideas of the public 
political culture [i.e., that it will provide basic rights and the material means for 
their effective use390], find that, when they adopt its framework of deliberation 
their judgments converge sufficiently so that political cooperation on the basis 
of mutual respect can be maintained.”391 To the extent that their comprehensive 
doctrines come into conflict with the political conception, the principles of 
justice tend to take priority: 
many if not most citizens come to affirm the principles of justice 
incorporated into their constitution and political practice without seeing any 
particular connection, one way or the other, between those principles and 
their other views. It is possible for citizens to appreciate the good those 
principles accomplish both for themselves and those they care for, as well as 
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388 Namely, 1) reasonableness: “a capacity for a sense of justice that enables them to understand, 
apply and to act from the reasonable principles of justice that specify fair terms of social 
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390 Ibid., 156-7. 
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utilitarians, perfectionists, etc. – will in general still endorse Rawls’ principles of justice on their 
own grounds – as natural laws of God, or on their own philosophical grounds – even if they 
reject that they are good because they are a realization of our moral autonomy, as Kant and 
Rawls (in TJ) would have had it.) 
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for society at large, and then to affirm them on this basis. Should an 
incompatibility later be recognized between the principles of justice and 
their wider doctrines, then they might very well adjust or revise these doctrines 
rather than reject those principles… These adjustments or revisions we may 
suppose to take place slowly over time as the political conception shapes 
comprehensive views to cohere with it.392 
Their allegiance does not therefore appear to depend on a conscious awareness 
of the way that the political conception is consequential for their comprehensive 
doctrine or vice versa:  "the comprehensive doctrines of most people are not 
fully comprehensive, and this allows scope for the development of an 
independent allegiance to the political conception that helps to bring about a 
consensus."393 
Rawls thus gives up Theory's more stringent Kantian requirement of 
conscious self-subjection to moral autonomy as a regulative ideal in order to 
achieve acceptance of the principles of justice and therefore the justice of a 
liberal demoractic society, and instead, in Political, says just the practice of 
accepting and adhering to a liberal political conception of justice (which for 
Kant would have constituted a merely anthropological and therefore contingent 
rather than autonomous basis for morality) indicates this moral-rational 
autonomy and ensures the justice of this society. As citizens in liberal 
democracies we, regardless of our comprehensive doctrines, are accustomed to 
taking the perspective of the original position, that is, we accept in practice the 
principles of justice that constitute the original position. The citizen's 
acculturation in a liberal democratic political culture ensures, as in the original 
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position, that his own view represents “the point of view of certain 
appropriately defined reasonable and rational agents,” who have learned and 
mastered “the concepts and principles of practical reason as well as the 
principles of right and justice that issue from the procedure of construction” so 
that they arrive at the same conclusions in the judgment of particular cases, not 
the contingent and therefore unstable conclusions and “the point of view of any 
particular agent, individual or corporate, or of any particular group of agents, 
at any particular time.”394  
 
But there are signs that this acculturation process does not succeed in 
reaching its goal – the citizen's rational/moral freedom (his "morality of 
principles") and, therefore, a just society. This failure becomes apparent in 
examining Rawls' account, in Political, of the "education" of individuals/groups 
who are party to a "modus vivendi" to an "overlapping consensus" of citizens. 
This "educational" (acculturation) process shares some similarities with Rawls' 
developmental account of the progress from the morality of authority to the 
morality of principles in Theory, and some of the same disturbing implications. 
 A "mere" modus vivendi is a compromise observed by competing 
individual or group interests, and is only stable as long as circumstances make 
it advantageous for its contracting parties not to violate it;395 if circumstances 
change, one of them will violate it to better its own interests, at the expense of 
the other individual/group. This modus vivendi resembles the establishment of 
"precepts" of a "morality of authority" that Rawls says children reluctantly, 
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unconsciously, and instinctively accept, only because these precepts end strife 
with one's parents.396 
How might a constitutional consensus come about? Suppose that at a certain 
time, because of various historical events and contingencies, certain liberal 
principles of justice are accepted as a mere modus vivendi, and are 
incorporated into existing political institutions… in much the same way as 
the acceptance of the principle of toleration came about as a modus 
vivendi397 following the Reformation: at first reluctantly, but nevertheless as 
providing the only workable alternative to endless and destructive civil 
strife.398 
Like the parties to the modus vivendi, the child acts out of instinct and desire, 
and narrow self-interest.399 Rawls cites Rousseau's Emile as the source of this 
"psychological law:” "we like from the start what contributes to our preservation, 
this attachment is quite unconscious and instinctive."400  
 The transition to a constitutional consensus occurs gradually, as the 
modus vivendi, embodied in an initially only temporary constitutional 
government: 1. guarantees basic rights and liberties – removing them from the 
political agenda, and the "shifting circumstances of time and place“ – and 
thereby decreases the "insecurity and hostility of public life“401 that otherwise 
results from a pluralist society402 by establishing "democratic procedures for 
                                               
396 "The child's having a morality of authority consists in his being disposed without the 
prospect of reward or punishment to follow certain precepts that not only may appear to him 
largely arbitrary but which in no way appeal to his original inclinations" (TJ, 466). 
397 Literally, this term means "way of living," which implies a practical compromise between 
disputing parties to reduce conflict. 
398 PL, 159. 
399 TJ, 463. 
400 Ibid., 463, Fn 9. 
401 PL, 161. 
402 “The deep divisions latent in society” (Ibid., 161). 
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moderating… political rivalry, and for determining issues of social policy;"403 2. 
explicates the liberal principles of justice (the guidelines of public inquiry and 
rules for assessing evidence) – as "public reason" – "in terms of common sense" 
accepted by citizens in general;404 3. ensures its basic political institutions 
guarantee these basic rights and liberties and provide the accepted "public 
reason" in applying the liberal principles of justice, thus encouraging "the 
cooperative virtues of political life."405 These three achievements work upon our 
"moral psychology" – i.e., the fact that we can conceive of "the good,” accept 
and want to act on "reasonable political principles of justice,” will act on them if 
everyone will, as a result develop trust in each other, which merely grows with 
more general recognition that our basic political institutions meet our needs.406 
But our stable allegiance to the liberal principles embodied in the constitution, 
out of the self-interested and temporary acquiescence to a modus vivendi, is 
also made possible by "a certain looseness in our comprehensive views, as well 
as their not being fully comprehensive,” as, for example, in the consensus 
worked out over toleration between Locke's religious argument, Kant's or Mill's 
comprehensive liberalisms, and a pluralist view (with a "freestanding political 
conception of justice").407 This looseness guarantees that we will prioritize the 
political conception of justice where it comes into conflict with some part of our 
comprehensive doctrine. 
From this foundation of stable constitutional consensus, political groups 
appeal to citizens from different comprehensive doctrines, thereby forcing them 
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406 Ibid., 163. 
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to formulate political conceptions of justice (165), defining the terms of common 
political discussion; new problems require definition of principles behind 
constitutional consensus to guide new decisions; to avoid "conflict,” legislation 
guaranteeing liberty of conscience, freedoms of thought, association, and 
movement, and basic welfare408 must be enacted – "there are forces tending to 
amend the constitution in certain ways to cover further constitutional essentials, 
or else to enact the necessary legislation with much the same effect"409 – 
"groups" will develop political conceptions covering these basic structural 
requirements. Again, since most people's comprehensive doctrines are "not 
fully comprehensive,"410 they can and do become independently committed to a 
consensus-making political conception, act on the basis of that conception as 
embodied in the constitution, and gradually develop trust in it – i.e., "an 
independent allegiance to the political conception that helps bring about [an 
overlapping] consensus."411  
 
 But when Rawls discusses the transition from the contingent, only 
"fortunate" modus vivendi to constitutional consensus, he leaves behind the 
example of the circumstances of the Reformation – i.e., simple (rather than 
reasonable) pluralism between individuals/groups with unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that exclude allegiance to the principles of fair and 
just cooperation, and lead to "endless and destructive civil strife."412 His 
                                               
408 “Below a certain level of material and social well-being, and of training and education, 
people simply cannot take part in society as citizens, much less equal citizens” (Ibid., 166). 
409 Ibid., 167. 
410 Ibid., 168. 
411 Ibid., 168. 
412 Ibid., 159. “In general both states (or groups or individuals) are ready to pursue their goals at 
the expense of the other… Social unity is only apparent, as its stability is contingent on 
circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of interests” (Ibid., 
147). 
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example for this transition from modus vivendi is instead the development of 
the happier consensus (around toleration) more than a century later. This 
historical jump takes for granted the transition from the modus vivendi to the 
accomplishment of the "reasonable pluralism" – in other words, the very 
transition he was supposed to be explaining. Now, "the crucial [historical] fact,” 
or foundation, is not the simple pluralism – of possibly unreasonable doctrines 
– of the modus vivendi, but "reasonable pluralism, itself the outcome of the free 
exercise of free human reason under conditions of liberty… an enduring 
background of free institutions."413 Instead of the emergence of a constitutional 
consensus, Rawls has shifted to discussing an overlapping consensus, and the 
simple pluralism of the modus vivendi no longer exists. The Lockean, 
Kantian/Millian, and pluralist views, whether they are fully comprehensive or 
not, are reasonable doctrines. Whereas Rawls was attempting to explain their 
emergence, now loosely held, reasonable comprehensive doctrines seem to exist at 
the moment of the (now redundant) modus vivendi. 
Rawls appears to employ this same strategy – importing the essence of 
the subsequent stage to explain the transition from the preceding – in 
discussing the moral development of the person, in Theory. Rawls says that the 
"second stage of moral development" – the "morality of association" – is not 
merely "a collection of precepts" like the "child's morality of authority" within 
the family. The defenseless child (as we noted above) "does not have his own 
standards of criticism, since he is not in a position to reject precepts on rational 
grounds;"414 His "prized virtues are obedience, humility, and fidelity to 
authoritative persons; the leading vices are disobedience, self-will, and 
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414 TJ, 464. 
 115 
temerity. We are to do what is expected without questioning, for not so to act 
expresses doubt and distrust, and a certain arrogance and tendency to 
suspicion."415 But, Rawls says, in the second stage, "morality of association,” 
"the family… is [already] a small association, normally characterized by a 
definite hierarchy, in which each member has certain rights and duties,"416 just 
like the school, the company/corporation, citizenship. This is because they all 
involve living up to corresponding ideals (the good son/daughter, 
brother/sister, student, worker, citizen) – i.e., "moral standards appropriate to 
the individual's role in the various associations to which he belongs.” Even this 
stage "quite naturally leads up to a morality of principles."417 In the morality of 
association, one becomes attached to others who live up to the ideals, fulfilling 
their respective duties, and displaying the cooperative virtues ("justice and 
fairness, fidelity and trust, integrity and impartiality"418) and feels guilt oneself 
when he neglects his own duties.  
On this account, it is as if the morality of principles were present during 
the morality of association, and the morality of association in the morality of 
authority. But if this suspicion arises, we can simply observe, Rawls says, that it 
is difficult to tell: "As far as possible each stage foreshadows in its teaching and 
explanations the conception of right and justice at which it aims and by 
reference to which we will later recognize that the moral standards presented to 
us are justified."419 For example, during the first stage – morality of authority – 
the child feels "(authority) guilt,"420 a feeling that is also supposed to develop in 
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the morality of association,421 or possibly fear of punishment, when he disobeys; 
"it is sometimes difficult to distinguish feelings of guilt from the fear of 
punishment, and especially from the dread of the loss of parental affection."422 
But if it is difficult to tell, then how do we know it is not fear of punishment, 
even in the later, association stage? 
Rawls assumes that in the acculturation process a legitimate political 
arrangement/distribution of power is ensured, in Theory, by the morality of 
principles of all free and equal rational persons, and, in Political, by free and 
equal citizens' overlapping consensus in the liberal political conception. But his 
accounts of moral development and the evolution of overlapping consensus 
suggest that the power relations characterizing the morality of authority and 
modus vivendi may continue through the moralities of association and 
principles and the constitutional and overlapping consensuses – as a learned 
habit of acquiescence to existing political and moral authority and convention, 
now embodied in an allegiance to principles and political conceptions. 
Though the development of characteristics – e.g., love and trust (of 
association), and independent allegiance (to principles) – characterizing the 
later stages of moral development are supposed to occur during the earlier 
stages (authority and association), this achievement appears to remain 
doubtful, even in Rawls' account. In the transition from authority to association 
morality, children, Rawls says, will learn to love rather than simply acquiesce to 
their parents if their parents are loving towards them. But he also (following 
Rousseau) accepts that providing mere preservation is enough to secure the 
child's love.423 Similarly, children's trust of their guardians, adherence to their 
                                               
421 Ibid., 470. 
422 Ibid., 465. 
423 Ibid., 463. 
 117 
precepts, desire to emulate them, and self-judgment and guilt according to their 
standards, are supposed to depend on the fact that their guardians are "indeed 
worthy of esteem," not too harsh, and lead by example, that is, upon the 
parents' embodiment of principles of justice, rather than simply upon their 
children's dependence upon them for satisfaction of their needs. But, Rawls 
admits (as we have seen above), guilt (allegedly based on a failure to live up to 
moral principles) is not easily distinguished from "the dread of the loss of 
parental love and affection."424 Likewise, in the association stage, shame, 
"evoked by shocks to our self-respect," is supposed to be moral insofar as a 
principle of right is "cited to account for it"425 – i.e., insofar as it is a preparation 
for the morality of principles. But shame is simultaneously caused by one's 
"apprehens[ion]" that his associates "reject him and find him contemptible, an 
object of ridicule."426 
The transition to the morality of principles happens when our 
compliance with the principles of justice becomes no longer dependent, as it was 
during association stage, on the approval and disapproval of the group;427 "we 
realize how social arrangements answering to [the principles of justice] have 
promoted our good and that of those… for whom we care," and this engenders 
"a desire to apply and act upon the principles of justice"428 that is "irrespective 
of… [their effect on] the well-being and approval of particular individuals and 
groups."429 We now explain both guilt and emotions by reference not to the 
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427 “It would seem that while the individual understands the principles of justice, his motive for 
complying with them, for some time at least, springs largely from his ties of friendship and 
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particular individuals or groups but rather to the relevant principles. But Rawls 
also admits not only that these particular attachments help strengthen our 
allegiance to moral principles430 but that they are necessary for moral motivation 
even in the final stage, the morality of principles, when a just political society is 
supposed to have been achieved. 
In general moral principles are affirmed for various reasons and their 
acceptance is normally sufficient for the moral feelings. To be sure, on the 
contract theory principles of right and justice have a certain content, and as 
we have just seen, there is a sense in which acting in accordance with them 
can be interpreted as acting from a concern for mankind, or for the good of 
other persons. Whether this fact shows that one acts in part from certain 
natural [i.e., potentially contingent] attitudes, especially as these involve 
attachments to particular individuals, and not simply the general forms of 
sympathy and benevolence, is a question that I shall leave aside here. 
Certainly the preceding account of the development of morality supposes 
that affection for particular persons plays an essential part in the acquisition 
of morality. But how far these attitudes are required for later moral motivation can 
be left open, although it would, I think, be surprising if these attachments were not 
to some degree necessary.431 
If the development of an allegiance to principles (i.e., a morality of principles) is 
not in fact independent of but relies on an attachment to particular individuals 
or a group (i.e., a morality of association), and the motive for this associative 
morality appears to be supplied by the child's dependent relation to his 
authority, then the achievement of a liberal political society is not a real (on 
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Rawls' definition) morality of principles. Instead, Rawls may inadvertently 
indicate a conditioning in acquiescence to established forms of authority, in our 
societal institutions, moral principles and political conceptions. 
 
But Rawls retains his faith in the achievement of this morality of 
principles and its corresponding just distribution of power in our democratic 
liberal societies. Maintaining this faith, however, in both Theory and Political, 
appears to require exclusions and rejection/repression of signs that might 
indicate that the liberal conception is not just and does not achieve our freedom, 
just as Rawls' faith in the "fact" of our longstanding and "free exercise of free 
human reason under… free institutions"432 requires excluding/repressing the 
possibility of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine that rejects the liberal 
political conception of justice). Rawls explicitly rules out the possibility that the 
moral sensibility of the morality of principles might turn out to be a mere 
"compulsive psychological mechanism cleverly installed by those in authority 
in order to ensure his unswerving compliance with rules designed to advance 
their interests;"433 the morality of authority is justified434 because of its ultimate 
reference to the supposed pre-existence of autonomously chosen principles of 
justice. For this reason, we should not suspect that our moral disposition is not 
free, even if we experience ourselves as unnecessarily acquiescent. The fact that 
we may find in our moral sense "inexplicable inhibitions which for the moment 
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[we are] unable to justify," is not because the morality of authority that 
established them was in error; "in a well-ordered society" we can trust that our 
moral education itself has been regulated by the principle of right and 
justice to which [we] would consent in an initial situation in which all have 
equal representation as moral persons. As we have seen, the moral 
conception adopted is independent of natural contingencies and accidental 
social circumstances; and therefore the psychological processes by which 
[our] moral sense has been acquired conform to principles that [we 
ourselves] would choose under conditions that [we] would concede are fair 
and undistorted by fortune and happenstance…. Nor can someone in a well-
ordered society object to practices of moral instruction that inculcate a sense 
of justice.435 
And, even though our moral education is supposed to "eliminate the conditions 
that give rise to disruptive attitudes,"436 sometimes the individual does not 
aspire to be a good citizen, instead irrationally (and inexplicably) ignoring the 
imperative to reflective equilibrium. There can still exist the "bad character" 
who commits "acts proscribed by penal statutes;"437 "just arrangements do not 
fully answer to their nature, and therefore, other things being equal, they will 
be less happy than they would be if they could affirm their sense of justice. But 
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here one can only say: their nature is their misfortune."438 And when this occurs, 
when acculturation of the ideal citizen fails – and these cases can be numerous – 
more extreme measures are justified: 
It can even happen that there are many who do not find a sense of justice fits 
their good; but if so, the forces making for stability are weaker. Under such 
conditions penal devices will play a much larger role in the social system. 
The greater the lack of congruence, the greater the likelihood… of instability 
with its attendant evils. Yet none of this nullifies the collective rationality of 
the principles of justice; it is still to the advantage of each that everyone else 
should honor them.439 
This applies just as legitimately to criminals and unruly children as it does to 
comprehensive doctrines (in Political) that are held too tenaciously, rather than 
"loosely,” whose particulars are not brought into line with the principles of 
justice. "As Berlin has long maintained… there is no social world without loss: 
that is, no social world that does not exclude some ways of life that realize in 
special ways certain fundamental values. The nature of its culture and 
institutions proves too uncongenial."440 Where the principles of justice fail to 
take hold of the individual, his/her child, shape his doctrine, or inhibit the 
individual from applying it in determining his behavior, the most explicit and 
coercive form of the morality of authority is close behind. 
Finally, we should not, Rawls writes, doubt the liberal conception of 
justice, even though our moral feelings can be irrational and injurious, 
"incorporating many of the harsher aspects of the authority situation in which 
they were first acquired… often [taking] perverse and destructive forms… 
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blunt[ing] without reason human spontaneity and enjoyment… [and] liable to 
be[ing] unreasonable and capricious,"441 we can still rest assured that "since 
arbitrary authority has disappeared" the well-ordered society's "members suffer 
much less from the burdens of oppressive conscience"442 than they otherwise 
would. 
 But if arbitrary authority has not disappeared, as seems apparent from 
our discussions of Theory's moral education and Political's history of liberal 
democratic overlapping consensus, but is instead institutionalized in relations 
of coercion and techniques (applied to us and by us) that condition and 
reinforce our habit of acquiescence and inhibition, then Rawls' faith and his 
exclusions (of signs of the failure of our moral education - our experience of 
liberal democracy - to produce freedom and justice) seem complicit. Indeed, in 
Political, Rawls says that the "political conception" has "a wide role as 
educator;"443 having been realized in the political culture, including its articulation 
by its institutions, the political conception brings up the individual from 
childhood "irrationality" and dependence to the citizen's "principle-dependent 
desires,” connecting these to a "concept-dependent desire"444 to "realize a 
political ideal of citizenship,"445 as Rawls describes in his account of the 
development of overlapping consensus (above);446 "[N]ot only are citizens 
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names imply, principle-dependent and concept-dependent desires are given their "force, or 
weight… entirely by the principle (or concept) to which the desire is attached… A person with a 
good will, to use Kant's term, is someone whose principle-dependent (and concept-dependent) 
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normal and fully cooperating members of society, but further they want to be, 
and be recognized as, such members… they want to realize in their person, and 
have it recognized that they realize [the] ideal of citizens."447 As an influential, 
institutional articulation of the liberal democratic political conception (of 
"justice as fairness"), Rawls' refigured categorical imperative – i.e., reflective 
equilibrium ("the study of principles which govern actions shaped by self-
examination,"448 as embodied in the original position449), his selective history of 
liberal democracy, and his exclusions and repressions seem, as in the modus 
vivendi, to take certain questions (about the extent of our unnecessary 
inhibitions), complaints, and comprehensive views "off the political 
[conceptual] agenda.” (We are reminded that the liberal constitution puts a 
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political ideal" (Ibid., 83-4). In the latter, "for example, we may desire to conduct ourselves in a 
manner appropriate to someone who is rational, whose conduct is guided by practical 
reasoning. Desiring to be this kind of person involves having and acting from these principle-
dependent desires, and not only from object-dependent desires governed by custom and habit" 
(PL, 84). As stated above, because we can conceive of "the good," accept and want to act on 
"reasonable political principles of justice," will act on them if everyone will, we, as a result, 
develop trust in each other, which merely grows with more general recognition that our basic 
political institutions meet our needs (Ibid., 163). Through normal political processes in the 
public culture and the articulation of the political conception, we become attached to an 
independent political conception and its embodiment in the ideal of citizen. 
447 Ibid., 84. Citizens have a “higher-order interest” in the exercise and development of their 
moral powers (Ibid., 106). 
448 TJ, 49. 
449 Rawls, as Bonnie Honnig notes, writes that the point of the original position is to "clarify and 
order our thoughts," to present us with questions about justice that we "feel sure must be 
answered in a certain way" (Ibid., 20). This operates to make the potentially disruptive moment 
of the founding of justice "into an act of maintenance, the choice of principles domesticated into 
an acknowledgment of them" (Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 134). It doesn't matter who submits themselves to the 
exercise of the original position, or when they do it. They "can at any time adopt its perspective, 
[i]t must make no difference when one takes up this viewpoint, or who does so[;] the same 
principles are always chosen" (TJ, 139). 
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tenuous end to "endless and destructive civil strife,"450 but only as long as it 
continues to be observed.)  
 
"How might it happen that over time the initial acquiescence in a 
constitution satisfying these liberal principles of justice develops into a 
constitutional consensus in which those principles themselves are affirmed?"451 
Possibly, through the (on Rawls' definition) illegitimate imposition of the liberal 
political conception, born from and perpetuating an unequal distribution of 
power, exercised first as crude, coercive authority and, once conditioned 
through the various associations and institutions, a habitual voluntary 
consensus in "citizenship,” with its practices of exclusion and repression – its 
norms of political participation, cooperation,452 discussion/interpretation,453 and 
a political agenda as represented by existing political parties.  
Kant's more patent and explicit prescription of humiliation techniques, 
aimed at the automatic functioning of the categorical imperative as second 
nature, attests to his realization that the prohibitions of the liberal political 
education were not yet assured to function automatically as habitual 
inhibitions. Rawls' reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus, on the 
other hand, assume an already acculturated, stabilized Kantian rational subject 
(who may in fact be an obedient, docile subject), the alleged achievement of 
more than two centuries of moral "education" by the liberal democratic political 
                                               
450 PL, 159. 
451 Ibid., 159. 
452 "Virtues… are," after all, "sentiments and habitual attitudes leading us to act on certain 
principles of right" (TJ, 436-7). 
453 "The two moral powers and their normal capacities" are "educated to" the political ideal of 
citizenship "by the public culture and its historical traditions of interpretation (PL, 85-6). 
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conception and institutions.454 An achievement which nevertheless is not 
entirely stable, as evinced in Rawls' exclusions and repressions (aimed at 
achieving the habitual inhibition of those particulars that conflict with the 
liberal democratic political conception, particular desires that might aim to 
reintroduce excluded issues into the political agenda). 
 
Habermas's "Motivational Deficit" 
The goal of Habermas’s critical theory is a “form of life free from 
unnecessary domination in all its forms.”455 As was true with Kant and Rawls, 
Habermas concludes that, given the plurality of definitions of the good life (the 
different conscious motivations of people to live a specific kind of life) 
characterizing modern existence, if the general/democratic will were to be 
given jurisdiction over definition of the good life (the particular ends of 
citizens), modern liberties would have to be sacrificed – either in the course of 
conflict over political power between various groups whose definition differs or 
in the systematic oppression of one group by another. Habermas, like Rawls 
                                               
454 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 222: 
"Historically, the process by which the bourgeoisie became in the course of the eighteenth 
century the politically dominant class was masked by the establishment of an explicit, coded 
and formally egalitarian juridical framework, made possible by the organization of a 
parliamentary, representative régime. But the development and generalization of disciplinary 
mechanisms constituted the other, dark side of these processes. The general juridical form that 
guaranteed a system of rights that were egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny, 
everyday, physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-
egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines. And although, in a formal way, the 
representative regime makes it possible, directly or indirectly, with or without relays for the 
will of all to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty, the disciplines provide, at the base, 
a guarantee of the submission of forces and bodies. The real, corporal disciplines constituted the 
foundation of the formal, juridical liberties. The contract may have been regarded as the ideal 
foundation of law and political power; panopticism constituted the technique, universally 
widespread, of coercion. It continued to work in depth on the juridical structures of society, in 
order to make the effective mechanisms of power function in opposition to the formal 
framework that it had acquired. The 'Enlightenment,’ which discovered the liberties, also 
invented the disciplines." 
455 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1981), 273. 
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and Kant, says that political theory, if it aims at the realization of liberal 
democracy, cannot therefore be involved in trying to define the “the good life” 
– i.e., the truth about what it consists of. Like Rawls, he takes up the Kantian 
problematic of how to achieve political freedom and equality – universal 
autonomy – by way of universal moral principles.456  
But Rawls' reflective equilibrium, according to Habermas, though it is 
supposed to stabilize his universal principles of justice by grounding them in 
the practices of the "citizen," relies upon a public culture that cannot but be 
particular to specific communities and traditions, therefore contingent and 
incapable of universalization in the conditions of modern pluralism. 
Specifically, with his conception of the person or citizen who embodies the two 
Kantian moral powers implicit in the public culture, Rawls, says Habermas, 
imports "normative contents into the very procedures of justification."457 To 
achieve true universality, one needs instead a "procedural conception of 
practical reason free of substantive connotations by developing it in a strictly 
procedural manner"458; it must "shift… from what each can will without 
contradiction to be a general law" - Rawls' (and Kant's) “monological”459 
method460 for arriving at principles of justice - "to what all can will in agreement 
                                               
456 Kant, Rawls and Habermas all set out to achieve preservation of both the liberties of the 
ancients (democratic self-determination) and the liberties of the moderns (individual protection 
from the political/general determination), and therefore ask the same question: What legitimate 
limits can be put on the democratic will; what universal limits would free and equal individuals 
choose to put on themselves? 
457 Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John 
Rawls's Political Liberalism.” The Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 3 (1995), 59, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2940842. 
458 Ibid., 117, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2940842. Italics mine. 
459 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, tr. Christian Lenhardt and 
Shierry Weber Nicholson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 65-7. 
460 According to Habermas, in "the so-called method of reflective equilibrium. The philosopher 
arrives at the basic concept of the moral person and the adjunct concepts of the politically 
autonomous citizen, of fair cooperation, of the well-ordered society, and so forth, via a rational 
reconstruction of proven intuitions, that is, intuitions actually found in the practices and 
traditions of a democratic society. Reflective equilibrium is achieved at the moment when the 
philosopher has attained the assurance that those involved can no longer reject with good 
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to be a universal norm."461 The universal acceptibility of moral principles can 
only be established socially, through the actual (rather than merely hypothetical) 
collective deliberation of everyone that will be affected by them. Only those 
"norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourse."462  
The pure proceduralism of Habermas' rational discourse is stable 
because, unlike Rawls' reflective equilibrium, it is based only on universal and 
not culturally contingent features of the person and his communicative action. 
According to Habermas, the universal features of the person result from a 
socialization process that occurs in all normal individuals. The normal "socially 
competent" subject is socialized to take into account the needs, interests, and 
feelings of others and give them equal weight to their own; “Kant’s Kingdom of 
Ends must be supposed here and now as a context of interaction and as a 
communication community in which everyone is capable of taking up the 
perspective of everyone else and is willing to do so.”463 This socialization 
consists of "the complete internalization of [the] few highly abstract and 
universal principles" required for norm justification.464 The subject's 
competency consists in his having identified himself with and having come to 
base his self-respect on his living up to the norms of communicative rationality, 
and therefore to the principles of justice that result from this procedure. 
Communicative rationality is, for Habermas, basic to the everyday speech acts 
                                               
reasons intuitions reconstructed and clarified in this manner" (Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of 
the Other, ed. Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Grieff (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 60). 
461 Ibid., 67. 
462 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1999), 107. This establishes Habermas's conception of justice as procedural rather than 
substantive. 
463 Jürgen Habermas, “Individuation through Socialization,” in Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. 
William Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 162. 
464 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1999), 183. 
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of everyone; in his inaugural lecture at Frankfurt University in 1965, Habermas 
states, "the human interest in autonomy and responsibility [Mündigkeit] is not 
mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is 
the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure 
autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses 
unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus."465 As 
Habermas's student, Thomas McCarthy notes, “The very act of participating in 
a discourse involves the supposition that genuine consensus is possible.”466 
Speech acts are characterized by an abstract core of norms, represented by four 
validity claims – claims that the speaker necessarily makes: by uttering 
something, the speaker claims, in addition to its a) grammatical 
comprehensibility, b) its truth (in “constative” speech acts), c) its rightness 
(appropriateness) in relation to a recognized normative context (in “regulative” 
speech acts), and d) that his apparent/manifest intentions are truthful (in 
“representative” speech acts).467 Action according to these validity claims is 
prerequisite to valid rational consensus. The social reality of the entire human 
species is constructed468 through communicative rationality469 – that is, 
                                               
465 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1971), Appendix, 314. 
466 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1981), 306. 
467 Jürgen Habermas, “Was heisst Universalpagmatik?” in Sprachpgramatik und Philosophie, ed. 
K.-O. Apel, (Frankfurt, 1976), 254-55; cited in Ibid., 286-7. 
468 Habermas accepts the “radically anti-Platonic insight that there is neither a higher nor a 
deeper reality to which we could appeal—we who find ourselves already situated in our 
linguistically structured forms of life” (Jürgen Habermas, “Contribution to a Discourse Theory 
of Law and Democracy” in The New Social Theory Reader, eds. Steven Seidman and Jeffrey C. 
Alexander (New York: Routledge, 2001), 30). 
469 To arrive at deliberative justice, according to Habermas, one’s reason must be communicative 
rather than instrumental. Whereas instrumental rationality decides only upon the means to 
achieving the norms we take for granted, norms that define our goals, communicative 
rationality reflects upon these norms. Functional rationality characterizes the capitalist welfare 
state, and is directed towards achieving the economic and political stability of the political 
body. See Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984; Suhrkamp Verlag 
(German edition), 1981), 285-6. 
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communication between participants who are trying to reach a rational 
consensus, mutual understanding.470 Thus the abstract core of norms that 
guarantee legitimate morality develop in the basic conceptual structure of 
experience of every individual.471 
In this way, Habermas, like Kant and Rawls, is committed to the operation 
of an autonomous/free practical reason in the subject – free from "contingent, 
subjective determinations… [and] every trace of compulsion[;] moral 
obligations acquire an unconditional or categorical validity only when they 
proceed from laws that emancipate the will… from all contingent 
determinations and in a sense assimilate it to practical reason itself."472 
Habermas' procedure and the norms that result from it are stable insofar as the 
subject is constituted in this way, acting only from "practical reason" as 
embodied in the procedural norms. Since this socialization is a universal feature 
of psychological development, it can provide a secure basis for Habermas' 
procedure for arriving at universally acceptable norms. As McCarthy puts it,  
When fundamental differences in beliefs and values block the initiation or 
continuation of communicative relations, the possibility of discursively 
resolving these differences [and thus arriving at universal norms of justice] 
takes on a particular significance. It represents the possibility of instituting 
or reinstituting a consensual basis for interaction without resort to force in 
any of its forms from open violence to latent manipulation; it represents the 
                                               
470 Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1979), 3. 
471 “It seems likely that this basic conceptual structure of possible experience developed 
phylogenetically and that it arises anew in every normal ontogenesis. Thus developmental 
studies of the type pursued by Piaget will have to be integrated into any adequate analysis of 
the "a priori of experience.” (Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 297). 
472 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, tr., ed., Max Pensky 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 32. 
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possibility of reaching agreement through the use of reason and thus by 
recourse to, rather than violation of, the humanity of those involved.473 
 
Habermas criticized Rawls for basing universal consensus around his 
liberal political conception upon a particular (i.e., non-universal) public culture, 
thus undermining its universal validity in a modern pluralist society. And, as 
we have noted, although Rawls makes clear that the legitimate application of 
the morality of authority (in which differences of power determine obedience) 
must be governed by pre-existing, legitimated principles, the morality of 
authority that is to characterize only the first stage of the acquisition of the 
moral disposition of the citizen seems to provide a large part of the motive force 
– as both the "latent manipulation" involved in the conditioning of liberal 
political cultural habits as well as open coercion when necessary – behind the 
citizen's acceptance of Rawls' principles and conception of justice as legitimate. 
But it is not clear that Habermas' discursive resolution of differences – i.e., the 
discursive establishment of norms - does not also have to resort to force as open 
violence and latent manipulation. As we will see below, the success of what 
Habermas first presents as a universal socialization to norms governing 
communication turns out to be (as in Rawls' case) culturally contingent, rather 
than the legitimate result of a universal propensity toward mutual 
understanding and respect. Competent subjectivity – i.e., freedom from early 
stage, affective attachments to particular and contingent objects and social 
relations, and reliance solely upon abstract norms proves – to be, on Habermas' 
own account, an impossible and dangerous fantasy. Habermas' project ends up, 
                                               
473 Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1981), 291. 
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like Rawls,’ relying upon a socialized affective attachment of (i.e., "latent 
manipulation") and enforced capitulation (i.e., "open [but legitimized] 
violence") to Habermasian norms of communication – norms whose validity 
was supposed to have resulted from a preceding universal, rational consensus 
of competent subjects. This latent manipulation in the Habermasian project 
takes the form of an imperative to abide by the validity claims of 
communicative rationality, that works secondarily upon a subject already more 
or less successfully conditioned by techniques of socialization that he is 
powerless to resist. This conditioning of the subject requires, at the moment of 
impasse between conflicting interests/views, a (patient) capitulation (and thus 
further conditioning of habits) to the norms governing discursive relations and 
therefore the laws and institutions allegedly established by a fictional universal 
consensus of competent subjects. 
 
According to Habermas, the universal socialization of communicative 
rationality creates the competent subjects necessary for acceptance of the norms 
governing discourse, and thus for the decisions/laws that result from it. 
Language is of course crucial in this process: "self-consciousness forms itself on 
the path from without to within, through the symbolically mediated 
relationship to a partner in interaction. To this extent it possesses an 
intersubjective core; its eccentric position attests to the tenacious presence of 
language as the medium through which one recognizes oneself in the 
other…."474 By the time the child is capable of intersubjective recognition in 
language, he has gone through the first two stages of ego development – 
                                               
474 Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. William Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1992), 178. 
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symbiotic and egocentric475 (and the corresponding "natural" identity is 
formed476) - and entered the third: “sociocentric-objectivistic”477 (thus forming a 
"personal" identity478). At the end of this third stage of ego development, 
''cognitive development has led to an objectivation of outer nature, linguistic-
communicative development to the mastery of a system of speech acts, and 
interactive development to the complementary connection of generalized 
behavioral expectations.”479 Linguistically, this development relies on "taking 
the attitude of the other toward oneself," which "fastens… upon the positive or 
negative sanctions" that a "reference person" (B), who "fulfills the social role of 
                                               
475 In stage 1, “symbiotic,” the child apparently makes no subjective distinction between subject 
and object; "the symboisis between child, reference person and physical environment is so tight 
and we cannot meaningfully speak of a demarcation of subjectivity in the strict sense" (Jürgen 
Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1979), 100–101). In stage 2, “egocentric,” the child “learns to perceive permanent objects 
in its environment”; it differentiates between self and environment, “but without yet clearly 
differentiating the environment into physical and social domains. Moreover, the demarcation 
[of the self] in relation to the environment is not yet objective. This is shown by the 
manifestations of cognitive and moral egocentrism. The child cannot perceive, understand and 
judge situations independently of its own standpoint—it thinks and acts from a body-bound 
perspective" (Ibid., 101). 
476 In this first of three stages in identity formation, the child's “natural” identity depends on the 
temporal continuity and physical boundaries of his/her body. 
477 The ego is decisively demarcated in the third stage, “sociocentric-objectivistic,” in which the 
child "differentiates between perceptible and manipulable things on the one hand, and 
intelligible subjects and their utterances on the other; and it no longer confuses linguistic signs 
and their references and meanings." The child learns to "demarcate its subjectivity in relation to 
outer nature and society," and "to distinguish between fantasy and perception, between impulse 
and obligation." 
478 In stage two of identity formation, the child gains a “personal” identity through his self-
location in the social life-world. Here the continuity that secures identity is provided by 
“intersubjectively recognized, temporally stable expectations” (Thomas McCarthy, The Critical 
Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 341). “The unity of the person . . 
. rests on membership in, and demarcation from, the symbolic reality of a group and on the 
possibility of localization within it. The unity of the person is formed through the 
internalization of roles that are tied in the beginning to concrete reference persons and later 
detached from them—primarily sex and generation roles that determine the structure of the 
family. This role identity, centered around sex and age and integrated with one's own bodily 
image, becomes more abstract and simultaneously more individual to the extent that the 
growing child appropriates extra-familial systems of roles" (Jürgen Habermas, "Development of 
Normative Structures,” in Communication and the Evolution of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 109). 
479 Ibid., 101. 
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an educator outfitted with parental authority,"480  "announces when he utters an 
imperative to" the child (A). Imperatives, unlike validity claims which can "be 
criticized and defended with reason," are "power claims[;] they… need, if they 
are to have any effect, to be externally connected with the hearer's empirical 
motives."481 These sanctions have their binding power as a result of the 
"differences in competence and authority" between A and B, B being in a 
position of authority and power over A. B makes clear to A that A's response to 
the imperative will be followed by sanctions: obedience with positive sanctions, 
disobedience with negative. Thus A is able to connect obedience with satisfying 
an interest of his own (i.e., his own pleasure), and an interest of B.482 In this way, 
the child's "dispositions to behavior" undergo "symbolic structuring."483 
(Behaviors – i.e., obedience – that result in positive sanctions are symbolized as 
"good;” behaviors – i.e., disobedience – that result in negative sanctions are 
symbolized as "bad.”)  
"A, on the way to symbolically restructuring his action orientations and 
dispositions, forms an identity as a member of a social group."484 First, A sees 
his obedience to the imperatives of B as satisfying (not yet norms but rather) B's 
interests, just as this obedience satisfies A's interests. A interprets B's sanctions 
as obedience to A's desires, and these desires as imperatives. In this way A 
comes to understand this mutual satisfaction of interests as an expected pattern 
of reciprocal behavior. "In uttering [A's desire/imperative], A has to anticipate 
that B will fulfill this imperative in the expectation that A will in turn follow [B's 
                                               
480 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 31. 
481 Ibid., 31. 
482 Ibid., 33. 
483 Ibid., 33. 
484 Ibid., 33. 
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imperative]."485 From A's perspective, B "no longer connects his announcement 
of sanctions only with individual imperatives but with the generalized 
expectation that A will exhibit a willingness to obey under the condition of the 
care [i.e., satisfaction of A's needs/imperatives] he receives from B. A 
anticipates this threat and takes up B's attitude toward himself when following 
B's imperative… This is the basis of the internalization of roles."486 The 
imperative of obedience is thus internalized as a role for A to fulfill in relation B 
in general (across time and variable situations), in the expectation that B will 
likewise fulfill his role in obeying the imperatives of A.  
Habermas makes clear that "If one considers the sociocognitive side of 
this process in isolation, one could get the mistaken impression that the child 
has a certain space for negotiation in pursuing his interests, wheras in fact it is 
only in this process that he learns to interpret his needs and to articulate his 
desires. Expectations come to the child as something external, behind which… 
stands the authority of the reference person," who has an "unequal disposition 
over the means of sanction."487 In this process is established a relationship of the 
child to itself; he relates to himself as "the authority of a suprapersonal will."488 
This will issues imperatives, specifically the generalized imperative of 
obedience, to the child. The child thus identifies himself as a subject having 
desires that are now defined as either appropriate or inappropriate according to 
the initial sanctions and now generalized expectations of B. Habermas 
emphasizes that A now perceives that both "A and B subordinate their 
                                               
485 Ibid., 34. 
486 Ibid., 34. 
487 Ibid., 34. "From the structure of language comes the explanation of why the human spirit is 
condemned to an odyssey—why it first finds its way to itself only on a detour via a complete 
externalization in other things and in other humans" (Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical 
Thinking, tr. William Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 153). 
488 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 34. 
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particular wills to a combined choice that is… delegated to the… generalized 
pattern of behavior."489 This combined choice is an incipient norm.  
The second step in the child's process of identification as a member of a 
group is the generalization of his pattern of behavior with B, the parental 
authority figure, so that it applies to all members of a group, and not just to 
interactions between A and B. A objectifies the pattern of behavior, seeing it 
from the perspective of a third person ("neutral") observer, rather than that of a 
participant. Now the pattern can be seen as applying between not just himself 
and B but between any two individuals in the group. Thus, the "concept of a 
concrete pattern of behavior can be generalized into the concept of a norm or 
action."490 A now understands that the collective will of the group is realized 
whenever anyone in the group utters or obeys the imperatives that A 
previously perceived only as governing the particular wills between A and B. 
This collective will and "imperativistic authority" of the group gains the 
authority of a norm for the individual only when, "by anticipating the sanctions 
[executed by the power of institutions] that come from violating a generalized 
imperative," he takes on the attitude of these institutions, structuring himself 
"in a system of internal, that is, moral, behavioral controls." From this point, 
"generalized behavior patterns acquire for him the authority of a 'thou shalt!' – 
no longer in an imperativist sense – and thus that kind of normative validity in 
virtue of which  norms possess binding force."491  
The crucial difference between this authority of the "generalized other" 
as normative in one's own will and "authority based only on disposition over 
means of sanction" is that the former rests instead "on assent."492 The "social 
                                               
489 Ibid., 35. 
490 Ibid., 36. 
491 Ibid., 38. 
492 Ibid., 38. 
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control exercised via norms" and the institutions that embody them is "not 
repressive" insofar as one can answer "yes" to "the question of whether an 
institution or a norm is worthy of being recognized in the interest of all 
involved."493 Habermas admits that "[f]or the growing child this question has 
already been given an affirmative answer before it can pose itself to him as a 
question" because of his initial powerlessness in relation to the means to 
sanction. But this question also "already contains the claim… that a norm 
deserves to be valid only insofar as… it takes into account the interests of 
everyone involved… embodies the will that all could form in common, each 
with his own interest, as the will of the generalized other."494 This is embodied 
in the four validity claims that are the basis of communicative rationality. They 
come to be raised, according to Habermas' account of identity formation, in the 
transition to adolescence.  
The adolescent lets go of his merely conventional/role identity and 
establishes a postconventional or "ego identity" when, faced with new and 
contradictory role systems, "the ego can no longer identify with itself through 
particular roles and existing norms." The adolescent must therefore "retract [his] 
identity… behind the line of all particular roles and norms." The norms 
governing each role system cannot but now "appear as mere conventions." The 
ego identity "stabilize[s] itself through the abstract ability to present itself in all 
situations as the one who can satisfy the requirements of consistency even in 
the face of incompatible role expectations and in the passage through a life-
historical sequence of contradictory role systems [and their corresponding 
identites]." He now distinguishes "between norms, on the one hand, and 
                                               
493 Ibid., 39. 
494 Ibid., 39. 
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principles according to which we can generate norms, on the other." Insofar as 
an ego identity is achieved, it is because it has learned to identify itself with and 
act according to principles that remain the same across different normative 
systems. "Such principles can serve as standards for criticizing and justifying 
existing norms."495 With them, the subject frees himself from the “dogmatism of 
the given and the existing."496 His identity formation therefore becomes 
"reflexive;"497 in the formation of new identities in new normative 
situations/groups, he claims validity for his identification on the basis of 
principles, that is through rational discourse. He is therefore capable of 
increasingly abstract group membership identity – i.e., in status or occupational 
groups, communities, nations, political orders, or in cultural-linguistic groups. 
This ability to identify with an abstract group identity – i.e., abstracted from "all 
particular roles and norms" – allows the identification (refered to above) with a 
"communication community in which everyone is capable of taking up the 
perspective of everyone else and is willing to do so.”498 In terms of ego 
development, the adolescent achieves the "universalistic" stage.499 
                                               
495 "Zur Einführung," in R. Döbert, J. Habermas and C. Nunner-Winkler, eds., Die Entwicklung des 
Ichs (Köln, 1977), 10-11, cited in Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 342. 
496 Jürgen Habermas, "Development of Normative Structures,” in Communication and the 
Evolution of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 102. 
497 He can “generalize and carry over to other situations the ability to overcome old identities 
and construct new ones. The particular cores of surrendered identities are then only the 
biographical traces of a learning process through which identity formation has become 
reflexive; and in every critical situation, this process is brought anew into motion" ("Zur 
Einführung," in R. Döbert, J. Habermas and C. Nunner-Winkler, eds., Die Entwicklung des Ichs 
(Köln, 1977), 10-11, cited in Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 342). 
498 Jürgen Habermas, “Individuation through Socialization,” in Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. 
William Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992),  162. 
499 This final stage of the formation of identity corresponds to the “universalistic” stage of ego 
development. In this stage, the ability to think hypothetically allows freedom from the 
“dogmatism of the given and the existing… Until then, the epistemic ego, bound to concrete 
operations, confronted an objectivated nature; and the practical ego, immersed in group 
perspectives, was dissolved in quasi-natural systems of norms. But as soon as the youth no 
longer naively accepts the validity claims contained in assertions and norms, he can transcend 
the objectivism of a given nature and explain the given from contingent boundary conditions in 
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Raising Validity Claims 
Once the subject has achieved ego identity (or "universalistic" ego 
development), within which he can differentiate between principles and mere 
conventions – a full ego identity capable of abstract group identity – he is 
competent to be aware of and raise the validity claims [i.e., principles] that 
universally govern communication, as opposed to those merely particular 
claims that constrain the "given and existing" norms whose authority was based 
upon the "contingent boundary conditions"/"sociocentrism" of the "traditional 
order" he was socialized into. Insofar as he is aware of the universal norms 
governing communicative rationality, the competent subject/social actor 
recognizes where speech is valid and thus aimed at achieving understanding - 
the immanent telos of speech500 – and where it is not – i.e., where the norms 
                                               
the light of hypotheses; and he can burst the sociocentrism of a traditional order and can 
understand (and if necessary criticize) existing norms as mere conventions in the light of 
principles” (Jürgen Habermas, "Development of Normative Structures," in Communication and 
the Evolution of Society, tr. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 102). On pp. 16ff., 
Habermas suggests certain "homologies" between this pattern of ego development and the 
evolution of world views. 
500 "[I]n action oriented to understanding, language finds the use for which it is fundamentally 
designed" (From an unpublished reply to Ernst Tugendhat, "Zu Tugendhats kritischen 
Bemerkungen,” (spring 1976), in Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 287-8). Universal pragmatics thus has first to reconstruct 
"the general presuppositions of consensual speech actions” (Jürgen Habermas, "What is 
Universal Pragmatics?" in On the Pragmatics of Communication, ed. Maeve Cooke (MIT Press, 
2000), 21), and then to move to analysis of strategic and deformed/defective modes of speech, 
which are parasitic on ideal speech ("In the end, the non-communicative [strategic] use of 
speech in action oriented to success presupposes the communicative use of language" (From an 
unpublished reply to Ernst Tugendhat, "Zu Tugendhats kritischen Bemerkungen,” (spring 
1976), in Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1981), 287-82), relying upon the operation of validity claims but not complying with 
them; “[U]nderstanding is the immanent telos or function of speech. This does not, of course, 
mean that every actual instance of speech is oriented to reaching understanding. But Habermas 
regards ‘strategic‘ forms of communication (such as lying, misleading, deceiving, manipulating, 
and the like) as derivative; since they involve the suspension of certain validity claims 
(especially truthfulness), they are parasitic on speech oriented to genuine understanding” (Ibid., 
287). Moral theory must therefore reconstruct the normative presuppositions of social 
interaction of competent social actors in any society. (Critical theory is meant to draw attention 
to the ways in which system (the market and state institutions) colonize lifeworld and displace 
social integration (rational will- and opinion-formation) based on communicative rationality 
(i.e., lifeworld). The competent subject, having reached the universalistic stage of ego 
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governing it are mere particular conventions "given and existing" in a group. In 
communicative rationality (or rational discourse), there is thus a “’virtualization 
of the constraints of action’—a putting out of play of all motives except that of a 
willingness to come to a rationally grounded agreement—and a ‘virtualization 
of validity claims’—a willingness to suspend judgment as to the existence of 
certain states of affairs (they may or may not be the case) or as to the rightness 
of certain norms (they may or may not be justified).”501 Where this occurs, it is 
called an "ideal speech situation," characterized by rational discourse. This 
discourse explicitly thematizes the validity claims that are normally (but 
usually only implicitly) raised in every speech act in normal interaction, and 
holds in suspension judgment as to their validity. Discourse thus provides 
Habermas’s ground for achieving uncoerced and therefore legitimate consensus 
– the "unforced force of the better argument”502 – when there is a dispute over 
the validity of problematic claims. Participants in discourse assume that the 
agreement they reach constitutes a “rational consensus” – that is, that it does 
not result from or have therefore an applicability/legitimacy limited to the 
peculiarities or situation of the participants. Rather, the agreement is accepted 
as “objectively" valid; valid for all rational subjects (as potential participants).  
Thus, the accomplishment of the universalistic ego identity rationally 
able to raise validity claims appears to provide the basis for Habermas' later 
proposal of the "competent social actor's" "postconventional" identification with 
                                               
development, and gained the ability to abstract from "all particular roles and norms," appears to 
have this critical ability. 
501 Ibid., 292. 
502 Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in 
Dialogue,” Ethics, 105, No. 1 (Oct., 1994), 45. Though this is exactly what Habermas criticizes 
Rawls for assuming he can establish to govern decisions about norms. 
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the abstract concept of "constitutional patriotism" as a stable source for non-
homogenizing and non-exclusionary solidarity and co-existence.503 
 
Doubts 
But Habermas himself comes to express doubt, at least indirectly, about 
the competence of his social actor and as a result the rationality and therefore 
legitimacy of the consensus that should ideally issue from communicative 
deliberation. 
The key to the "abstractive" reflexivity allegedly achieved by the 
competent subject is that "moral knowledge becomes detached from moral 
motivation"504 – i.e., those particular attachments of the lifeworld that, according 
to Habermas, necessitate and motivate communicative rationality and provide 
its context in the first place. As Sharon Krause indicates, "the 'rational assent' 
required to establish validity [in the ideal speech situation] is infused with 
values from the 'lifeworld,' which forms the context of discourse and includes 
'cultural traditions, social orders, and personal identities.'"505 But if it is these 
particular, "conventional" identificatory attachments that motivate subjects, 
then the ego's retraction from them seems to leave it – allegedly assimilated to 
practical reason as it is – with what Habermas calls a "motivational deficit."506 
On its own, Habermas admits, reason can only motivate subjects "weakly."507 If 
                                               
503 See Patchen Markell, “Making Affect Safe for Democracy?,” Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000), 
38-63, http://www.jstor.org/stable/192283. See also my discussion of Markell's article below. 
504 Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, tr., ed., Max Pensky 
(Cambridge: MIT Press), 34. 
505 Sharon Krause, "Desiring Justice: Motivation and Justification in Rawls and Habermas," 
Contemporary Political Theory 4, no. 4 (2005), 376-7, citing Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and 
Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 23. 
506 Ibid., 374, citing Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, transl. William Rehg 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 95. 
507 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, transl. C. Lenhardt and S.W. 
Nicholsen, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 107. 
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this is true, then even when the subject imagines itself as part of an "unlimited 
communication community," it remains practically just as identified 
with/attached to those conventional norms that first formed its subjectivity. 
Patchen Markell508 notes that in a 1974 essay (“Can Complex Societies 
Form a Rational Identity?”509) Habermas realizes the difficulty posed by 
universalistic norms: on the one hand, universalistic norms undermine identity-
formation on the basis of "families, tribes, cities, states, and nations”510 in 
opposition to alien groups; on the other, Habermas admits that if the “place 
from which socially effective bonds issue, previously occupied by these 
traditional identificatory attachments is not filled,” then “universalistic 
morality, in the same way as the ego structures consistent with it, would remain 
a mere postulate.”511 Habermas’s solution to the "motivational deficit" at the 
time of this essay was that modern individuals could form affective relations 
with, and thus a new kind of collective identity based on, the “basic norms of 
rational discourse” (the idealized “unlimited communication community”512) as 
embodied in an “anticipated” or “projected” community of autonomous 
subjects who recognize each other in terms of their autonomous identities.513 
This new form of identification corresponded to Habermas’s theorization of the 
passage developmentally from conventional identification (i.e., the individual’s 
                                               
508 Patchen Markell, “Making Affect Safe for Democracy?,” Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/192283. 
509 Jürgen Habermas, “Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity?” in Toward the 
Reconstruction of Historical Materialism (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), abridged in “On 
Social Identity,” Telos (Spring 1974), 94. 
510 Patchen Markell, “Making Affect Safe for Democracy?,” Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000), 41, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/192283. 
511 Jürgen Habermas, “Can Complex Societies Form a Rational Identity?” in Toward the 
Reconstruction of Historical Materialism (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976), abridged in “On 
Social Identity,” Telos (Spring 1974), 94. 
512 Habermas, Jürgen, “Individuation through Socialization: On Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity,” 
in Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 186. 
513 Ibid., 184-8. 
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“blind subjugation” to the “fixed contents” of traditional social 
expectations/roles, and a collective identity attached to the fixed and given 
attributes of kinship, ethnicity, territory, objects imagined as existing 
“independent of and prior to the political opinion and will-formation of the 
citizens themselves”514) into the maturity of postconventional identification: the 
individual’s autonomous and critical relation to social expectations,515 and a 
collective identity grounded in a shared “consciousness of universal and equal 
opportunity to participate in value and norm-forming learning processes,”516 a 
“self-determining political community.”517  
During the 1980s, Habermas proposed precisely this kind of 
“constitutional patriotism”518 as a way of achieving social integration while 
avoiding recourse to revisionist, normalizing attempts to reformulate German 
identity. The mobilization in such (latter) attempts of a fantasy of a 
homogeneous community resulted, he observed, in intolerance and ethnic 
cleansing.519 In this way, Markell argues, Habermas hoped to “bring the 
sustaining energy of affective identification into politics while avoiding the 
possibility of conflict between citizens’ passionate attachments and their 
rationally grounded moral and political obligations.”520 According to Mead, 
whom Habermas cites in this regard, "'A person may reach a point of going 
                                               
514 Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and 
Citizenship,” in The Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Grieff (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 2000), 117. 
515 Habermas, “Individuation through Socialization,” in Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. William 
Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 182-3. 
516 Jürgen Habermas, “On Social Identity,” Telos (Spring 1974), 100. 
517 Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity,” Appendix II to Between Facts and 
Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 496. 
518 Jürgen Habermas, “Apologetic Tendencies,” in The New Conservatism, ed. and tr. Shierry W. 
Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 227. 
519 “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship,” in The 
Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Grieff (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2000), 115. 
520 “Making Affect Safe for Democracy?” Political Theory 28, no. 1 (2000), 43-4. 
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against the whole world about him….'[521] But,” Habermas comments, "he will 
not be able to sustain himself as a solitary being in vacuo, even in this extreme 
isolation, except as he constitutes himself [as] a member of this wider 
commonwealth of rational beings."522 Political affect and identification must be 
connected not to a concrete historical community but instead to a community of 
rational beings who hold universal norms that provide a basis for valorization 
by a “diversity of cultural life-forms, ethnic groups, religions, and world-
views.”523 Such an “independent affective connection to moral principles,” 
Habermas proposes, will provide a solid foundation from which to decide 
“which of our traditions we want to continue and which we do not.”524 
 
Habermas' proposal of constitutional patriotism and postconventional 
identification is merely an extension of a process that is allegedly universally 
achieved in the competent social actor/subject; this subject, as we have seen 
above, is competent in that he achieves a universalistic ego, able to "retract its 
identity… behind the line all particular roles and norms," instead identifying 
itself abstractly and reflexively/critically as stable in light of this autonomy. But 
a Kantian kingdom of ends as an imaginary ideal speech situation or an 
imaginary communication community retains practical reason and its 
universalistic norms at the core – and is therefore still only weakly motivating, 
if at all. Just as Rawls relied on a "looseness" of comprehensive doctrines to 
                                               
521 George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed. 
Charles W. Morris (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
522 Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. William Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1992), 184-5. 
523 Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and 
Citizenship,” in The Inclusion of the Other, ed. Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Grieff (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 2000), 117. 
524 “Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity,” in The New Conservatism, ed. and tr. 
Shierry W. Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 262. 
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achieve the acculturation of the "citizen" (even though it was the fact, Habermas 
says, that these comprehensive doctrines contained "deeply held" convictions 
that necessitated the priority of justice/right in the first place), so Habermas 
relies on the simple giving up of strong affective ties and their replacement with 
the weak motivating force of "reason." If the strong affective ties could be 
replaced so easily with the weak motivating force of a reason achieved in the 
competent social actor, then there would be in the first place no conflicts to 
resolve, no need for the ideal speech situation. 
 Habermas ultimately, in his later writings and interviews, admits at least 
that particular affective (conventional) identifications in the lifeworld do 
continue to exert their effect long after his image of moral development say 
they are overcome. The  “identity of a person, of a group, or of a region is 
always something concrete, something particular,” requiring an “image;” it can 
never “consist merely in general moral orientations and characteristics, which 
are shared by all alike.”525 On this later view, the earlier solution of 
constitutional patriotism with its abstract idea of “the people” (which 
Habermas thought would “filter” out the other-creating elements of national 
pride and historical consciousness that characterize nationalism), because it 
fails to correspond to any “visibly identifiable gathering of autonomous 
citizens,”526 offers no image in which the people can identify themselves.527 Such 
an image can never accurately represent the shifting, changing demos and its 
democratic will. But it is nevertheless necessary – if we want to stabilize society, 
securing it from the conflicts that result from citizens' passionate attachments. 
                                               
525 Peter Dews, ed., “The Limits of Neo-Historicism,” in Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with 
Jürgen Habermas (London: Verso, 1992), 239. 
526 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1999), 136. 
527 “Popular Sovereignty as Procedure,” Appendix I to Between Facts and Norms, transl. William 
Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 486. 
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Habermas thus later reformulates constitutional patriotism as “ties to 
[universal moral] principles” but now “nourished by a heritage of cultural 
traditions that is consonant with them.”528 Constitutional patriotism is now a 
particular, cultural achievement, not unlike the later Rawls (whom Habermas 
criticized on precisely this point) would have put it; it can “enduringly link” 
universal principles “with the motivations and convictions of citizens” but only 
by situating them “within the historical context of a legal community,”529 or 
“shared political culture.”530 In this respect, the transition from childhood 
instrumental rationality to communicative rationality, in which it is decided 
whether and how much an existing order is undermined or 
reconstructed/reinforced, is a "particularly dangerous" time because not only 
family communication structures but also "cultural traditions contain different 
potentials for stimulation according to their formal [developmental-logical] 
levels; they can, for instance, offer and stimulate the transition to a post-
conventional identity, or hold the restructuring of role identity at the 
conventional level."531 
This "shared political culture," however, as Markell observes, is a 
prepolitical artifact that the demos did not rationally choose in an ideal speech 
situation but is nevertheless attached to. In making universality a part of a 
particular culture, Habermas undermines the legitimacy of this political culture 
                                               
528 “Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity,”in The New Conservatism, ed. and tr. 
Shierry W. Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 262. 
529 “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State,” in The Inclusion of the 
Other, ed. Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Grieff (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 225. 
530 “The Limits of Neo-Historicism,” in Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas 
(London: Verso, 1996), 499-500. 
531 "Zur Einführung," in R. Döbert, J. Habermas and C. Nunner-Winkler, eds., Die Entwicklung des 
Ichs (Köln, 1977) 15, cited in McCarthy, Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 343. 
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from the universalistic perspective of the competent subject it is supposed to 
achieve. If the abstract core of socialized universal norms does not suffice as a 
source of attachment for consensus (in, e.g., the political problem of German 
reunification after 1989), even when these norms are made explicit as per 
Habermas' argument, then, his image of "universal" moral psychological 
development must also be wrong.532 Instead, it seems, the early, particular 
production of conventional subjectivity continues to exert its effect in ways 
ignored by the fantasy of a universalistic ego or "competent social actor." The 
"competent social actor" is not just "culturally contingent" but something 
altogether different than a universalistic ego. He is, instead, an only apparently 
"practically rational" individual whose particular attachments remain hidden 
behind and/or masquerade as universal norms, a universal/normal 
psychological development, and an ideal "citizen." The fact that Habermas' 
competent social actor as universalistic ego does not exist, that the "moral 
standpoint" has not been accomplished,533 means that the (particular) norms 
                                               
532 Habermas must rely not on the critical rationality which is supposed to be established, 
according to his developmental schema, with the transition from natural and personal identity 
to ego identity. Instead, the transition to ego identity seems in reality to turn out to be an 
extension of what Habermas sees as the personal identification process, which is characterized 
by the “internalization of roles that are tied in the beginning to concrete reference persons and 
later detached from them—primarily sex and generation roles that determine the structure of 
the family. This role identity, centered around sex and age and integrated with one's own 
bodily image, becomes more abstract and simultaneously more individual to the extent that the 
growing child appropriates extra-familial systems of roles" (“Historical Materialism and the 
Development of Normative Structures,” in Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: 
Beacon, 1979), 109). The movement to “more abstract” forms of identification does not seem to 
secure identification from the more dangerous—because not critically rational—less 
questioning forms of identification that were supposed to precede them. Adolescence would, 
rather than necessarily marking the transition to critical rationality (i.e., an identity based on 
abstraction from accepted norms, an ego that can sustain itself in abstraction from particular 
identifications and thus devide impartially between them), as Habermas argues in most of his 
writing, instead involve the extension of previous “natural” and “personal” identifications to 
forms that are nonfamilial but nevertheless just as uncritical. 
533 Krause ("Desiring Justice: Motivation and Justification in Rawls and Habermas," 
Contemporary Political Theory 4, no. 4 (2005), 383, Fn 18) notes that Habermas alternatively 
assumes that the moral disposition of the competent social actor a) has already been 
accomplished historically (Between Facts and Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1999), 95), b) belongs to all subjects universally insofar as they are linguistically 
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that constitute communicative rationality must include legal compulsion; 
Habermas argues that the  
subsystem "law," as a legitimate order that has become reflexive, belongs to 
the societal component of the lifeworld. Just as this reproduces itself only 
together with culture and personality structures through the flow of 
communicative actions, so legal actions, too, constitute the medium through 
which institutions of law simultaneously reproduce themselves along with 
intersubjectively shared legal traditions and individual competences for 
interpreting and observing legal rules. As part of the societal component, 
these legal rules constitute a higher level of legitimate orders; at the same 
time, however, they are also represented in the other two lifeworld 
components, as legal symbolism and as competences acquired via legal 
socialization. All three components share cooriginally in the production of 
legal actions.534 
But this legal compulsion as part of the inherited culture is not itself legitimately 
structured by competent social actors – i.e., by the reflexive reason that was 
supposed to lend legitimacy to legal force, to make it the product of the free 
will of the demos. This legal force is, rather than "a higher level of legitimate 
orders,” the product of the normally operative culture- and tradition-bound 
psychology of individuals (perhaps, specifically, individuals who have more 
control over the "means of sanction"). 
                                               
competent (Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, transl. C. Lenhardt and S.W. 
Nicholsen, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 82-98; Justification and Application, transl. C. Cronin 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 31, 76f, 114), but also c) not accomplished and a radical departure 
from the normally operative, culturally bound, object-oriented moral psychology of people 
(Between Facts and Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 4f, 25, 113f; Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, transl. C. Lenhardt and S.W. Nicholsen, (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1996), 109, 179). 
534 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, transl. William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1999), 80-1. 
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So, despite his contention that discursive rationality can legitimately 
provide a "consensual basis for interaction without resort to force in any of its 
forms from open violence to latent manipulation"535 Habermas ends up relying 
on force in its two forms: open coercion in compliance with the ruling culturally 
inherited norms; and latent manipulation in the form of socialization – primary, 
in a culturally specific, moral psychological upbringing, and secondary, in 
raising the validity claims.536 
Socialization of the "universal" norms by the conditioning of habit, 
occurs through bodily, personal identification processes, as Habermas himself 
states, rather than in opposition to or rational abstraction from them. If, as 
Habermas clearly holds, affective identificatory connections to the arbitrary 
authority of traditional identity survive and continue to be dangerous to 
communicative rationality, then his account of socialization needs to be 
modified. The early socializaton of the subject to acquiesce to traditional 
authority seems to retain its hold on the subject long after this authority first 
takes hold. That is, if Habermas is right that the individual cannot "go… 
'against the whole world about him'… sustain himself as a solitary being in 
vacuo" merely on the strength of  post-conventional identification, but "can only 
assure itself of itself if it is able to return to itself from the perspective of others 
as their alter ego," then Habermas must be mistaken about the possibility of a 
post-conventional ego that "does not return to itself as the alter ego of some 
other alter ego from among its own concrete group (as the 'me')… [that] now 
                                               
535 Thomas McCarthy, Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 291. 
536 That is, raising them as universal achievements when they are, as Habermas himself attests, 
not achieved and are rather held as ideals of a particular culture (and perhaps even only part of 
that culture's population); strategic speech and ideal speech are not ultimately distinguishable. 
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comes upon itself as the alter ego of all others in every community — 
specifically, as a free will in moral self-reflection and as a fully individuated 
being in existential self-reflection."537 
Habermas' later argument that particular (i.e., liberal democratic) 
cultures "offer and stimulate the transition to a post-conventional identity,"538 
suggests that even liberal democratic subjectivity relies upon the conditioning 
of affective attachment. His simultaneous observation that even in liberal 
democratic cultures "constitutional patriotism" does not offer sufficient affective 
motivating force to achieve post-conventional identity,539 and needs the 
supplement of the law, suggests that competent subjectivity assimilated to the 
commands of practical reason is a persistent liberal fantasy (a fantasy in which 
Kant, Rawls and Habermas all participate), and that this fantasy is one into 
which the liberal democratic subject is – more or less successfully – socialized. 
This fantasy of reciprocal and general (i.e., universal) rational consensus about 
governing norms540 is one that, as Habermas himself indicates, the child is 
powerless (because he has no access to the "means of sanction") to resist; "for 
the growing child" any "institution or… norm" that the parental or other 
authority commands as an imperative "is worthy of being recognized [as] in the 
interest of all involved."541 In this fantasy-imperative, the image of the 
                                               
537 Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. William Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1992), 187. 
538 "Zur Einführung," cited in McCarthy, Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 343. 
539 Seen in this light, Habermas's argument that individual identity entirely depends on the 
individual's relation to others—"Not only as an autonomous being but also as an individuated 
being, the self of the practical relation-to-self cannot reassure itself about itself through direct 
reflection but only via the perspective of other" (Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, tr. 
William Mark Hohengarten, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 186)—suggests that his primary 
affective relations exert an influence on his actions far more powerful than does his imaginary 
relation with an ideal "communication community" (Ibid., 185). 
540 A fantasy/projection altogether as monological as what Habermas criticizes as Rawls's and 
Kant's projections. 
541 Haberman, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, tr. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981), 39. 
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competent social actor provides the ideal for the subject's self-examination and 
measurement. The continued reinforcement of this fantasy, in his education and 
the (Kant-inspired) political thought of his culture, ensures his obedience to and 
therefore the conservation of existing (status quo) liberal norms and institutions 
precisely because he has been conditioned to accept that these have resulted 
from the free will of all competent liberal democratic subjects. In the 
identificatory attachment to this fantasy, language, as Habermas has 
demonstrated, is crucial. The Habermasian liberal terminology and argument – 
"pure proceduralism," "neutrality," and "reciprocal" respect of "universal," 
"principles," "communicative rationality" and "practical reason" - work upon the 
already socialized/conditioned liberal subject, directing him back in his 
moment of doubt. 
To the extent that this fantasy is not adopted, and this socialization fails, 
the other form of force is employed: the subject is constrained by the law. 
Habermas' account of moral psychological development amounts, then, to a 
prescription and standard against which to test for normal development of the 
subject. The raising of the validity claims is a mere continuation of this 
examination technique, applied to the subject either by himself or others, 
depending on how successful their preceding socialization has been. The 
raising of validity claims appears to work the way the invocation to Kant's 
categorical imperative and Rawls' reflective equilibrium do – i.e., upon a more 
or less successfully already-socialized/conditioned subject, in Kant's case via 
the imperative addressed to the "rational being" to exercise techniques of 
humiliation upon himself and others, in Rawls' by one's constant self-
examination as "citizen."   
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6. Agonistic Respect and Ambivalent Tension 
This chapter examines the neuroscientific understanding of the way the 
human organism is conditioned, its limits and possibilities in perceiving and 
acting, in order to determine its general amenability to change via the 
application of techniques – that is, to determine the reality/truth of what 
Foucault observes as "basic human capacities to remark, describe, and 
remember."542 I begin to answer the questions posed by Foucault's observations 
of both the disciplinary corporealization of docile bodies and techniques of the 
self aimed at freedom – how can we be free, and how free can we be? But I 
begin with a discussion of the work of a political theorist who also attends to 
these limits and possibilities, specifically in our Euro-American subjectivity, 
suggesting a techniques of the self for our time.  
William Connolly's discussion of those moments in which 
perception/judgment occurs and is conditioned, reinforced or transformed in 
our everyday practices, our daily techniques, is aimed at encouraging an 
acceptance of the fundamental uncertainty of existence, rather than its rejection 
– by the ressentimental, punitive, liberal morality we Euro-Americans are 
conditioned to reproduce. Over the course of his work, Connolly comes to see 
that though genealogization of accepted moral conventions is important, to 
change our moral dispositions we must also re-cultivate them through 
techniques that work directly upon “the visceral register” – i.e., a 
"neuropolitics" – by way of the neurophysiological mechanisms and sites that 
recent neuroscience suggests are the basis of all of our behavior, including both 
the habits that account for most of our action and the innovative, less common, 
                                               
542 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 385, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
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spontaneous departures from habit. Given his observation of the ubiquity of 
habit in behavior, and the ubiquity of the conventional disciplinary techniques 
that produce habit, Connolly’s almost exclusive focus on the cinematic 
experience as a transformative technique needs supplementation by attention 
to other techniques that can be applied in more of our everyday activities. In 
addition, we need a more complete understanding of our neurophysiology 
than the one Connolly provides to be able to evaluate and adjust our 
dispositional techniques. This chapter aims, therefore, to provide an 
examination of Connolly’s important contribution and direction, and provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of our neuropsychology, in order to 
further the mostly neglected but crucial question of how the dispositions (or 
habit) that makes most of our decisions gets formed and can be changed. 
 
Liberal Subjectivation 
"Being" in the world, Connolly observes, is wonderful, but it is also 
tragic. This basic reality cannot be cheated. We are constituted by forces within 
and outside our own and each other’s bodies, forces whose effects we enjoy 
and suffer but cannot ultimately master. Our fundamental vulnerability creates 
anxiety, and this anxiety prompts us to react. The authoritarian reaction to this 
vulnerability attempts to manipulate, control, and coerce the world’s 
(including, importantly, the human organism’s) mostly uncontrollable 
“diversity of forces and energies,”543 to create an order that will eventually 
conform to the power of a ruler. This project of mastery, however, as much of 
Connolly’s work has shown, is not just an authoritarian or ancient one; it is also 
                                               
543 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 72.  
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the project of liberals and recent prominent Anglo-American political theory. 
(We have already seen the forms this project takes in Kant, Rawls, and 
Habermas). They “compensate for the loss of transcendental or teleological 
reassurance by loading secular thought with a [concealed] faith that the world 
itself is predisposed to be mastered in support of the identities they favor.”544 
This liberal, Anglo-American project attempts to create a subject who 
experiences and treats herself as fully responsible and culpable for her own joy 
and suffering, who assumes that obedience to a benevolent authority (or 
benevolent organization of authority) will be rewarded with security from 
vulnerability.545  
 But if it is impossible to secure the human organism from its 
vulnerability to the internal and external forces which animate and effect it, 
then the attempt to achieve a liberal identity for it will inflict additional 
violence and suffering upon it – as an organism constituted by precisely these 
forces. This characteristic of Anglo-American liberal thought – the absolute 
necessity of making oneself culpable, responsible, and obedient to an authority 
                                               
544 Ibid. For example, Habermas contends that his communicative rationality is universal, Rawls 
that the citizen is autonomously rational. 
545 “A drive circulates… in Western culture… to look for someone to hold responsible when 
utopian hopes are shattered by hard realities” (William Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative 
(Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1993), 100). Connolly owes this insight ultimately to 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche explicitly and repeatedly indicates in On the Genealogy of Morals that the 
origin of ressentiment is fear, even if this fear becomes an avoidance: "Here precisely is what has 
become a fatality for Europe – together with the fear of man we have also lost our love of him, 
our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even the will to him" (On the Genealogy of Morals and 
Ecce Homo, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), 44). This loss occurs with the birth 
of ressentiment as a reaction to fear - "That lambs dislike great birds does not seem strange" (Ibid.). 
Only later is our "suffering" of man "not fear" (Ibid., 43) – because the triumph of slave morality 
leaves nothing to fear (or admire) in domesticated, docile man. But, Connolly says, the "fluid 
mood of estrangement from an uncertain object" – i.e., the anxiety – occasioned by the uncanny 
is interpreted in the Augustinian case as a sign of one's failure or guilt and a prompt to 
"reinstate more intensely the conviction of identity or morality… just disrupted" (The 
Augustinian Imperative (Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1993), 137). This obedience 
constitutes an avoidance of the uncertainty or ambivalence of the uncanny, a "suppression" of it. 
This will be discussed, below, as learned behavior – i.e., the avoidance of fearful stimuli in order 
to reduce the pain/fear it elicits. That is, ressentiment is a specific avoidance response to a 
reaction to a stimulus. 
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capable of securing us from vulnerability – Connolly calls “the Augustinian 
Imperative,” after the celebrated saint, who interprets the world in this manner. 
Augustine's interpretation of the myth of Genesis546 is one we Euro-Americans 
share; the predominance of the Augustinian imperative in our culture – its 
“infiltration into contemporary practices of identity, production, responsibility, 
guilt, punishment, confession, and faith”547 – is evinced in our automatic, 
unquestioned assignment of sole responsibility to the perfectly free will of the 
man and woman (and the snake) for the Edenic tragedy, and the absolute 
goodness/perfection of an all-powerful, all-knowing God, who can save us 
from tragedy.548 Our cultural conditioning/acculturation leads us to interpret549 
punished acts as “bad” acts, to assume culpability for the actions for which 
we’re punished and to take responsibility for our future obligation and 
obedience to the punishing authority; the Augustinian imperative, in the 
various forms of humiliation exercised in our families, schools, corporations, 
political and social institutions, lays the ground for an interpretation of the 
Genesis story along Augustinian lines. And this interpretation reinforces this 
conditioned imperative, deepening the reach of its command.550 Augustine’s 
                                               
546 “It exercises so much cultural power that it is difficult to read those old words without 
immediately projecting Augustine’s meanings into them” (Ibid., 94). 
547 Ibid. 
548 Ibid.,101. This move, from the Augustinian perspective, would secure for the Augustinian 
God’s favor. By doing God’s will, as opposed to following one’s fallen, selfish will – the one that 
Augustine says is fallen as a result of the original fall… the split-off will that diverged from 
god’s will at the moment of Adam’s choice (whereas in reality this will is merely free choice, the 
responsibility that humans must take on for their choices) – one reduces vulnerability to 
minimum or, (increases security to a maximum) by eliminating choice, by subsuming all 
choices under God’s law. 
549 But with interpretive direction/instruction from the various institutional authorities, not 
simply punishment, delineating good and bad, along the lines discussed by Habermas in The 
Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, 
tr. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1981). 
550 Even where the voice of doubt appears – as to the goodness of a god who with omnipotence 
and omniscience (including prescience) wills a situation for which Augustine gives him no 
responsibility – it is silenced by an imperative to obey, a fear of death… which is visceral and 
has greater pull on our morality than our “logic.” 
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account/interpretation reminds us of our own past actions – actions that 
seemed to us at first of ambiguous or no consequence, but that – when 
punished by some patriarchal authority – we come after the punishment to judge 
as if they were clear and intentional ‘crimes,’ deserving of punishment.  
This unformulated shock of recognition by adults of the retroactive 
character of their own judgments, and the pressures to repress this 
experience in the interests of treating themselves as moral agents, 
contributes to the magnetic power of Genesis. Adults [in our Euro-
American culture] have an uncanny recollection of how the story goes even 
before Augustine tells them how to read it.551 
The earliest Genesis account,552 on the other hand, leaves open another 
interpretation: that not only the humans and the snake but also Yahweh, 
because he made the man, woman, and snake and their dispositions, share 
responsibility for the tragedy.553 This god cannot be omnipotent and omniscient 
but rather “an energetic, active, impatient god who has things to learn about 
the effects of its interventions”554 – not unlike a parent or other human 
authority. This latter non-Augustinian response to (interpretation of) the shock 
of tragedy – “the terror that seems to accompany the initial experience of a tear 
or rift in the fabric of being”555 – implies an awareness (explicit consciousness) 
of oneself as not only subject but object, vulnerable to both enjoyment and 
suffering that one does not control; we can be “used, exploited, abused, 
dominated, killed” by each other, and “harmed, damaged, hurt, and 
                                               
551 William Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative (Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 
1993), 134. 
552 The book written by J (referred to as J because the author calls the god figure Yahweh, or 
Jehovah). 
553 Ibid., 96. 
554 Ibid., 96. 
555 Ibid., 101. 
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destroyed” by nature or god/s, but we can also be “helped, loved, nurtured, 
and befriended by others and blessed by nature/god.”556  
The repression of this awareness of oneself as object is what creates the 
uncanny. The Genesis story is uncanny557 because it recalls for us our past 
                                               
556 Ibid., 99. 
557 As opposed to Connolly's stricter definition, Freud says that the term "uncanny" tends to 
refer to "what excites fear in general," and in particular to "that class of the frightening which 
leads back to what is known of old and long familiar" – i.e., what modern psychology refers to 
as anxiety, as opposed to fear. Freud notes the term’s ultimate ambiguity: "among its different 
shades of meaning the word ‘heimlich’’ exhibits one which is identical with its opposite, 
‘unheimlich.’ What is heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich.” (Gutzkow, Freud writes, 
comments, ‘We call it "unheimlich"; you call it "heimlich.”’) “In general we are reminded that 
the word ‘heimlich’ is not unambiguous, but belongs to two sets of ideas, which, without being 
contradictory, are yet very different: on the one hand it means what is familiar and agreeable, 
and on the other, what is concealed and kept out of sight. ‘Unheimlich’ is customarily used, we 
are told, as the contrary only of the first signification of ’heimlich,’ and not of the second" (“The 
Uncanny,” in The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 17, 
ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1974), 224-25). Freud says that what is familiar also 
contains what is concealed: "heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction 
of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some 
way or other a sub-species of heimlich." Jentsch observes the "uncanny effect of epileptic fits, 
and of manifestations of insanity, because these excite in the spectator the impression of 
automatic, mechanical processes at work behind the ’ordinary appearance of mental activity" – 
that is, the hidden mechanical automatic functioning of something that is supposed to be 
autonomous. (In this sense, the enlightenment uncanny is the automaton concealed behind 
reason.) Connolly (though he might have examined the culturally inflected fear of death specific 
to our time and place) follows Freud in allowing primary narcissism a role in determining the 
uncanny but drops out Freud's explanation – the castration complex. Freud, roughly, argues 
that the ego's doubling (as a result of the prohibitions of primary narcissism, its repression of 
specific desires and its self-identification with acceptable desires) creates an agency that pushes 
away those desires, and anything associated with them; an other is created alongside this new 
agency. An unfamiliar other, a stranger, who is nevertheless ultimately the repressed desire at 
the core of oneself – and therefore intimately familiar. "The idea of the ‘double’ does not 
necessarily disappear with the passing of primary narcissism, for it can receive fresh meaning 
from the later stages of the ego’s development. A special agency is slowly formed there, which 
is able to stand over against the rest of the ego, which has the function of observing and 
criticizing the self and of exercising a censorship within the mind, and which we become aware 
of as our ‘conscience.’ In the pathological case of delusions of being watched, this mental 
agency becomes isolated, dissociated from the ego, and discernible to the physician’s eye. The 
fact that an agency of this kind exists, which is able to treat the rest of the ego like an object — 
the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation — renders it possible to invest the old 
idea of a ‘double’ with a new meaning and to ascribe a number of things to it — above all, those 
things which seem to self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism of earliest 
times." (In other words, those things that persist as latent/repressed desires… which to the 
conditioned conscience/perception appear as other, in need of constraint and punishment, 
because of the conscience/perception’s "punitive orientation to difference." According to Freud, 
"When all is said and done, the quality of uncanniness can only come from the fact of the 
'double' being a creation dating back to a very early mental stage, long since surmounted — a 
stage, incidentally, at which it wore a more friendly aspect. The 'double' has become a thing of 
terror, just as, after the collapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons." It is "possible to 
recognize the dominance in the unconscious mind of a 'compulsion to repeat' proceeding from 
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experiences of “the contingency of life and the fragility of things;”558 it reminds 
us of the limits of our power. Familiar because we have experienced it, 
unfamiliar because we have repressed the experience. In our Euro-American 
case, this repression is profound: the anxiety that results from the experience of 
contingency is used to elicit further repression. In fact, the Augustinian 
morality elicits the uncanny (for example, in the retelling of the Augustinian 
account of Genesis) – the anxiety it occasions559 – in order to colonize it, turn it 
into revenge against the very figure this morality presents to elicit the 
uncanny560 (in Augustine’s Genesis account – the snake, the man’s 
doubt/curiosity, his and Eve’s eating of the apple). We interpret our anxiety as 
guilt; the anxiety that the uncanny occasions "readily becomes translated into 
those pangs of guilt through which a moral economy reinstates the 
equivalences that had just been disturbed" by the uncanny.561 Augustine's 
reading of Genesis "subdues the uncanny within morality" – that is, subdues the 
awareness of contingency, the vulnerability/possibility of reality - by making 
                                               
the instinctual impulses and probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts — a 
compulsion powerful enough to overrule the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of 
the mind their daemonic character, and still very clearly expressed in the impulses of small 
children; a compulsion, too, which is responsible for a part of the course taken by the analyses 
of neurotic patients. All these considerations prepare us for the discovery that whatever 
reminds us of this inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny;" "if psycho-analytic 
theory is correct in maintaining that every affect belonging to an emotional impulse, whatever 
its kind, is transformed, if it is repressed, into anxiety, then among instances of frightening 
things there must be one class in which the frightening element can be shown to be something 
repressed which recurs. This class of frightening things would then constitute the uncanny." 
Freud reiterates, "this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is 
familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through 
the process of repression;" "The uncanny effect of epilepsy and of madness has the same origin. 
The layman sees in them the working of forces hitherto unsuspected in his fellow-men, but at 
the same time he is dimly aware of them in remote corners of his own being" “The Uncanny,” in 
The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 17, ed. James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1974), 238-41). 
558 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 25. 
559 The feeling of anxiety is the "most productive and dangerous effect" of the uncanny (William 
Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative (Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1993), 135). 
560 Ibid., 137. 
561 Ibid., 132–33. 
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its source an omnipotent, benevolent (moral) god, and the uncanny within 
identity by repressing and oppressing otherness (one’s 
vulnerability/possibility) wherever it appears, within oneself and others.  
Whereas Augustinians highjack the anxiety elicited by the uncanny with 
ascetic techniques upon oneself and others to repress it, Connolly would have 
us accept with gratitude our vulnerability to contingency as also open-ended 
possibility – less terrifying, less in perceived need of repression and control. 
Instead of the Augustinian imperative for responsibility as absolute 
control/command over ourselves and others in keeping with the law of God, 
we might see moral responsibility as a constantly renegotiated and 
“indispensable social practice that typically contains elements of injustice in it, 
as a necessary activity (which is, because of anxiety) inherently susceptible to 
inflation by those who impose utopian dreams of unity, salvation, freedom, or 
agency onto [inherently heteronomous] life.”562  
 In Identity/Difference (1991), Connolly had already indicated how this 
utopian drive to self-reassurance”563 is constituted by tactics of self-identity 
(and otherness) – tactics that attempt to stabilize an identity (e.g., selfless, good, 
saved) as universally normal by the “deniable violences”564 of the 
repression/oppression of difference as an other (e.g., the selfish will, the city of 
the flesh). (In Kant, Rawls and Habermas, the ideal of the abstract, universal, 
liberal subject is established by tactics of humiliation applied to 
repress/oppress the particular, acculturated subject.) These tactics, which aim 
at repressing and distracting from the anxiety occasioned by the uncanny, are 
                                               
562 Ibid., 101. 
563 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 9. 
564 William Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 137. 
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socialized by (in our Euro-American case) an Augustinian morality,565 and, 
because they are typically subconscious and automatic, hard to change 
consciously.566 In Identity/Difference and Augustinian (1993) it is, therefore, 
already clear that moral dispositions/identies – both the Augustinian 
disposition and Connolly’s alternative “non-ressentimental” “ethical 
decency”567 – are formed or transformed by techniques (and counter-
techniques) that change psychophysiology568 – especially Connolly’s invitation 
                                               
565 One has “established tactics of self-identity… means by which one has become constituted as 
what one is” (William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 9). 
566 This is not to say that conscious discursive engagement can not be an effective means of 
altering one’s orientation to morality and contingency, but that the means must engage affect 
(and, just to be clear, affect is always engaged in discursive analysis as well) in such a way that 
one’s conditioned responses to the anxiety of the uncanny do not further harden the structures 
of response – in this case, punitive ones. Connolly is aware – later in Neuropolitics - of this 
linguistic connection: “some brain nodules… have the capacity to register only intense, crude 
inscriptions, whereas others to which the first are connected are capable of linguistic 
refinement. But in the process of thinking, all of them form a complex series of loops and counterloops 
with each other, the rest of the body, and the larger culture” (William Connolly, Neuropolitics: 
Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 74). 
567 William Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative (Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 
1993), 137. 
568 In Identity/Difference (I/D), the “experience of contingency in identity” can be engendered by 
“genealogy and democratic agonism” (William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic 
Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 11); the way these 
methods work as tactics/techniques that change dispositions is still unclear. But there are 
nevertheless hints in I/D and Augustinian of a new attention to techniques and their effects on 
moral disposition. “Genealogy,” the method of both Augustinian and I/D, is for Connolly a 
“mode” of reflection that “cultivates” dispositions (Ibid., 10). In Augustinian, Connolly’s 
inclusive and empathetic terminology appears to be consciously chosen – a series of symbols 
that “work subsymbolically” to recultivate affective dispositions, that appear to try to access the 
unconscious uncanny: though we have made each other suffer, we are invited as “friends” to 
understand our collective suffering, as well as our ability to forgive/accept the tragic 
contingency of the circumstances that have conditioned Augustine’s and our punitive 
dispositions. (Connolly reveals the contingencies leading to Augustine’s own conditioned 
tendencies in ethics and self-identification, as well as how Augustine’s tendencies amount to 
techniques that habituate us Euro-Americans to command moralities like Augustine’s.) 
Genealogical discourse is of course only one possible counter-technique, and by no means the 
most efficacious, but it is clear now that the change in orientation to morality that Connolly 
wants to effect must take account of and work psychophysiologically, even if the language of 
Identity/Difference (while conscious of the relationship between affect and interpretation) still 
makes no explicit connection between the theoretical analysis of genealogy and the visceral (i.e., 
psychophysiology). (This lack of awareness is apparent, for example, in the following citation: 
“In the contemporary world… practices of child-rearing, intimate relations, tactics of self-
improvement, gender relations, administrative regulation, therapy, work-incentive systems, 
medicine, advertising, election strategy, and political dissent are all legitimized or delegitimized 
through the theorizations that help to constitute them…” (Ibid.,11). 
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in Augustinian (1993) to cultivate an ethical sensibility more open (less anxious 
and reactionary) to the uncanny by applying “subtle tactics to the self”569; even 
if Connolly’s explicit consideration of specific tactics/techniques and their 
effect on “the visceral register” will have to wait until Neuropolitics (2002).570 
In Neuropolitics, Connolly novelly and explicitly focuses on the visceral 
“register” – i.e., in a psychophysiological sense, how we are morally 
conditioned/cultivated, and how we might cultivate a different ethical 
disposition. Though Connolly spends much of the book on the genealogization 
of accepted (Kantian and other571,572) moral economies,573 this genealogical 
                                               
569 William Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative (Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage Publications, 
1993), 138. 
570 In Ethos of Pluralization (1995), Connolly develops further the account of the formation of 
dispositions – especially fundamentalisms. Fundamentalisms “that demand… a unified faith, 
race, reason, gender duality, normal sexuality, nation and/or territory… ethnic cleansing, 
enforced heterosexuality, racialization of crime and punishment redogmatizations of divinity, 
nature, and reason… intensification of state border patrols” (xii). For example, white, blue-
collar males made resentful by the workplace subjugation/feminization, are then courted by 
the elite, right-wing ideal of masculine assertion, and so end up enacting a masculine 
fundamentalism, in which they “belligerently assert primordial rights against women, gays, 
intellectuals, and African-Americans” (William Connolly, Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 114). But Connolly’s analysis remains largely sociological 
(rather than psychophysiological), and his solutions, political. 
571 Indeed, the Augustinian cultivation project (1. genealogize established – i.e., accepted as 
"given, necessary, or intrinsic" – conceptions ("gender, identity, nature, the will, truth, the Law") 
2. "cultivate fugitive excesses or surpluses in the experience of life to fold greater generosity into 
the ethical sensibility governing you” 3. "apply subtle tactics to the self" to make it less anxious 
and reactionary in the face of the uncanny, less likely to use the anxiety generated by the 
uncanny to re-repress it in the interest of maintaining "established moral economies" 4. create 
political strategies that "fold agonistic generosity more deeply into the cultural ethos of a 
democratic society” (138)), minus the explicitly political agenda is more or less the stated 
agenda of Neuropolitics – 1) contest accepted moral economies – the focus this time on Kant and 
neoKantians 2) engender nontheistic gratitude 3) apply techniques that cultivate us to an 
affective disposition of agonistic respect (106). We might call this “disposition of agonistic 
respect” one of universal respect for persons (defined as beings with affective dispositions), as 
opposed to the Kantian disposition which respects persons not as affective and particular but 
rather as rational, abstract/noumenal beings – i.e., which in the guise of respecting the 
universal law of reason in all rational beings subserves the particular interests of the dominant 
culture and class. As we have seen, In Kantian democratic theory, universal noumenal reason is 
supposed to provide the basis of universal respect for the law (even though Kant, Rawls and 
Habermas reveal that the Kantian subject's moral disposition respects the law via techniques of 
conditioning). 
572 In both Augustinian Imperative and Neuropolitics, it looks like 2 and 3 are not very distinct and 
entail "subtle tactics of the self." In fact, even the activity involved in 1 cannot but work on "the 
visceral register" just as "subtle techniques of the self" do, even if they are not theorized this 
way, as we have already seen in our discussion of the work linguistic signs do in Rawls' and 
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critique is supplemented by a discussion of how neuroscientific findings help 
explain our moral conditioning and could inform our counter-techniques, in 
the service of greater self-governance (democracy). Connolly’s 
neurophysiological theorization, like many popularizations of neuroscience, 
lacks systematicity, potentially undermining some of its conclusions and 
therefore its potential application to our own technical experimentation. As 
importantly, Connolly mostly limits his analysis of technique to a 
decontextualized discussion of watching film, discussing only 
indirectly/obliquely most of everyday life experience, outside the cinema or 
screening room – i.e., where we repeat or confront habitual behavior, and 
where we face the institutional and freedom-limiting authorities of our lives.574 
Nevertheless, Connolly’s discussion of neuroscience has some validity, and 
does suggest an important direction for a further elaborated and systematized 
psychophysiological theory that could be put in the service of freedom. 
 
                                               
especially Habermas' theories of childhood and linguistic development. Connolly himself 
recognizes this point, citing Foucault, “‘It is not enough to say the subject is constituted in a 
symbolic system…. It is [also] constituted in real practices…. There is a technology of the 
constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using them.’ [“On the 
Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York, Pantheon, 1984), 369]. The thoughtful application by oneself of techniques 
to one’s entrenched patterns of affective thought can both track the institutional technologies 
through which the visceral register has been organized and activate presumptive 
responsiveness to new social movements of pluralization” (William Connolly, Neuropolitics: 
Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 108). 
573 This focus is an obvious legacy in the work of his students. For example, Paul Saurette, The 
Kantian Imperative: Humiliation, Common Sense, Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2005); John Tambornino, The Corporeal Turn: Passion, Necessity, Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2002). 
574 Our friends and intimate relations, my parents and siblings as they are now, strangers I pass 
by or interact with in public, school colleagues and authorities, employers I work for, 
corporations and companies I buy things from, administrative government offices I pay taxes to 
and get basic services from, police. 
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Connolly’s neuroscientific evidence for cultivation 
The basic point of Connolly’s discussion of neuroscience is that 
dispositions are conditioned, neurophysiological structure, which interprets 
our present experience and makes our decisions, or significantly circumscribes 
their possible range. Dispositions are memory – i.e., they are neural 
representations of experience, which provide the context of perception and 
decision.  
Dispositions are, according to neuroscientist Antonio Damasio,575 
“records which are dormant and implicit… of the… emotional reaction to the 
object… [W]hen we recall an object… dispositions… make their implicit 
information explicit… we retrieve not just sensory data, but also accompanying 
motor and emotional data.”576 In the “miniscule” time required for our reaction 
to an object/event, much unconscious calculation – accessing of neuronal 
networks of affect-imbued representations of our experience – occurs “behind 
the seemingly open stage of your [conscious] mind.”577 When we are “in the 
midst of action,” this dispositional memory, cultivated/conditioned over our 
lifetime, provides context – the way we see our situation, our options, and their 
consequences. This context constrains or perhaps even makes our decisions, 
even though we appear to make them freely and in the moment. 
 
                                               
575 Behavioral neurologist and neuroscientist, currently David Dornsife Professor of 
Neuroscience at the University of Southern California, director of USC's Brain & Creativity 
Institute (BCI) analyzing and treating movement, behavior, and cognition disorders, recipient of 
the several prestigious awards in medicine and neuroscience, and author of several best-selling 
books on emotion and the brain. Damasio and Joseph LeDoux (below) are Connolly’s main 
sources for his discussion of neuroscience and its implications for understanding habit and 
experimenting with technical modifications of it. 
576 A. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness 
(London: Heinmann, 1999), 160–1. 
577 Ibid., 126. 
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Dispositional sites 
Damasio calls the neurons (neuronal networks) that are fundamental to 
our dispositions “somatic markers.” Located in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, which, Connolly notes, operates “below the threshold of [conscious] 
reflection,”578 somatic markers do the work of deliberation, sifting through a 
“wealth of detail” and highlighting components “that are likely to be 
relevant”579 –usually pertaining to the danger or favorability of the 
object/event. Connolly reiterates Damasio’s account of a patient with damage 
to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex who was able to react fearlessly, 
noninstinctively, to the feeling of his car sliding on ice, so that the car remained 
in his control. He calmly drove over an icy patch of road because he had no 
access to the somatic markers that precipitated other drivers’ panicked 
responses and accidents in the same conditions. But when asked to choose 
between two dates to return to the clinic, this patient was unable to 
discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information:  
For the better part of a half-hour, the patient enumerated reasons for and 
against each of the two dates: previous engagements, proximity to other 
engagements, possible meteorological conditions, virtually anything that 
one could reasonably think about concerning a simple date. Just as calmly 
as he had driven over the ice… he was now walking us through a tiresome 
cost-benefit analysis, an endless outlining and fruitless comparison of 
options and possible consequences. It took enormous discipline to listen to 
all of this without pounding on the table and telling him to stop, but we 
                                               
578 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 35. 
579 A. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon, 1994), 
175. 
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finally did tell him, quietly, that he should come on the second of the 
alternative dates…. He simply said, "That’s fine."580 
Cut off from the unconscious deliberation (contextualization) work his somatic 
markers would execute, Damasio’s patient, Connolly comments, was 
“condemned to the infinite imperative of calculative reasoning because he had 
lost the affect-imbued markers appropriate to contextual decision making.”581  
In addition to the somatic markers, Connolly focuses on the amygdala, a 
key anatomical structure in fast decision-making. It is part of a “system that 
generates rapid, coarse judgments in dangerous situations operating below the 
capacity of conscious assessment and feeling.”582 Connolly cites neuroscientist 
Joseph LeDoux’s583 influential study of the amygdala – its involvement in 
“those unconscious crunching operations during the half-second delay 
[between sensory reception and consolidation of conscious perceptions, 
feelings, judgments], working ‘sub-symbolically, in codes that are not 
decipherable consciously.’584”585 The amygdala “both influences conduct on its 
own and bumps intensities into conscious thinking and judgment [in the cortex] 
                                               
580 Ibid., 194. 
581William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 35. Whether this demonstrates “the limits of pure reason,” as Damasio 
(Descartes’ Error 194) and Connolly conclude, is not clear. Nevetheless, this subject resembles 
Rawls’ decision-maker, with veil of ignorance, devoid of relevant markers, which it is the 
project of the veil to obscure; and Habermas’ cosmopolitan subject, who identifies only with 
norms… but in the end turns out to need and already be attached to a supplementary concrete 
object of identification. 
582 Ibid., 90. 
583 NYU Professor of Neuroscience and Psychology, director of the Center for the Neuroscience 
of Fear and Anxiety for analyzing human pathological anxiety and fear through animal 
research, author of the critically acclaimed books on the brain and fear, The Emotional Brain 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) and Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are 
(New York: Viking, 2002). 
584Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 280. 
585 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 90–91. 
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that the complex brain regions then process according to their own capacities of 
reception, speed, and organization.”586  
 
Connolly’s Conclusions 
Though the nature of their relationship remains unclear in Connolly’s 
discussion, the amygdala and somatic markers, both appear to register the 
effect of past conditioning upon present conscious processes unnoticed and in 
parallel rather than serially (the way the conscious mind perceives).587 Both 
convert culture into individual response/behavior. Somatic markers have 
“intersubjective and linguistic elements mixed into them;”588 they are 
“culturally mobilized, corporeal disposition[s] through which affect-imbued, 
preliminary orientations to perception and judgment scale down the material 
factored into cost-benefit analyses, principled judgments, and reflective 
experiments.”589 Via the somatic markers, the “higher, linguistic register” 
responds not just to intelligible signs/events, but also the “visceral dimension 
of trauma, an intense set of feelings that gather in the gut, the muscles, and the 
pallor of the skin.”590 The amygdala “contains culturally influenced tendencies 
to action.”591 It participates in a subsystem that both “organizes coarse 
infraperceptions and impulses to action on its own” and shapes higher brain 
regions’ “prioritizations with respect to perception, argument, interpretation, 
                                               
586 Ibid., 90. 
587 “Consciousness seems to do things serially… one at a time, whereas the unconscious mind, 
being composed of many different systems, seems to work more or less in parallel" (Joseph 
LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 280). 
588 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 36. 
589 Ibid., 35. 
590 Ibid., 36. 
591 Ibid., 206, Fn 27. Italics mine. 
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and action.”592 “Thinking and judgment are already well under way before they 
enter the picture as conscious processes.”593  
In addition, Connolly discusses virtual memories – records of the past in 
body-brain networks that have “effects upon the present without taking the 
shape of recollection.”594 They effect our perception without our awareness, 
whether we are “sunk in the middle of action”595 or in non-emergency 
situations: “even ordinary perception moves pretty fast, faster than the 
conscious mind can think.” Perceptions are organized “through complex 
mixtures of sensory encounter, virtual memory, and bodily affect.”596 Virtual 
memories “mobilized” during perception “subtract from the incoming sensory 
material a surplus irrelevant to a small set of action possibilities….”597  
Thus, through virtual memory, somatic markers and the amygdala, 
Connolly concludes that acculturation exerts its influence through the 
“incomprehensible quantities of unconscious calculation”598 that take place 
during “the half-second delay between the reception of sensory material and 
the consolidation of perceptions, feelings, and judgments”599 in our conscious 
interpretation of this material. “Thought [and behavior more generally] is always 
                                               
592 Ibid. Italics mine. 
593 Ibid., 28. 
594 Ibid.,  97. 
595 Ibid., 26. 
596 “As your affect-charged biocultural memory deems particular elements unnecessary or 
unworthy, they are subtracted from the myriad sensory materials rushing in” (Ibid., 28). 
597  During the act of perception, memory “recovers” the “accumulated efforts of the past” in the 
form of “‘intelligently coordinated movements… the definite order and systematic character 
with which the actual movements take place…’” (Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. 
M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (New York: Zone, 1991), 82, cited in William Connolly, Neuropolitics: 
Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 27). Memory “‘no 
longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not 
because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present 
moment’” (Ibid., 28). 
598 Tor Norretranders, The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size, tr. Jonathan 
Sydenham (New York: Viking, 1998): 164. 
599 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002): 83. 
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under way by the time you place it under the incomplete governance of intentionality 
and public expression.”600  
 
Tactics 
If perception, thought, decision is already influenced by the 
acculturated/conditioned amygdala, somatic markers, and virtual memory by 
the time consciousness becomes aware of an object/event, then directly 
appealing to this consciousness to change its perception and behavior will 
encounter resistance, as Connolly repeatedly states: “The logic of everyday 
perception seems innate to actors in the midst of action;”601 The “weight of 
somatic markers… generates a need for tactics and techniques by which to 
work on them when their compressions of experience become too restrictive or 
destructive”602 – as in the Augustinian command morality; “the amygdala 
cannot be changed by argument alone, but it, or the relays in which it is 
implicated, may be susceptible to some degree of tactics of change that mimic 
the way it was culturally programmed.”603  
 Connolly, nevertheless, proceeds to spend the larger portion of 
Neuropolitics using the neuroscientific evidence of cultural conditioning to argue 
against established command moralities of transcendentalists and thick 
universalists, who tend automatically to dismiss  “perspectives anchored in 
sensible and infrasensible sources.”604 The fact that sense experience in the form 
of conditioning/acculturation tends to govern thought/behavior means that 
Kant and neoKantians treatment of arts of the self (“ubiquitous exercises, tools, 
                                               
600 Ibid., 71. 
601 Ibid., 28. 
602 Ibid., 35–36. 
603 Ibid., 206, Fn 27. Italics mine. 
604 Ibid., 106. 
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and techniques helping to shape thinking and sensibility in profound ways”605) 
to “therapies” (aimed at removing “neuroses or blockages in the powers of 
normal rationality, recognition, deliberation, and decision”) is a misleading 
reduction: 
If the unconscious dimension of thought is at once immanent in subsisting 
below the direct reach of consciousness, effective in influencing conduct on 
its own and also affecting conscious judgment, material in being embodied 
in neurological processes, and cultural in being given part of its shape by 
previous inscriptions of experience and new experimental interventions, 
then several theories of morality [including] the Kantian model of command 
through the Habermasian model of deliberative ethics and the Rawlsian 
model of justice… may deserve active contestation [because] some of the 
above theories systematically underplay the role of technique and artistry in 
thinking and ethics while others overestimate the degree to which the 
cultivation of an ethical sensibility is linked to an intrinsic purpose 
susceptible to general attunement or recognition.606 
Fortunately,607 this (genealogization of command moralities, aimed at opening 
transcendentalists and thick universalists up to the immanent naturalist’s 
“ethics of cultivation”608) is just one of Connolly’s three related strategies to 
                                               
605 Ibid., 85. 
606 “The apodictic experience of morality as law recorded by Kant does not flow from the 
noumenal to the phenomenal realm as he contended. It may flow, rather, from the infrasensible 
dictates of the amygdala into higher consciousness” (Ibid., 104). Connolly makes clear that what 
he intends is not to disprove “the Kantian transcendental” but to open the door to “a 
contending interpretation of the transcendental field… It may be that Kant’s identification of an 
inscrutable transcendental field is profound, while his insistence that it must be eternal, 
supersensible, and authoritative in the last instance is open to modification” (Ibid., 85). 
607 The “visceral [i.e., cultivated/conditioned] resentment to difference… blunts the capacity to 
nourish agonistic respect between interdependent constituencies, and diminishes critical 
responsiveness to new movements of cultural diversification” (Ibid., 106).  
608 Ibid. 
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“spiritualize positive possibilities on the immanent field.”609 We need also to 2) 
create techniques that lessen “existential resentment against the absence of… 
final guarantees... in the world;”610 in particular, techniques that work upon the 
amygdala;611 and 3) recultivate the “infrasensible” conditioned self to increase 
our “preliminary gratitude for the abundance of being already there,[612] in the 
interests of folding more modesty and receptive generosity into entrenched 
presumptions, established interests, and operational codes.”613 (Practically 
speaking, these latter two strategies are indistinguishable; decreasing 
existential resentment is by definition to increase one’s existential gratitude.)  
Still, despite the resistances that Connolly says result from our 
conditioned dispositions, his discussion of tactics centers primarily on the 
category of “thought.” The above three (or two) strategies should all be 
pursued because thoughts can be partly changed by both conscious argument 
and tactics that have their effect unconsciously, and change in each of the 
conscious614 and unconscious “registers” can “filter into the experience and 
                                               
609 Ibid. 
610 Ibid. “[O]ne can strengthen or modify a sensibility, to some uncertain degree, by working 
tactically upon the infrasensible register in which it is set” (Ibid., 105). 
611 “For the amygdala is implicated in a larger brain system that triggers fear, anxiety, 
resentment” (Ibid., 104). 
612 Connolly has Varela’s buddhist strategy in mind here, and so the feeling of contentment that 
arises from meditative breathing is a relevant example. See Francisco Varela et al., The Embodied 
Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 
613 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002): 106. Since the world is neither “a dispenser of rewards for virtue” nor 
simply “a pliable medium susceptible to human mastery,” (The Augustinian Imperative: A 
Reflection on the Politics of Morality (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), 9). Connolly 
says we can think and feel our experience of the world as an “abundance” in terms of the gift 
we receive in “richness of being” (Why I am not a Secularist (Minneapolis : University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), 54), adopt an attitude of “nontheistic gratitude,” which embraces the 
“nonteleological excess of being over identity,” rather than trying to establish one’s own truth 
and purity by alienating/eliminating those uncanny elements that constitute/d a threat to my 
sense of security. 
614 “Thinking” itself is a technique – it carries “compositional power, participating in modifying 
old dispositions and forging new habits even as it expresses established habits and dispositions” 
(William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2002): 99). 
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imagination available to the others:” “You work experimentally on the relays 
between thought-imbued intensities below the level of feeling and linguistic 
complexity, thought-imbued feelings below the level of linguistic sophistication, 
images that trigger responses at both levels, and linguistically sophisticated 
patterns of narrative, argument, and judgment.”615 
This same preoccupation with thought is reflected in Connolly’s 
technique of choice: film. 
 
Technique - Film 
Connolly’s “short list of everyday techniques… by which thinking is 
altered in its direction, speed, intensity, or sensibility”616 includes listening to 
music, circulatory surgery, running, Prozac and Valium, whipping, bathing, 
studying, giving in to feelings, concentrating on a practical activity, full-
spectrum lighting, talking in public, watching TV analytically, reading, 
drinking wine, meditating, dancing, and avoidance. Technique, “in film, 
institutional life, and everyday life, is ubiquitous.”617 But Connolly spends 
much of his time in Neuropolitics on film.  
Film is an effective technique because its “interplay of sound, rhythm, 
movement, and image… communicate[s] affective energies to us, some of 
which pass below intellectual attention while still influencing emotions, 
judgments, and actions….”618 Film, in other words, can work upon us 
unconsciously to open us up to contingency, the uncanny nature of reality, the 
uncanny nature of ourselves – reality that is (conversely) done violence to by a 
                                               
615 Ibid., 107. 
616 Ibid., 100. 
617 Ibid., 102. 
618 Ibid., 13. 
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moral/ethical disposition that aims at commanding it into an untenable 
identity. How exactly film works unconsciously upon the amygdala to change 
dispositions is not clear here. Connolly’s discussion centers more on the role of 
virtual memory (whose implicit relation to the amygdala and conditioned 
dispositions was noted earlier). But film, it seems, is primarily special for 
Connolly more for its conscious than its unconscious possibilities: film allows the 
opportunity for conscious reflection on constitutive virtual memories because 
one does not need while watching film to make action decisions at the time of 
perception the way one does in everyday life; “to focus on the sounds, sights 
and smells of a scene or to wallow in your imagination… can be dangerous in 
operational perception.”619 The longer the delay between perception and action, 
the more the constitutive virtual memories are explicitly available to 
reevaluation620 - i.e., creative/”inventive” thinking.621,622,623 In this respect, film 
occupies a privileged place, along with “TV, meditation, and brain/body 
experiments” (though none of these receives the extended consideration film 
does), in allowing awareness of the nature of perception.  
                                               
619 Ibid., 28. Italics mine. But note how the focus/emphasis here (and below) is primarily on 
“how perception proceeds”… and only secondarily and thinly on recultivation. 
620 Connolly, discussing Bergson, Ibid.. 
621 Virtual memories are the foundation of creative thinking, but only “in settings less 
constrained by the requirements of action” (Ibid., 92). 
622 “During thinking, as the imperious demands of action-oriented perception are relaxed, 
elements in a nonchronological region of time drift, slide, and bounce into communication with 
each other. The creative dimension of thinking flows from this encounter between a 
nonchronological region of time, the fugitive present, and an uncertain future. Its compositional 
effect… is engendered by new pathways mapped into the body and brain as new thinking 
becomes conditioned” (Ibid., 97). 
623 Though Connolly is less careful, I will, in general, avoid using the word “habituated” or 
“habituation” to refer to what in psychology and physiology are referred to as “conditioned” or 
“conditioning.” “Habituation” in psychology refers to the progressively diminished probability 
of behavioral response to a stimulus with its repeated presentation; and it is a non-associative 
form of learning. “Conditioning,” on the other hand, refers to associative learning in which the 
repeated presentation of an unconditioned stimulus with a neutral stimulus eventually confers 
the ability on the neutral stimulus (now conditioned stimulus) to elicit the same behavioral 
response as the unconditioned stimulus without presentation of the latter. “Habituation,” in 
this regard, refers to precisely the opposite of what Connolly appears to intend. 
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But, not surprisingly, this is not true of all film. Connolly is in particular 
interested in films that “display the ubiquitous role of bodily affect in 
perception and judgment”624 – that in effect make us think in a more 
Bergsonian way. Though Connolly writes that Bergsonian interpretation is 
useful because it “opens the door to a wide range of tactics by which to work on 
affective memories that help to structure perception and judgment,”625 his 
discussion is almost exclusively about how to combine Bergson’s insights with 
awareness of technique in films to change our understanding of perception in 
general.  
The flashback, for example, when combined with Bergsonian theory, can 
“make visible to viewers how each encounter insinuates into perception 
affectively imbued memories below the threshold of explicit feeling and 
visibility.”626  The close-up calls attention to “side [or infraconscious] 
perceptions” that situated actors fail to perceive but are nevertheless later 
consequential;627 in Vertigo, the unrealistic-looking falling body of Madeleine 
and the prematurity of her scream, both of which Connolly first took to be 
evidence of substandard technical work by Hitchcock, is revealed on 
Connolly’s third viewing to have been installed intentionally by Hitchcock as 
an “infraconscious perception that later infuses an eerie undertone of doubt 
into recollections of Madeleine’s fall to death.”628 The resulting “layered 
memory” (part conscious, part unconscious) of the scene can result in a 
seemingly inexplicable new line of thought or action (e.g., John Ferguson’s 
obsessive search for Madeleine even after he seems consciously to have 
                                               
624 Ibid., 25. 
625 Ibid., 41. 
626 Ibid., 29. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Ibid., 14. 
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accepted her death as fact). In Citizen Kane, there are three levels of memory: 
“(a) explicit memories called up by an existing situation, (b) potential 
recollections that… operate implicitly in action contexts” where there is no time 
for explicit recall, and (c) fragmentary/inarticulable effects (traces) of the past 
in/on the present.629 Though these “affective markers” never enter 
consciousness, they might be “susceptible to some degree of being worked 
upon by tactical means.”630,631 You can, for example, let it “infect your dream 
life” and work upon the infrasensible register that way.632 The Apostle and its 
sequel demonstrate varying syntheses of doctrine and practice appropriate to 
the varying subjectivities of characters, so that all – the ministers and the 
ministered – develop a “trust in life,”633 undermining (where it existed) their 
dogmatism and resentment – the very means by which the doctrine of each was 
originally secured. In addition, between the two sequels, there is an “irrational” 
cut, a disruption in the action, much like Jim Jarmusch’s intervening dark 
screen moments in Stranger than Paradise. These moments “underline the 
element of contingency and creativity in the connections forged across 
scenes.”634,635 
                                               
629 Ibid., 38. 
630 Ibid., 40. 
631 The ambiguity around the identity and meaning of “Rosebud” “enacts Bergson’s view that 
the past is constituted not simply out of the present that it was but during the time it is called 
into being;” each of the witnesses’ and Kane’s memories are “shaped by the affect-imbued 
context” they arise within (Ibid., 37). 
632 Ibid., 40. 
633 Ibid., 137. 
634 Ibid., 135. 
635 Five Easy Pieces’ closing scene “could rapidly mobilize a series of affectively imbued virtual 
memories and, above them, a set of explicit recollections,”635 thus “tracking” the way the film 
conveys the role of Bobby/Robert’s past “in his present through bits and pieces [flashbacks] as 
the story proceeds” (Ibid., 70). Or, in Being John Malkovich, Malkovich’s uncanny sense that his 
desire is out of his own control may allow the viewer “the dim perception you sometimes have 
of something alien inhabiting your desire. It renders such disturbing or delicious experiences 
more available for reflection” (Ibid., 29–30). 
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 There is no doubt value in Connolly’s combination of film analyses and 
neuroscientific findings; they may even create virtual memory images that, as 
Connolly hopes, will change our way of perceiving and thinking in the 
direction of democracy and agonistic respect. But if all thought is 
affective/dispositional, as he repeatedly says throughout Neuropolitics, and if 
the “exercises, tools, and techniques” that “shape thinking and sensibility in 
profound ways”636 are likewise ubiquitous, if “technique, in film, institutional 
life, and everyday life, is ubiquitous,”637 if Foucault, whom Connolly cites on 
this point, is right that “the subject is constituted in real practices, [that] there is 
a constitution of the self which cuts across symbolic systems while using 
them”638 – and if Foucault means not just arts of the self but also institutional 
techniques that cultivate/condition the modern subject – if all of this is true, 
then we may want to know just how far an awareness of cinematic technique 
and theory will cultivate a freer ethical disposition.639 An ethical disposition 
opposed to the project of docility that Foucault says has been the object of our 
modern institutions of power since “the enlightenment” – or, in Connolly’s 
terms, a project of cultivating the Augustinian command subjectivity.   
Watching film while thinking about Bergsonian theory may help 
cultivate out of our ressentimental (Augustinian) dispositions an ethical 
disposition towards democracy and agonistic respect. But if this ressentimental 
disposition is strong (structured into neural networks that have been 
strengthened throughout formative and later years) and ubiquitous (i.e., 
                                               
636 Ibid., 85. 
637 Ibid., 102. 
638 Ibid., 108, citing Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in 
Progress,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 369. 
639 Connolly suggests combining film technique and one’s own experience, contemporary 
neuroscience and cultural theory of perception can “trigger creativity in your own thinking or 
cultivate some noble potentiality in  your sensibility” (Ibid., 16–17). 
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constituted by daily practices through which we respond fearfully and 
punitively to the stress we feel in reaction to “others” and at the prospect of a 
more democratic engagement), then we ("the people,” who claim to want more 
governing power over our lives) probably need more broadly applicable 
techniques, that can be used in many activities throughout the day, instead of 
just in those moments in the theater (or in front of the video screen) and when 
we can take time to “get away” from the rapid pace of life. This is probably as 
true in both types of instances that Connolly says would prompt us to want to 
change our dispositions: when we are a) “confronted with the cruel effects our 
perceptual habits have on those marginalized or demonized by them,” or b) 
“when some ingrained habits of perception foster debilitating anxiety and 
depression”640 – especially the latter; persons debilitated by anxiety and 
depression are less likely to turn to Bergson and films like Stranger than Paradise 
for relief than to something with a more ubiqitous effect, like anti-depressant or 
anxiety-reducing drugs (which appear to work rather by producing psychic 
indifference than by causing empathy, which would be counter to Connolly’s 
goal of respectful agonism641). In addition, if Connolly is right that our 
dispositions are less susceptible to direct appeals to our logic, because our logic 
is under the control of our fearful,642 ressentimental dispositions,643 then, if we 
                                               
640 Ibid., 29. 
641 M. Scoppetta et al., “Selective Serotonine Reuptake Inhibitors prevents emotional lability in 
healthy subjects.” European Review for Medical and Pharmacological Sciences 9 (2005), 343–48; 
Shauna P. Reinblatt, and Mark A. Riddle, “Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor-Induced 
Apathy: A Pediatric Case Series,” Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychopharmacology 16, no. 1/2 
(2006), 227–33. 
642 As I try to make clear above (see footnote 543), Nietzsche, in On the Genealogy of Morals, 
discusses ressentiment as initially premised on powerlessness and fear, afterwards becoming an 
avoidance and suppression of uncertainty by the assertion of slave morality. 
643 The distinction that must be made here is not between consciously and unconsciously 
consequential techniques, but between techniques that elicit defensive reactions and those that 
do not. If talking about moral disposition geneaologically or otherwise evokes defensive 
reactions, these reactions will in general preclude any change in disposition except a 
reinforcement of the eliciting stimulus's association with pain/punishment, a strengthening of 
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want to effect changes that address it we will have to rely less heavily on 
techniques like Connolly’s Bergsonian film-watching. 
But, first – and more importantly – to evaluate/prescribe techniques in 
terms of their relative strength and direction of dispositional effect, we will 
need a more systematic understanding of our neuropsychologies than that 
provided by Connolly’s in part ambiguous discussion of the amygdala, somatic 
markers, and virtual memories. We can make better use of neuroscientific 
findings on the mechanisms of conditioning to provide a more explicit 
understanding of the techniques that cultivate our ressentimental subjectivity644 
(the one we tend to see in modern democratic societies), as well as how to 
change it. 
Finally, in the work of changing our dispositional relationship to our 
cultural traditions/authorities, we may discover that our way of relating to 
authorities also changes, both within and outside of our selves, perhaps even in 
more aggressive directions than are implied by “democracy and agonistic 
respect.” The creation of democracy will probably require a disposition not only 
ethically predisposed to democratic governance but also willing to confront 
arbitrary authority in its several forms, not simply its dispositional form in 
dialogical relations and or only along politically legitimated lines (e.g., voting, 
private debate, and work in the privacy of one’s neighborhood – running, 
drinking – and one’s home – movies, TV, running, sleeping; the latter are all 
techniques that Connolly notes). A less fearful disposition. One that can speak 
and act fearlessly. 
                                               
its ability to evoke, in this case, a ressentimental moral reaction, or, in other words, a 
strengthening of the ressentimental moral disposition. 
644 Though Connolly suggests transformative “tactics” – “tactics that mimic the way [the 
amygdala] was culturally programmed,” (William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, 
Speed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 206, Fn 27), an analysis of the 
techniques of cultural programming is largely absent from his work. 
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Neurophysiology Revisited 
Identifying techniques that will be effective in freeing our dispositions 
from their ressentimentality requires some understanding of what it takes to 
cultivate or condition a disposition. Given that our disposition is our neural 
micro-architecture, the neural site of our conditioning, techniques are 
consequential or not, in particular directions, at this micro-architectural level. 
Our entire neural architecture, which therefore includes our dispositions, is 
determined by the interaction of the organism’s homeostatic striving with its 
environment – both 1) the unchangeable macro-architecture, which is 
determined by the interaction of genetic coding (the neural record of our 
species’ homeostatic striving) with the embryonic, fetal, and childhood 
biological environment (which, in most cases, is stable enough to ensure what 
we call “normal” development) that establishes basic motor and cognitive 
abilities, and 2) the relatively plastic/changeable micro-architecture, which is 
both limited and produced by the interaction of our macro-architecture with 
the environment. Any techniques we apply to the organism will therefore meet 
up against the limits and possibilities of a macro- and micro-architecture 
(conditioned memory/representations) determined by the organism’s past 
experience and conditioning (including its technic-al training), some (macro-
architecture and part of our micro-architecture) which are general to us as 
humans, regardless of our culture and some (part of our micro-architecture) 
specific to our conditioning in a particular culture.645 We can, based on an 
understanding of our neural architecture, identify a few criteria that techniques 
                                               
645 What can be changed within our dispositions must be determined experimentally. In fact, 
neuroscience/psychology (and indeed all of human history) is a record of experiments in what 
can be changed, and to what effect. 
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must possess in order to recondition a disposition. But we may also, with a 
rough conception of our particular micro-architecture, be able to identify 
criteria more particular to freeing a ressentimental Euro-American disposition 
from its ressentimentality. 
  
Neurophysiology reexamined: Dispositions in the brain 
Actions become habits/tendencies by becoming structured as memory 
(conscious and unconscious) – the substrate of our behavior (including thought 
and action) – in the “plastic” (malleable) micro-architecture of our brains. 
“Plasticity” is a homeostatic mechanism, an essential part of the human 
organism qua “homeostasis machine.”646 The human body’s genetic inheritance 
is a set of mechanisms that automatically regulate life and aim at not just 
survival but well-being.647 Damasio, borrowing from Spinoza, refers to the self 
as a conatus – “striving, endeavor, tendency” of a thing to persevere in its own 
being. “In biological terms,” the conatus is “the aggregate of dispositions laid 
down in brain circuitry that, once engaged by internal or environmental 
conditions, seeks both survival and well-being.”648 
In order of increasing complexity, this set of inherited 
mechanisms/dispositions is: metabolism (endocrine/hormonal secretions, 
digestive muscular contractions, etc., which control heart rate, blood pressure, 
circulation, blood and intercellular acidity/alkalinity, protein, lipid, and 
carbohydrate storage and distribution); basic reflexes (e.g., startle reaction to 
noise, touch, heat, cold, dark); immune system (warding off of viruses, bacteria, 
parasites, toxic chemicals – internally or externally generated); pleasure 
                                               
646 Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 
2003), 31. 
647 Ibid., 35. 
648 Ibid., 36. 
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(reward) and pain (punishment) behaviors (including approach and 
withdrawal); drives and motivations (e.g., hunger, thirst, curiosity and 
exploration, play and sex);649 emotions (joy, sorrow, fear, pride, shame, 
sympathy, and so on); and, finally, feelings (perceptual maps of bodily state – 
of all the other preceding levels of homeostatic regulation (primarily), and 
(secondarily and with time) of thoughts consonant with that state and a certain 
mode of thinking). 
As complex organisms, all of our mechanisms of self-regulation, 
“whether spontaneous or reactive,” and even down to the cellular level, result 
from commands – though these are primarily unconscious – from the brain.650 
They exist as “dispositional representations” in the brain, as the “micro-
architecture” of the brain. A dispositional representation “is a dormant firing 
potentiality which comes to life when neurons fire, with a particular pattern, at 
certain rates, for a certain amount of time, and toward a particular target which 
happens to be another ensemble of neurons….” The end result is a particular 
behavioral response to which the organism is predisposed by its firing patterns 
(i.e., by its reactions, its preparation of the organism). “[F]iring patterns result 
from the strengthening or weakening of synapses, and that, in turn, results 
from functional changes occurring at the microscopic level within the fiber 
branches of neurons (axons and dendrites).”651 
 These functional changes that occur at the microscopic level can occur 
only because of what is called “plasticity” – the ability of synapses to change 
structure and connectivity to reflect the co-occurrence of stimuli in the 
organism’s internal or external environment. Plasticity proper occurs with the 
                                               
649 Ibid., 31–33. 
650 A. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Avon, 1994), 
89. 
651 Ibid., 104. 
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birth of synapses. But the brain is plastic in a more general sense from the 
beginning (before synaptogenesis); even in the developing nervous system of 
the embryo, genes interact with the environment in neural development. In 
other words, experience/environment is crucial, gets recorded and contributes 
to the structure of the organism; its effects ramify throughout the organism’s 
life. The development of the brain’s macro-architecture as much as its micro-
architecture depends on plasticity. 
The brain’s basic architecture, its “initial connections” are produced 
primarily by genetic and other internal environmental factors.652 But even the 
earliest stages of the organism’s development rely on the chemical environment 
of the mother – the amino acids the embryo’s genes use to produce the 
proteins653 necessary for its development are available only from its mother; 
and the embryo is affected by toxins, chemical additives, hormones, antibodies 
in the chemical environment provided by the mother. Shortly after neuron 
production has begun, neurons are segregated (under the control of homeotic 
genes) into different brain regions, where they will have sizes and shapes and 
possess transmitters and modulators specific to their respective brain regions. 
This neuronal differentiation is, while directed genetically, nevertheless subject 
to the influence of the specific chemical environment of its brain region.654 
Neurons migrating from the neural tube to specific brain regions also 
functionally differentiate according to the region they migrate to – i.e., their 
                                               
652 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 
72. The embryonic brain develops from the ectoderm, one of the embryo’s three germinal layers 
(ecto-, meso-, and endo-derm). The ectoderm thickens to become the neural plate, which 
becomes the neural tube, in which neurons are produced by precursor cells, under the influence 
of hormones from outside the neural tube. 
653 Genes’ purpose is protein assembly. 
654 Young neurons transplanted before differentiation into a different region take on 
characteristics specific to the recipient region rather than the donor. See Shlaggar, B. L. and D. 
D. O’Leary, “Potential of Visual Cortex to Develop an Array of Functional Units Unique to 
Somatosensory Cortex,” Science 252 (1991),1556–60. 
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synaptic connections. (Migrating cells are functionally ambivalent.) The growth 
of axons, as growth cones, towards other neurons with which they will synapse 
depends on the chemical state of the growing axon – which determines 
whether it attaches to or repels specific proteins in their environment.655 Once 
growth is complete, growth cones cede to axonal terminals which form 
synapses with postsynaptic neurons. Activity at synapses leads to an increase 
in synaptic complexity – the stabilization of active synaptic connections, the 
regression (elimination) of inactive synaptic connections, and activity-
dependent formation of new synapses (synaptogenesis).656 This principle 
applies throughout the life of synapses, not just during development. 
In sum, our brains will all, given a normal chemical-physical 
environment during development, develop approximately the same structures 
and circuits – the same macro-structure and in part micro-structure (which we 
share as a result of similar experiential histories regardless of our particular 
cultures and subcultures). Experience as synaptic activity (via synaptic 
plasticity) also establishes a micro-structural connectivity specific to the 
experience of each culture, each subculture, and each individual.657 
 
Synaptic connectivity, which constitutes macro-architectural 
developmental growth and the micro-architectural strengthening of synaptic 
connections, is established by “long term potentiation” (LTP). LTP occurs at a 
synapse when the excitation (action potential) of a presynaptic neuron – that on 
its own does not produce an action potential in the postsynaptic neuron (i.e., a 
                                               
655 J. R. Terman and A.L. Kolodkin, “Attracted or Repelled? Look Within,” Neuron 23 (1999), 
193–95. 
656 S. R. Quartz and T. J. Sejnowski, “The Neural Basis of Cognitive Development: A 
Constructivist Manifesto,” Behavioural Brain Research 20 (1997). 
657 See Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 
2002): 72. 
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weakly connected presynpatic neuron; neuron C in Figure 2) – coincides with 
the firing of a presynaptic neuron that on its own does produce an action 
potential in the postsynaptic neuron (i.e., a strongly connected presynaptic 
neuron; neuron A, in Figure 1). This coincident presynaptic excitation produces 
changes at the postsynaptic cell membrane which afterwards make the 
postsynaptic neuron more likely, or “potentiated,” to excite in response to 
excitation in the previously weakly connected presynaptic neuron alone. This 
change, called “early LTP” (Figures 3 and 4), occurs in the course of minutes 
and tends to last less than three hours.658 Late LTP (Figure 4), which always 
                                               
658 U. Frey and R. G. Morris, “Synaptic Tagging and Long-Term Potentiation,” Nature 385 (1997), 
533–36. When a presynaptic neuron excites/”fires,” its axonal terminals release glutamate into 
the synaptic gap. Released glutamate, the most widespread and abundant neurotransmitter in 
the nervous system of mammals, is then bound/taken up by two types of postsynaptic 
receptors – AMPA and NMDA receptors. The AMPA receptor (alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-
methylisoxazole-4- propionic acid; AMPA receptors are the primary facilitators of fast 
excitatory synaptic transmission throughout the nervous system) is the primary means by 
which the postsynaptic cell fires. Only if the AMPA receptor binds glutamate and causes a 
postsynaptic action potential (and the depolarization of the cell and unblocking of the NMDA 
receptor) does the NMDA receptor (N-methyl d-aspartate) bind glutamate and allow the 
passage of calcium into the cell. This passage of calcium into the postsynaptic cell causes the 
phosphorylation of and consequent increased receptivity of AMPA receptor proteins at the 
synapse in question (see H. K. Lee, “Phosphorylation of the AMPA receptor GluR1 subunit is 
required for synaptic plasticity and retention of spatial memory,” Cell 112 (5) (March 7, 2003), 
631–43). In addition, glutamate released from the firing presynaptic neuron precipitates (via 
protein kinases activated by synaptic glutamate release) the insertion of (previously) 
nonsynaptic AMPA receptors into the postsynaptic cell membrane. After these changes the 
same amount of glutamate from the presynaptic cell is more likely to result in a postsynaptic 
action potential (This phosphorylation reaction is characteristic of early long-term potentiation. 
Where the presynaptic cell was only weakly connected to the postsynaptic cell – that is, where 
the presynaptic cell’s glutamate release upon excitation was insufficient to cause an action 
potential – the postsynaptic cell will not fire, NMDA receptors will not allow Ca passage into 
the cell, and the AMPA receptors that cause firing/action potential will not be phosphorylated, 
so that the next time that the presynaptic cell fires, the postsynaptic cell will be no more likely to 
excite. Where the pre-existing connection between pre- and post-synaptic cells was already 
strong, the glutamate released by the excitation of the presynaptic cell will be sufficient by itself 
to cause the excitation of the postsynaptic cell. However, if the weakly connected presynaptic 
cell fires at the same time as a strongly connected presynaptic cell, the glutamate released from 
the weakly connected presynaptic cell will bind the NMDA receptors at the weakly connected 
cell’s synapse as well - because of the postsynaptic action potential caused by the strongly 
connected cell’s presynaptic impulse. After the accompanying AMPA receptor change, the 
same action potential of and glutamate release from this weakly connected presynaptic cell is 
more likely (because of increased AMPA receptor availability) to precipitate an action potential 
in the postsynaptic cell. This increased synaptic excitability/potentiation is called long-term 
potentiation, or LTP. 
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follows early LTP, involves more changes in both pre- and post-synaptic 
neurons, so that the potentiation of the presynaptic neuron lasts from hours to 
years.659 
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Figure 1. LTP: Action potential in neuron A alone. A-B pre-potentiated 
across synaptic space between neurons A, C, and B. 
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Figure 2. No LTP: Action potential in neuron C alone. No potentiation. 
No response. 
                                               
659 Late (or enduring) long-term potentiation – i.e., lasting from hours to years – utilizes 
additional mechanisms, on which there exist several theories. The most widely accepted and 
demonstrated is “synaptic tagging,” in which a post-synaptic action potential induced at a 
particular synapse results in a short duration protein-synthesis-independent “synaptic tag” that 
sequesters LTP-inducing post-synaptic proteins produced in response to post-synaptic 
phosphorylation (see U. Frey and R. G. Morris, “Synaptic Tagging and Long-Term 
Potentiation,” Nature 385 (1997), 533–36). Late LTP occurs when calcium influx at the NMDA 
receptors (activates specific protein kinases that enter into the cell nucleus where they initiate 
CREB-1 gene transcription which) produces new proteins that travel throughout the cell. When 
these new proteins reach the recently activated synapses, they are sequestered/taken up by a 
molecular “tag” (an active kinase at the activated synapse/s, which lasts no more than three 
hours – i.e., the duration of early LTP) generated by the action potential at the postsynaptic side 
of the previously active synapses. Sequestering of these proteins results in: phosphorylation 
and dendritic spine growth, the increased availability of AMPA receptors, and growth of new 
synapses (via release of neurotrophins from just active postsynaptic dendrites, taken up by 
presynaptic terminals) (see Ibid.; K.C. Martin et al. “Synapse-specific, long-term facilitation of 
Aplysia sensory to motor synapses: a function for local protein synthesis in memory storage,” 
(K.C. Martin et al., "Synapse-specific, long-term facilitation of aplysia sensory to motor 
synapses: a function for local protein synthesis in memory storage," Cell 91, no. 7 (Dec 26, 1997), 
927-3). Neurotrophins released by the potentiated (i.e., fired) postsynaptic cell diffuse through 
the synapse to the presynaptic, firing neuron, are taken up by the presynaptic axon and 
precipitate axonal branching and new synaptic connections. Conversely, neurotrophin release 
prevents presynaptic cell death, and is thus a selective mechanism in preventing the 
presynaptic cell death that would otherwise occur; neurons that are not used  do not survive. 
Synaptic activity thus determines the pattern of connectivity in the brain.) 
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Figure 3. Early LTP: Coincident excitation of neurons A and C. A-B 
potentiation produces excitation in neuron B, and facilitates changes 
resulting in C-B potentiation (early LTP). 
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Figure 4. Early and late LTP: Action potential in neuron C alone. 
Synapse C-B potentiated. 
 
The LTP we have thus far discussed in terms of single neurons takes place in 
groups and networks. In order for any one postsynaptic neuron to achieve its 
action potential/fire, many presynaptic neurons must fire simultaneously onto 
it. In addition, the firing of many presynaptic neurons onto a postsynaptic 
nerve occurs in great numbers of neurons at the same time, thus forming a 
network of synaptic transmission. The constitution of the dispositional network 
predisposing the organism to a particular behavioral response via late LTP 
requires many repeated presentations of paired stimuli. Via synaptic plasticity, these 
repeated transient firing patterns create networks that are organized into 
general regional separations of function, and pathways between these regions; 
brain development is a) the present genetic realization/representation of the 
(past) phyletic struggle of the organism to achieve an optimal state of being 
and b) the present experiential (ontogenic) realization of that struggle in the 
individual organism’s internal and external environment. Synaptic plasticity 
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establishes the brain’s macro- and micro-architecture,660 which simply are the 
memory661 (conscious and unconscious) of the organism, the functional record 
of its learning, its experience.662 This memory as macro- and micro-architecture 
is the substrate – disposition – of our behavioral responses. The extent and 
                                               
660 Phylogenetically old representations (memory) are built evolutionarily into the structure of 
primary sensory and motor cortex – but need rehearsal/stimulation in critical periods for 
proper structure and functioning; these are the periods in which plasticity (LTP) occurs most 
readily. 
661 Memory in the brain is general in the sense that wherever synapses have simultaneously 
fired, there occurs a strengthening of synaptic connections and eventually a whole 
network/pattern of firing, which will be activated whenever a sufficient part of the original 
stimulus is provided. 
662 LTP has been widely and long understood as the mechanism behind Hebbian plasticity (after 
Donald Hebb, the psychologist who proposed that “When an axon of cell A is near enough to 
excite cell B or repeatedly and consistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or 
metabolic changes take place in one of both cells such that A’s efficiency, as one of the cells 
firing B, is increased” (D. O. Hebb, The Organization of Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1949), 62), through which neuron development, memory formation, and learning occur. In his 
review article “Long-Term Potentiation and Memory,” Lynch concludes that though there is no 
direct evidence explicitly connecting LTP with learning and memory, there is “a great deal of 
circumstantial evidence” (M. A. Lynch, “Long-Term Potentiation and Memory,” Physiological 
Reviews 84 (2004), 117), of LTP in most brain areas/structures, including, importantly, the 
hippocampus, amygdala, visual and somatosensory cortices, prefrontal cortex, cerebellum, the 
subiculum. The ubiquity of some form of LTP has led some respected neuroscientists to venture 
that there is no reason to doubt that LTP will be found to occur in all mammalian brain 
synapses (for example, see R. Malenka and M. Bear, "LTP and LTD: An Embarrassment of 
Riches," Neuron 44 (2004), 5-21. The reduction of memory and learning to LTP, however, is on 
all counts too simplistic: on the one hand, in animal experiments, stimuli are applied to very 
specific fibers and recordings made at very specific cell populations, whereas memory 
consolidation during actual training activates many modalities “likely to translate into 
potentially confounding activation of several pathways and brain areas” (M. A. Lynch, “Long-
Term Potentiation and Memory,” Physiological Reviews 84 (2004), 119); on the other, because 
there are many forms of memory and many facets of each, “reduction of such a complex 
modality to the form of plasticity that is LTP is simplistic” (Ibid. Lynch adds the following 
“cautionary points”: 1) data based on LTP sustained in one synaptic pathway should not 
automatically be assumed to apply to other synaptic pathways, 2) different synaptic 
connections might use different signalling molecules, 3) LTP found in one set of conditions (e.g., 
in vivo or in vitro, in anaesthetized or conscious animal) cannot automatically be assumed to 
occur in other conditions, 4) in order to compare or reconcile various findings, one must take 
account of the specific behavioral measure and particular (early or late) LTP form (Ibid.). 
Conversely, there are also many different forms of LTP, depending on the type of synapse and 
experimental conditions; the explanation of memory as LTP would have to be qualified 
accordingly. Nevertheless, memory consolidation requires some form of plasticity, and LTP is 
certainly at least involved in memory and learning, and displays the same properties as memory 
consolidation would require: specificity, associativity, cooperativity. It is relatively 
uncontroversial to assume, then, that forms of plasticity, including LTP indispensably, underlie 
brain structural and functional development – in other words, the representational networks – 
the architecture - that constitute learning and memory, in their conscious and unconscious 
forms.  
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nature of dispositional change by the application of technique is determined by 
the limits and possibilities of this architecture. 
Within this neural macro-structure/architecture, the amygdala and 
prefrontal cortex are crucial determinants or components of our dispositions, as 
Connolly notes. But a more precise understanding of their relationship and 
their place in the larger neural architecture will allow us to make more precise 
recommendations and evaluation of techniques aimed at freeing our 
dispositions from ressentiment. 
 
Architecture and Networks 
Our neural architecture can be functionally separated into three parts: i) 
sensory and autonomic input, ii) processing, and iii) motor and autonomic 
output. There are 5 main sensory inputs to the central nervous system: the 
visual system, olfactory system, gustatory system, auditory system, and the 
somatosensory system.663 In each case, sensory stimuli cause action potentials 
in first order neurons whose cell bodies reside in the dorsal root ganglia of 
spinal nerves, or in the cranial nerves’ sensory ganglia – outside the central 
nervous system. The first order neurons connect synaptically to second order 
neurons, whose axons cross to the opposite side of the spinal cord and project 
toward and synapse with third order sensory cells of the brain.664 Excitatory 
                                               
663 The somatosensory system includes: 1) discriminative touch – pressure, vibration, texture… 
via Meissner's corpuscles, Pacinian corpuscles, Merkel's disks, Ruffini endings in the skin; 2) 
pain and temperature – via free nerve endings in skin, muscle, bone, and connective tissue that 
register temperature changes and pain peptides (prostaglandins, histamine, and substance P); 3) 
proprioception – via muscle and joint receptors – i.e., muscle spindles, Golgi tendon organs and 
tendon/joint afferents. 
664 Most of these third order sensory cells are located in the sense-specific nuclei in the thalamus, 
with the exception of the olfactory system, in which neural signals travel via the olfactory bulb to 
the medial amygdala (social functions), and to the piriform (odor identification) and entorhinal 
cortices (which connect to the hippocampus for memory formation/recall) of the primary 
olfactory cortex in the medial temporal lobe. 
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(i.e., electro-chemical) activity from these third order neurons of each sensory 
system665 goes three routes: 1) to the reticular activating system (ARAS) in the 
midbrain, 2) via the thalamus directly and quickly to the amygdala and 3) via 
the thalamus indirectly to the amygdala via sense-specific areas of the cerebral 
cortex.666,667 Sensory input is processed at a low, crude/rough level in the 
thalamus, and at a higher level in the sensory areas of the cortex, and its 
associated regions – most importantly, the hippocampus and medial prefrontal 
cortex (PFC). 
 
    cortex     
 
       HIGH       slower, more info        ROAD 
 
              “quick and dirty” 
 
 thalamus    LOW    amygdala 
     ROAD 
 
      
    
ARAS* 
    
 
    emotional stimulus          emotional response 
 
Figure 5. Neural processing of fear. Adapted from Joseph LeDoux Synaptic Self 
(New York: Penguin, 2002) Figure 5.7, p. 123.668 
*LeDoux does not include reticular activation in his diagram. 
 
Stimulation along the thalamo-amygdalar and thalamo-cortico-
amygdalar routes (from stimulus to response) stimulates the amygdala to 
respond to “emotional” stimuli – stimuli that, phyletically or ontogenically, are 
                                               
665 Minus the olfactory. 
666 The visual system to occipital cortex, auditory to superior temporal cortex, somatosensory 
and gustatory to post-central gyrus. 
667 See L. M. Romanski and J. E. LeDoux, “Equipotentiality of thalamo-amygdala and thalamo-
cortico-amygdala projections as auditory conditioned stimulus pathways,” The Journal of 
Neuroscience 12 (1992), 4501-4509. 
668 With permission from the author. 
 188 
interpreted as threatening or rewarding to the organism669 – with “emotional” 
responses – i.e., internal and overt bodily responses that prepare the organsim 
to act (approach, fight/flight, or freezing, depending on the value of the 
stimulus).670 According to LeDoux, the conscious perception, or feeling of the 
emotion (awareness of bodily preparation and expression) and thought about 
the emotion take much longer and involve higher cortical processes than are 
involved in the initial response. 
Thalamo-amygdalar and thalamo-amygdalo-cortical processing 
activates or suppresses hypothalamic activity to the two major motivation 
circuits, generally called “punishment”/“fear” (periventricular) and “reward” 
(medial forebrain bundle, MFB) circuits.671 Fearful/punishing stimuli induce 
thalamo-amygdalar excitation of the hypothalamus, which, via release of 
corticotropic releasing hormone/factor (CRH/F), initiates sympathetic 
responses (from brainstem autonomic centers672 and the descending reticular 
activating system (DRAS)673) including reduced pain sensitivity674 (stress-
                                               
669 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 
206. 
670 Damasio defines emotions similarly: a “patterned collection of chemical and neural 
responses” that change the internal state of the organism to prepare it for the varied 
actions/behaviors, which belong to the repertoire of the “reward” and “punishment” 
motivation circuits (A. Damasio, “Emotions and feelings: a neurobiological perspective,” 
Feelings and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium, eds. A. S. R. Manstead et al. (New York: 
Cambridge UP, 2004), 50–51. 
671 See J. J. Paton et al. “The Primate Amygdala Represents the Positive and Negative Value of 
Visual Stimuli During Learning,” Nature 439 (2006), 865–870. Both circuits are, in their basic 
structure, unconscious memory systems which react to evolutionarily/phyletically threatening 
or rewarding stimuli with, respectively, defense (fight/flight) or approach (reward) behaviors. 
But the structure of unconscious amygdalar memory is also modified by experience. Stimuli 
that co-occur with phyletically (i.e., evolutionarily) threatening or rewarding stimuli come, via 
LTP, to be interpreted (ontogenically, via individual conditioning) as threatening or rewarding 
on their own, and from then on can play the same conditioning role as unconditioned stimuli do 
(see Figures 1-4). 
672 For example, vagal nuclei and the pituitary. 
673 The descending reticular activating system (DRAS) provides background tone and postural set 
(i.e., muscles controlling balance), against which more specific voluntary motor actions are 
carried out. The DRAS also contributes to control of respiration and cardiac rhythms, 
gastrointestinal peristalsis, glandular secretion, urination, and coughing, swallowing, 
mastication and vomiting reflexes. The descending system receives input from structures whose 
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induced analgesia), release of adrenal hormones,675 taut stomach, racing heart, 
high blood pressure, clammy hands and feet, dry mouth, and increased 
muscular tension.676,677 This preparation for action predisposes the body to 
fight/flight (and immobilization) behaviors. (This preparation appears to be 
what I experiencced that day as a TA in the classroom confrontation with that 
professor five years ago – a preparation that I can now remember having 
occurred in childhood and afterwards in my confrontations with authority.) 
Connolly’s conclusions regarding the amygdala are based on LeDoux’s 
argument that a) “quick and dirty”678 thalamo-amygdalar processing results in 
behavioral output before “higher” cortical processing can modify the behavior 
in question,679 and that b) thalamo-amygdalar processing, via amygdalo-cortical 
connections, even predetermines the direction and content of the later cortical 
processing of the stimulus/event,680 which precedes and motivates actions in 
                                               
excitatory/innervating action has already been modified by other brain areas – the subcortical 
motor output areas, the hypothalamus, and the vestibular nuclei (in the medulla). Input to the 
reticular activation system from the hypothalamus is largely autonomic; the hypothalamus is 
supplied by the solitary tract nucleus, which conveys visceral sensory stimulation from the 
vagus, including blood pressure and gut distension; optic nerve fibers to the suprachiasmatic 
nucleus (in the hypothalamus), which regulates circadian rhythms and associates them with 
light/dark cycles; circumventricular organs (nuclei), which react directly to blood composition 
changes – e.g., the OVLT (organum vasculosum laminae terminalis) responds to osmolarity 
changes, the area postrema responds to toxins and can bring on peristalsis; thermo- and osmo-
receptors that respond to ionic balance and temperature. 
674 Called “nociception.” 
675 Via the pituitary release of ACTH. 
676 Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 132.  
677 But parasympathetic inputs to the hypothalamus moderate these sympathetic responses; the 
parasympathetic system has an augmentary effect only on digestive and sexual arousal 
functions; it otherwise diminishes the effect of sympathetic excitation. The hypothalamus also 
receives input from higher brain structures: from the limbic and olfactory systems - the 
amygdala, the hippocampus, and the olfactory cortex.  
678 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 
123. 
679 “More processing time by the brain means a slower mental and behavioral response from the 
organism. In situations where rapid responses are required, speed can be more important than 
accuracy” (Ibid.) 
680 As we noted above, Connolly writes that the amygdala “both influences conduct on its own 
and bumps intensities into conscious thinking and judgment [in the cortex] that the complex 
brain regions then process according to their own capacities of reception, speed, and 
organization” (William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 90). 
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response to the stimulus. This is true, says LeDoux, in particular of fear-
inducing stimuli. Only the initial punishment/fear response is entirely 
thalamo-amygdalar – i.e., non-cortical. While the reward (MFB) circuit is, like 
the punishment circuit, in that it is thalamo-amygdalar and works via the 
hypothalamus, research shows that initial reward processing requires higher, 
cognitive structures – the hippocampus681 and medial prefrontal cortex.682 
Rewarding stimuli683 apparently excite thalamo-amygdalar processing and 
prefrontal (neocortical) and hippocampal processing that prepare the organism, 
via MFB dopaminergic reward effects,684 for approach/engagement behaviors. 
According to LeDoux, because the fear/punishment circuit is initially strictly 
thalamo-amygdalar, it acts faster than, and even initially preempts the 
cognitive processing involved in the reward (MFB) circuit; fight/flight/freeze 
reactions happen before and preempt preparations of the organism for 
approach/engagement. Even after the initial thalamo-amygdalar reaction, fear, 
via amygdalar influence upon thalamo-cortico-amygdalar processing, controls 
behavior and “monopolizes consciousness.”685 
                                               
681 The entorhinal cortex and ventral subiculum. 
682 The dopaminergic network extending from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc and ventral striatum). See T. M. Korotkova et al., ”Excitation of Ventral 
Tegmental Area Dopaminergic and Nondopaminergic Neurons by Orexins/Hypocretins,” The 
Journal of Neuroscience  23, no. 1 (January 1, 2003), 7. 
683 LeDoux’s research and discussion focuses almost exclusively on fear’s influence on the 
amygdala; food-seeking and sex-seeking are his reward stimuli and behavior. But, importantly, 
his discussion of reward behavior includes emotional bonding (Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: 
How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002): 233–34), where specifically sexual 
interaction does not occur, and pleasurable stimuli generally, which rely upon the 
dopaminergic MFB circuit (245ff.). Furthermore, LeDoux’s discussions of fearful emotional 
stimuli broadly include stimuli conditioned to evoke fear responses the experience of “fear and 
anxiety in… safe situations” (217). 
684 These are reinforced by MFB output-related learning (plasticity-mediated memory) in the 
amygdala, MFB, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and hippocampus. See L. R. Squire 
et al, eds. Fundamental Neuroscience (San Diego: Elsevier Science, 2003). 
685 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002): 
226. 
 191 
 In the 3) thalamo-cortical-amygdalar route, sensory excitation from the 
thalamus synapses with a primary sensory area, whose pyramidal neurons686 
send axonal connections to adjacent/nearby areas and these to other areas of 
occipital, temporal, and parietal cortex for further processing;687 all areas in 
these sensory cortical pathways are called unimodal association cortex688 - 
networks of cells that are interconnected to represent associated qualities of a 
complex stimulus or group of stimuli in the corresponding sensory modality689 
(e.g., visual stimuli are represented in the visual unimodal association cortex). 
These networks are created by the strengthening of synaptic connections (LTP) 
resulting from temporal contiguity, spatial contiguity, repetition, and 
emotional/motivational connotations690 of the constituent qualities of a 
stimulus/event. Unimodal association cortex sends projections to a) the frontal 
lobe cortex (prefrontal cortex, PFC), thereby accessing (and simultaneously 
modifying) sensory-motor associations, b) the paralimbic cortex, which connects to 
the amygdala and hippocampus,691 thus accessing (and simultaneously modifying) 
emotional associations and memory, respectively. Synaptic connectivity in the 
unimodal association cortex thus accomplishes the integration and distribution 
of information (representations) both from sensory input networks, “bottom 
up,” and from consolidated/ing sensory-motor memories, “top down.” 
                                               
686 Named morphologically for their three-sided structure. 
687 Again, with the exception of the olfactory system. Only signals from the olfactory sensory 
system do not pass through the thalamus to the amygdala – the faster route. But this does not 
mean that olfactory signals undergo more sophisticated processing before projecting to the 
amygdala. The cortex to which the olfactory tract projects has only four cellular layers, whereas 
all the other sensory system inputs project into areas with six cortical layers, in other words, to 
neocortex. (All the other lobes of the brain - the frontal, parietal, occipital and temporal lobes – 
are primarily neocortex.) The olfactory system cortex projects directly to the hypothalamus. 
688 J. M. Fuster, The Prefrontal Cortex: Anatomy, Physiology, and Neuropsychology of the Frontal Lobe, 
3rd ed. (New York: Lippincott-Raven, 1997), 67. 
689 Ibid., 72. 
690 Ibid., 47–48. 
691 In the temporal lobe; the hippocampal memory system stores and provides general 
situational information. 
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Unimodal association cortices also project to parietal and temporal lobe 
multimodal convergence cortex, that is, transmodal areas,692 which, like unimodal 
association cortices, connect to the hippocampus. From primary sensory to 
unimodal association to transmodal association cortex, higher categories of 
knowledge (of greater abstraction and generality) are represented/realized.693 
The multi/transmodal cortices include areas central to phonological 
processing, language production, and assignment of semantic meaning.694 
The mental operations involved in linguistic processing and production, 
and in conscious thought generally, involve working memory – the holding of 
several objects in focus/attention simultaneously, thus enabling their conscious 
relation (e.g., performing computations, reading, and writing). Sensory 
memory in association cortices (e.g., echoic memory of auditory perceptions 
and iconic memory of visual-spatial perceptions, lasting from one millisecond 
to one second), becomes short-term memory when it is made the object of 
attentional focus (by the ARAS and amygdala), and is available to working 
memory for manipulation for less than a minute, unless attentional focus 
renews it in short-term memory. Consistent with Damasio’s “somatic marker” 
                                               
692 Ibid., 67–8. 
693 Ibid., 71, 74. 
694 The multi-/trans-modal cortices that are central to language construction are the angular and 
supramarginal gyri (which comprise the left inferior parietal lobe). (The angular gyrus, in 
combination with the posterior cingulate gyrus, helps process semantic meaning, whereas the 
supramarginal gyrus helps process word phonology and articulation.) These cortical areas 
connect (auditory, visual, and somatosensory) sensory input from unimodal association cortex 
to Wernicke’s area (in the left temporal lobe) - where phonological processing, language 
production, and assignment of semantic meaning occur - and Broca’s area (in the frontal lobe), 
whose general role is the representation of phonetic sequences – heard, generated, or recalled 
(Ibid., 187–88; 191). Though there is some localization of language processing in these specific 
sites, the angular and supramarginal gyri, and therefore also Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas, 
receive information from the amygdala and cingulate gyrus ((located in the medial brain, 
wrapping around the corpus callosum). Both of these areas receive axons from the thalamus, 
somatosensory cortex, and neocortex – and therefore provide the emotional-environmental 
context essential to linguistic (and all other modes of mental) processing (J. M. Fuster, Cortex 
and Mind: Unifying Cognition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 189-90) – as will be 
discussed below. 
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theory, research indicates that PFC modules seem to be the locus of the 
conscious executive activity involved in working memory function.695 These 
modules’ connections with association (unimodal and transmodal association 
cortices), sensory (cortices), motor (cerebellum), and limbic (thalamus, 
amygdala, hippocampus) areas provide stimulation, based on the individual’s 
previous experience, that influences working memory.  
The conversion of short-term and working memory – both sensory and 
motor696 – into long-term memory ‘storage’ in neocortex appears to occur via 
synaptic plasticity mechanisms in the hippocampus.697 Research has shown a 
time-dependent transition of the metabolic activity – i.e., a reorganization of the 
neural circuitry – involved in memory-based performance, a transition from 
                                               
695 See J. M. Fuster, The Prefrontal Cortex: Anatomy, Physiology, and Neuropsychology of the Frontal 
Lobe, 3rd ed. (New York: Lippincott-Raven, 1997); J. D. Cohen et al., “Temporal Dynamics of 
Brain Activation During a Working Memory Task,” Nature 386 (1997), 604-8; Fundamental 
Neuroscience, eds. L. R. Squire et al. (San Diego, CA: Academic, 2003), 1543–64; J. M. Fuster, 
“Unit Activity in Prefrontal Cortex During Delayed-Response Performance: Neuronal 
Correlates of Transient Memory,” Journal of Neurophysiology 36 (1973), 61–78; P. S. Goldman-
Rakic, “Toward a Curcuit Model of Working Memory and the Guidance of Voluntary Motor 
Action,” in Models of Information Processing in the Basal Ganglia, eds. J. C. Houk, J. L. Davis and D. 
G. Beiser (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 131-148. 
696 The neocortex provides executive motor (procedural) memory via representational maps of 
all types of movement (simple to complex) in the premotor cortices, in connection with basal 
ganglia, limbic cortices, and the cerebellum (which is also crucial in the consolidation of long 
term motor memory (Garrett T. Kenyon, “A model of long-term memory storage in the 
cerebellar cortex: A possible role for plasticity at parallel fiber synapses onto stellate/basket 
interneurons” The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 94, no. 25 (December 9, 1997), 
14200–14205). The primary motor pathway is the corticospinal pathway – primarily projections 
from precentral gyrus of cortex, but also the premotor and supplementary motor areas, and the 
postcentral gyrus (i.e., primary somatosensory cortex); these projections are pyramidal neurons, 
from cortical pyramidal cells to white matter (all still within the precentral gyrus) – into the 
corona radiata, which divides into the caudate and putamen; the radiating axons of the caudate 
and putamen constitute the “internal capsule” – a two-way highway, in which sensory 
information travels up from the thalamus to specific sensory cortices, and motor and 
somatosensory information travels through on its way to the spine, via the posterior limb of 
internal capsule. 
697 Hippocampal output creates sharp-wave ripple complexes in the subiculum, parasubiculum, 
and deep layers of entorhinal cortex (within the subiculum). These ripple complexes constitute 
network patterns that appear to correspond to long-term memories. See György Buzsáki and 
James J. Chroback, “Synaptic plasticity and self-organization in hippocampus,” Nature 
Neuroscience 8, no. 11 (November 2005), 1418–20. 
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hippocampal metabolic activity to neocortical metabolic activity.698 Various 
neocortical areas699 - including the PFC – take over the functional contribution 
of the hippocampus to memory retrieval;700 long-term (consolidated) memories 
synaptically potentiated in association neocortex provide context in working 
memory for the interpretation/evaluation of each new stimulus-object supplied 
by sensation to short-term memory.  
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Figure 6. Neural processing of fear – in more detail. Adapted from Joseph 
LeDoux Synaptic Self (New York: Penguin, 2002) Figure 5.7, p. 123.701 
 
                                               
698 Bruno Botempi et al.,“Time-Dependent Reorganization of Brain Circuitry Underlying Long-
Term Memory Storage,” Nature 400 (August 12, 1999), 671-675. 
699 Primarily frontal, anterior cingulate, and temporal cortices. 
700 Memory consolidation occurs as permanent cortical memory representations via a transitory 
interaction between hippocampus and association neocortex (L. R. Squire and P. Alvarez, 
“Retrograde Amnesia and Memory Consolidation: A Neurobiological Perspective,” Current 
Opinion in Neurobiology 5 (1995), 169-177; B. J. Knowlton and M. S. Fanselow, “The 
Hippocampus, Consolidation, and On-line Memory,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 8 (1998), 
293–96; T. J. Teyler and P. DiScenna, “The Hippocampal Memory Indexing Theory,” Behavioral 
Neuroscience 100 (1986), 147–54; A. R. Damasio, “Time-Locked Multiregional Retroactivation: A 
Systems-Level Proposal for the Neural Substrates of Recall and Recognition,” Cognition 33 
(1989), 25–62. Also, see M. D'Esposito et al., “The Neural Basis of the Central Executive System 
of Working Memory,” Nature 378 (November 16, 1995), 279–81. 
701 With permission from the author. 
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Thus, the longer route from sensory input to the amygdala by way of the 
cortices involves many modifications of excitatory stimulation – importantly, 
conscious access to and comparison with other experience. 
But, as we have noted, LeDoux argues that, “in the domain of fear,” the 
amygdala, by immediately precluding operation of the medial prefrontal cortex 
or mPFC702 (the location of Damasio’s “somatic markers”), and subsequently, 
by changing cortical sensory processing, influencing the mPFC,703 and, 
indirectly, attention, alters the direction and conditioning of later (still within 
the few initial seconds of fear stimulation) unconscious perception and 
behavior; this thalamo-amygdalar and thalamo-cortico-amygdalar processing 
in turn alters the material available to working memory,704 and thus even 
conscious perception and behavior. In other words, when fearful stimuli are 
present, thalamo-amygdalar processing dominates – both immediately, in the 
emotional reaction, and subsequently in the thalamo-cortico-amygdalar route – 
importantly, of the mPFC.705 This initial processing appears to establish, via 
LTP, unconsciously learned fear memory in the PFC. That we do not have 
strong amygdala-mediated fear reactions (taut stomach, racing heart, high 
blood pressure, clammy hands and feet, dry mouth, and increased muscular 
tension) does not mean we no longer have fear of the precipitating stimuli, or 
that these stimuli are no longer present. LeDoux writes, “characteristically, 
amygdala-dependent signs of emotional arousal, such as elevations of heart 
                                               
702Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 
217. 
703 In the immediate emotional preparation of the organism, LeDoux theorizes that inhibition of 
prefrontal cortex allows the amygdala to respond to fearful stimuli (Ibid.); subsequently, in 
providing motivation to behavioral responses, the amygdala influences access to prefrontal 
cortical memory. 
704 Ibid., 226. 
705 LeDoux argues that PFC influence on the amygdala is initially “shut off” by thalamo-
amygdalar route (Ibid., 217). 
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rate, occur during the initial phase of avoidance learning, but disappear as the 
avoidance response is learned.”706 To avoid fear reactions, we simply avoid 
fearful stimuli. LeDoux's observations of amygdalar effects would appear to 
provide a basis for Connolly’s conclusion that during the "half-second delay" 
between stimulus and behavioral response, even in the ordinary perception of 
everyday life, we are under the unconscious influence of the amygdala and/or 
amygdalar conditioning of the PFC.707 But it would also follow that this "half-
second" establishes future (avoidance) behavior. Even if during subsequent 
moments one thinks, compares, and concludes that one should not be afraid of 
the stimulus, subsequent presentations will continue eliciting the overpowering 
fear reaction, and this fear reaction will determine a fearful response. 
 
But if fear is this primary, if preliminary unconscious processing favors 
fear conditioning, then, given what Connolly has said about the unavoidable 
suffering (experience of pain) of life, we would expect all dispositions to be 
fearful dispositions – fearful reactions would predetermine fearful behavioral 
responses, and this would be irreversible; phylogenically (unconditioned) and 
ontogenically (conditioned) associated fearful stimuli would in every instance 
establish (except when overpowered by other, stronger fear stimuli) 
irreversible fear conditioning. This irreversible fear conditioning would 
provide a large base for the association of new stimuli with punishment; one's 
happiness would depend on avoidance of an ever-increasing range of stimuli 
                                               
706 Ibid., 251. “A dog needs its amygdala to learn that playing around in the road is dangerous, 
but once the learning has occurred, he can happily play in the yard next to the road. (In this 
case, avoidance of danger doesn’t cause fear, it prevents fear.” 
707 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 28; 206, Fn 27. As we noted above, the amygdala, Connolly writes, 
“both influences conduct on its own and bumps intensities into conscious thinking and 
judgment [in the cortex] that the complex brain regions then process according to their own 
capacities of reception, speed, and organization” (Ibid., 90). 
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increasingly powerful in provoking fear reactions and responses (i.e., further 
avoidance). The conditioning of culturally prohibited, habitual reward 
behaviors to reward stimuli would only occur accidentally outside and before 
the surveillance of punitive authorities; their subsequent discipline would, 
through fear conditioning,  establish the subject's increasingly unconscious, 
avoidance of the stimulus/object and its associated behaviors. LeDoux 
indicates that fear and anxiety disorders may occur in individuals with 
abnormal “genetic and epigenetic organization of prefrontal synapses” or 
“experiences that subtly alter prefrontal synaptic connections,”708 so that their 
regulation of the fear circuit, by prefrontal cortex, is impaired. They have fear 
and anxiety even when “objective information” indicates that there is no danger. 
But given that, in LeDoux's theory, amgydalar conditioning of the prefrontal 
cortex even in the normal individual macrostructurally ensures a fear 
conditioned microstructure, unconscious conditioning will, given the 
unavoidable suffering of everyday life, increasingly indicate that there is 
danger, and that it is to be avoided. Conscious, working memory will reiterate 
this fact, or avoid direct confrontation with "dangerous" stimuli. Obedience to 
the rules of existing power arrangements would be practically guaranteed. The 
techniques in which Connolly places his hope for a free-er ethical disposition 
would have no effect on this universally fearful disposition. In fact, it would be 
difficult to explain even the conscious imagination of a disposition that would 
risk techniques of the self, aimed at freedom. This universal, fearful disposition, 
to the extent that it pursues pleasure, would without exception pursue it within 
the parameters of the conventions of existing – and therefore, on this theory, 
                                               
708 Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (New York: Viking, 2002), 
217. 
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natural – hierarchical power relations. (This would justify not simply a suspicion 
of ourselves and others but an assumption that we should fear ourselves and 
others.)  
This would imply an organism that in essence is constrained to mere 
self-preservation, and at most traditionally prescribed experiences of pleasure, 
rather than a “conatus” – i.e., striving for optimal well-being.709 Retelling the 
Genesis story, for example, would universally and automatically achieve further 
reinforcement of the unconscious fearfulness of our dispositions. The uncanny 
would always remain inexplicably uncanny. Foucault's parrhesiatic practices 
would never be able to change their normative, governing standards 
(established by disciplinary techniques and then strengthened by ascetic 
practices), and so would merely amount to conventionally defined relations 
whose truth-telling practices would always work, ultimately, to support these 
norms. Such an organism would appear to be determined in a crude sense. 
To the extent that such an organism's drives or desires contradict these 
norms/conventions, it is capable only of the kind of "compensation" or 
"imaginary revenge" upon the world710 that characterize a ressentimental slave 
morality. In other words, if the human organism's psychophysiology is fear-
dominated in the way LeDoux describes, then humans would be universally 
fearful and incapable of the agonism that Connolly hopes to encourage. If he 
were to take seriously the implications of the neuroscience he relies on, then 
Connolly cannot realistically hope for anything beyond fearfulness and the 
                                               
709 Connolly’s preference for Bergsonian film watching, removed from the demands/stresses of 
everyday life – in which interactions with individuals with institutional authority are not likely 
to occur – may, in avoiding fear stimulation, betray a partial hopelessness based on this part of 
LeDoux’s perspective according to which fear responsiveness and conditioning predominates 
in the human organism. 
710 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage, 1989), 36-9. 
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mere reproduction of ressentimental morality – i.e., the valorization of 
suffering, weakness, and self-humiliation and the derogation of pleasure, 
strength, and agonism.  
To the degree that we observe ourselves as capable of the kind of 
agonistic respect Connolly hopes for, LeDoux's theory must misinterpret our 
experience and the neuroscientific evidence. LeDoux's theory, it turns out, is 
not universally accepted, and, according to some recent research, mistaken; 
while its foundational parts seem to lead to the conclusion that fear (or 
avoidance) and ressentiment are universal and irreversible, thereby precluding 
the possibility of any consequential/disruptive critique, there is a competing 
theory and evidence that suggests the importance of one's particular 
conditioning (or cultural training) in making more (or less) probable (as opposed 
to determining) the disciplinarity of the subject (its avoidance and punishment 
behavior) as well as the degree of development of its critical capabilities (its 
engagement and risk behaviors) – a theory and evidence, in other words, that 
allow not simply the presence but the greater or lesser probability of differing 
degrees of agonistic respect and critique based on one’s conditioning. This 
evidence indicates that fear is not predominant the way LeDoux often711 thinks 
it to be. Luiz Pessoa and others, using the same kind of backward-masking 
tasks712 upon which LeDoux bases his view that fear stimulation predominates, 
                                               
711 LeDoux, though holding that fear is in fact primary and initially preemptive of cortical 
activation – both PFC and hippocampal, so that initial unconscious processing of fearful stimuli 
is entirely thalamo-amygdalar, says that there is secondary hippocampal and PFC modulation 
of amygdalar fear responses. But, on his view, emotional conditioning, under the influence of 
the amygdala, structures the PFC and hippocampus to avoid the fearful stimulus/event. This 
seems to mean that if the stimulus/event re-presents itself, it will merely reinforce the already 
conditioned PFC and hippocampal avoidance. 
712 Subjects are shown a fearful face for a short duration (a range from 40 to 10ms - i.e., during 
the period that LeDoux says working memory/attentional consciousness is inoperative but 
autonomic reactions, via the lateral amygdala, occur) and then a neutral face for 50ms or more. 
The neutral face is supposed to "back-mask" the fearful face, since it is shown immediately after 
and long enough for attentional consciousness to become aware of it. 
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have demonstrated that many subjects (roughly two-thirds of their sample) are 
capable of conscious awareness of a fearful stimulus (i.e., its fear-invoking 
status) within713 the time frame – i.e., Connolly's “half-second delay”714 – that 
allegedly "unconscious" (amygdalar) autonomic responses and conditioning to 
a fearful stimulus occur.715 Instead of the universal inability to recognize fearful 
faces before or at the onset of their initial autonomic effects, which we would 
expect from LeDoux’s theory, the speed of conscious detection of fearful 
stimuli varies across subjects. This variation may be due to the subjects' 
attentional focus; other research has demonstrated that attentional (conscious) 
focus is required for fearful stimuli to have any noticeable emotional (reaction) 
effect716 – when people are intensely focused on one object, it is less probable 
that other objects will be noticed – even in instances when fear stimuli are 
present: when intense focus precludes noticing them, autonomic fear reactions 
                                               
713 In this study, 33ms, in some cases after 17ms. 
714 In fact, this "half-second delay" was originally Benjamin Libet's finding; Libet found that 
conscious awareness was supposed to occur from 500ms of exposure to a stimulus, whereas 
much shorter duration painful stimuli and pain-conditioned stimuli initiated autonomic 
responses – i.e., before conscious awareness of them. In addition, in other research Libet 
reported that subjects became aware of intentions only after a behavioral responses. See 
Benjamin Libet, "The Timing of Mental Events: Libet's Experimental Findings and Their 
Implications," Consciousness and Cognition 11, no. 2 (June 2002), 291–99. 
715 Pessoa et al. found that, on reviewing LeDoux's and other research, it was possible that 
"noisy or weak" signals accounted for the inability (in that research) for subjects to detect fearful 
stimuli within the time that immediate autonomic reactions to the stimuli were supposed to 
occur. By carefully eliminated noisy or weak signals from the stimulus group, Pessoa provided 
for a more reliable fear detection result (Pessoa et al. “Visual Awareness and the Detection of 
Fearful Faces,” Emotion 5, no. 2 (2005), 243–47). Pessoa found that “64% of the subjects tested 
were able to detect briefly presented (33 ms) and masked fearful faces” (Ibid., 246). All subjects 
were able to detect fearful faces at 70ms. 
716 Martin Eimer and Amanda Holmes, "The Role of Spatial Attention in the Processing of Facial 
Expression: An ERP Study of Rapid Brain Responses to Six Basic Emotions," Cognitive, Affective, 
& Behavioral Neuroscience 3, no. 2 (2003), 97–110. See also L. Pessoa, S. Kastner and L. G. 
Ungerleider, “Attentional Control of the Processing of Neural and Emotional Stimuli,” Cognitive 
Brain Research 15, no. 1 (2002), 31–45;  L. Pessoa et al., “Neural Processing of Emotional Faces 
Requires Attention,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 99 (2002), 11458–63. 
This also seems to be the finding in Pessoa et al. 
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will not result.717 When fearful stimuli do disrupt attention to other objects, it is 
only through capturing this attention in conscious awareness. 
This body of research appears to indicate that, even if the speed of 
conscious awareness differs between individuals, initial fear processing – the 
occurrence of emotional reactions – relies on conscious awareness; that is, these 
reactions involve “higher” cortical activity in the hippocampus and PFC. Even 
in infants, conscious medial temporal lobe memory (involving 
parahippocampal and hippocampal structures) occurs from early on, within 
the first postnatal months, at first supporting recognition memory (even within 
the first few days of life), and then recall memory within the child's first year.718 
The absence of autobiographical memory up to the age of 2 or 3, though it has 
often been explained on the basis of a "qualitative shift from one memory 
system to another" (typically unconscious to conscious, as in LeDoux's 
amygdalar explanation), appears instead to result from increasing experience-
related development of "encoding, retention, and retrieval."719 Not surprisingly, 
these experience-related improvements in memory function co-occur with 
improvements in conditioning. That children are effected but cannot recall 
events in conscious memory does not mean that they were not conscious of 
                                               
717 In addition, as we have noted above, Pessoa et. al's research was guided by the observation 
that "in the face of weak, noisy signals, subjects may often indicate not detecting target stimuli 
and thus appear to be unable to reliably detect them" (Pessoa et al., “Visual Awareness and the 
Detection of Fearful Faces,” Emotion 5, no. 2 (2005), 243). 
718 Michelle de Haana et al., "Human Memory Development and Its Dysfunction After Early 
Hippocampal Injury," Trends in Neurosciences 29, no. 7 (July 2006), 374–81. 
719 H. Hayne, "Infant Memory Development: Implications for Childhood Amnesia," 
Developmental Review 24 (2004), 62. Hayne's review paper finds that infants' encoding abilities – 
the speed, detection of retrieval clues, matching of retrieval clues and target memories; 
retention interval; and contextualizing ability all improve drastically over the course of the first 
two years, apparently as a result of experience rather than structural change. Likewise, 
language, like other retrieval clues, is an extension of the infant's ability to encode, retain and 
retrieve cues and memories; the "same encoding, retention, and retrieval mechanisms that 
characterize memory processing across the lifespan" (Ibid., 64) explain childhood improvement 
in memory and also childhood amnesia. See also Michelle de Haana et al., "Human Memory 
Development and Its Dysfunction After Early Hippocampal Injury," Trends in Neurosciences 29, 
no. 7 (July 2006), 374–81. 
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them at the time. In fact, this research seems to indicate that to be affected, they 
must have been conscious of them. 
Finally, research demonstrates that the VTA dopaminergic (DAergic) 
activity that establishes working memory attention – i.e, the attentional focus 
prerequisite to reaction/response and conditioning – occurs in response to all 
arousing stimuli, whether they are rewarding, punishing, or uncertain.720 
Stimuli/events, e.g., food rewards, become incapable of producing DA 
responses once they become predictable. Instead, DA activation occurs in 
conditions “of salient environmental change, conditions that require an 
organism to (i) become responsive to environmental stimuli, (ii) prepare for the 
possible output of high levels of behavioral activity, (iii) maintain a working 
memory representation of the just-encountered event.”721 According to some 
authors, DA activation’s importance in preparing for action in both 
appetitive/rewarding and aversive/punishing conditions should be 
understood as establishing a “tonic motor readiness” – a “state of anxiety” 
which is neither wholly positive nor wholly negative while nevertheless being 
anticipatory.722 (In this process the ARAS, which receives incoming sensory 
stimulation just before the thalamus, is probably crucial.723) "[M]ost DA in the 
                                               
720 J. C. Horvitz, “Mesolimbocortical and Nigrostriatal Dopamine Responses to Salient Non-
Reward Events,” Neuroscience 6, no. 4 (2000), 651–56; Wolfram Schultz, “Behavior Dopamine 
Signals,” Trends in Neuroscience 30, no. 5 (May 2007), 203–10; Don M. Tucker, “Dopamine 
Tightens, Not Loosens,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 3 (1999), 537–38; Daniel S. Zahm, 
“The Evolving Theory of Basal Forebrain Functional-Anatomical ‘Macrosystems,’” Neuroscience 
and Biobehavioral Reviews 30 (2006), 148-172; Trevor W. Robbins, “Arousal Systems and 
Attentional Processes,” Biological Psychology 45 (1997), 57–71. 
721 J. C. Horvitz, “Mesolimbocortical and Nigrostriatal Dopamine Responses to Salient Non-
Reward Events,” Neuroscience 6, no. 4 (2000), 654. 
722 Don M. Tucker, “Dopamine Tightens, Not Loosens,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 3 
(1999), 537–58. The authors note that DAergic activation resulting in "engagement" behaviors is, 
contrary to then current accepted neuroscientific opinion, not an exclusively "reward system" 
behavior, that it involves "punishment system" excitation as well. (This is precisely the moment 
that Connolly indicates that he hopes to be reopened by the dissociation of fearful stimuli from 
their punishment associations.) 
723 Ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) (in the mid- and hind-brain) neurons, 
compared to the sensory-thalamo-cortical route, effect a longer-lasting but less specific cortical 
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VTA projection system [is] involved in information processing that is not of 
necessity guided directly by incentives."724 (Or perhaps not by clear ones, 
perhaps instead by a conatus not simply motivated by reward engagement or 
pain avoidance, but optimal well-being?) 
Together, this new research appears to demonstrate that in all subjects, 
arousing stimuli are initially – in the immediate time following exposure to a 
fear stimulus (i.e., Connolly's "half-second delay") – a) experienced ambivalently 
– i.e., neither exclusively punishing nor exclusively rewarding (in terms of the 
preparation of the organism for fear or reward behaviors), and b) experienced 
consciously. That is, fear stimuli activate areas involved in both punishment and 
reward circuits, and thus their ambivalent status, via LTP, becomes (if it is not 
already by virtue of being phyletic macrostructure or ontogenic/conditioned 
microstructure) part of the neural synaptic microstructure. This must be 
established, as with any form of conditioning, through attention and repetition. 
In the repeated presentations required for the stimulus's initial fear 
conditioning – eventuating in avoidance behavior – the stimulus's ambivalent 
                                               
response by sending nonspecific, polysynaptic projections diffusely throughout the cortex; their 
excitation innervates background arousal and cortical activity, which are prerequisite to sensory 
processing, consciousness, and cognition processes of specific cortical areas. Strong, novel, 
stimuli facilitate action potentials at the norepinephrinergic (NE) nuclei (locus coeruleus and 
lateral tegmentum), which in turn excite cortical cells at synapses that have recently been 
activated by specific sensory stimuli, thus maintaining arousal around and focusing attention 
on arousing stimuli. (The  ARAS-stimulated cortex responds by stimulating the ARAS, which 
renews ARAS-stimulated background arousal in the cortex.) The ARAS also includes 
dopaminergic nuclei (substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area) which project via the medial 
forebrain bundle into the forebrain in the brain’s reward circuit, communicating with the 
amygdala, prefrontal cortex, and thalamus, and modulating memory, motivation, and motor 
control. The reticular formation includes the raphe nuclei and ventral tegmental field whose 
serotoninergic and cholinergic cells (respectively) that directly and indirectly connect to the 
thalamocortical system, and thereby regulate states of awareness. (Cycles of attention and 
inattention throughout the day depend not only on sensory input to the reticular activating 
system, but also input from the thalamus directly to the cortex and indirectly through the ARAS 
to the cortex.) 
724 R. D. Oades, “Dopamine: Go/No-Go Motivation Vs. Switching. Commentary on Depue & 
Collins’ ‘Neurobiology of the Structure of Personality: Dopamine, Facilitation of Incentive 
Motivation and Extraversion,’" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1999), 532–33. 
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status is also, though more weakly, established as neural microstructure. Our 
phyletic macrostructure appears, then, to guarantee that we automatically 
attend, react, and respond to phyletically fearful stimuli, but this 
macrostructure also appears to guarantee: that the organism attends to stimuli 
that are new/uncertain (unpredictable); that this arousal for response is 
ambivalent (in part pleasurable and in part unpleasurable); and that the 
resulting potentiated attentional/preparatory microstructure remains725 – i.e., as 
a potentially retrievable memory (regardless of subsequent conditioning).726 
Finally, in those cases where fear conditioning often occurs only after 
conditioning of prohibitied reward behavioral responses to stimuli has already 
occurred, this reward conditioning of course also remains.727 
When we see fearful stimuli, to reduce the aversive reaction we tend to 
avoid them; our reaction does not mean that we do not see them, but that their 
stimulation of our conditioned microstructure, via conscious attendance, 
facilitates preparation for avoidance. That we no longer experience strong 
defense reactions and responses to these stimuli comes from this avoidance 
behavior – not from the fact that the stimuli are no longer capable of eliciting 
these reactions and responses, but because they can and do728 - i.e., if we are 
forced into close proximity to them. We attend further to unpredictable details 
because of their status as neither specifically rewarding nor punishing; this can 
happen with stimuli we are already familiar with because of a change in 
                                               
725 From sometime between the age of 2 and 3. Childhood experience is discussed below. 
726 If the stimulus did not have an ambivalent microstructuring effect in the organism – making 
attention possible, if it were only to elicit a microstructure that was potentiated to always result 
in the punishment pathway stimulation and therefore punishment behavior, this neutral 
attention would be impossible. 
727 Indeed, if it did not, there would be no need for the coercive institutions of society past 
childhood. 
728 For example, in the following chapter, Steve Paxton notes that when our personal space is 
invaded, we tend to constrict our own movement to within closer range of our own body, thus 
avoiding the feared contact. 
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attentional focus of the individual - when we are already attending to 
particular stimuli, we may not notice other stimuli unless because of their 
intensity (our phyletic/ontogenic experience with it) they become more 
arousing and elicit attentional focus.  
 
Conditioning and "extinction" (or re-conditioning to unlearn a habitual 
reaction and response) appear, then, to work by the same principle of 
repetition.729 Repeated experience of, which means attention to, a particular 
uncertain stimulus is required to establish its aversive or rewarding (or 
ambivalent) status for the organism. The individual can be made to attend to it 
by means of its co-occurrence with phyletically (i.e., unconditioned) or already 
ontogenically (i.e., conditioned) aversive stimuli.730 This can occur, for example, 
                                               
729 Research indicates the importance of repetition in achieving extinction. In particular, short 
intervals between trainings (“trial massing”) in initial extinction sessions (“trials”) have been 
found to speed up extinction learning (G. J. Quirk, “Learning Not to Fear, Faster,” Learning & 
Memory 11 (2004), 125–26). In fact, extinction trials both in part elicit fear and reward 
“incubation” – i.e., elicit a fear or reward reaction – and, at the same time, extinguish fear or 
reward reactions. If extinction trial intervals are longer (“trial spacing”) they tend to incubate 
fear or reward by eliciting the fear or reward response more than extinguish it. 
730 The extinction of conditioned punishment behaviors (i.e., the unpairing of particular CS from 
US) occurs by the repeated presentation of the punishment behavior-inducing CS without the co-
occurrence of US – i.e., without accompanying punishing stimuli (J. P. Schroeder and M. G. 
Packard, “Facilitation of Memory for Extinction of Drug-Induced Conditioned Reward: Role of 
Amygdala and Actyelcholine,” Learning & Memory 11 (2004), 641–47; P. H. Janak et al., 
“Dynamics of Neural Coding in the Nucleus Accumbens During Extinction and Reinstatement 
of Reward Behavior,” Behavioural Brain Research 154 (2004), 125–35). Punishment/fear and 
reward extinction takes place in part by medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) projections to the 
amygdala - i.e., via the slower, cortical route to the amygdala. But extinction also occurs via 
NMDA-mediated LTP of inhibitory neurons within the amygdala itself (F. Sotres-Bayon et al., 
“Emotional Perseveration: An Update on Prefrontal-Amygdala Interactions in Fear Extinction,” 
Learning & Memory 11 (2004), 525–35; R. Fuchs et al., “The Role of the Basolateral Amygdala in 
Stimulus-Reward Memory and Extinction Memory Consolidation and in Subsequent Cued 
Reinstatement of Cocaine Seeking,” European Journal of Neuroscience 23 (2006), 2809–13; M. E. 
Bouton, “Context and Behavioral Processes in Extinction, Learning and Memory” Learning & 
Memory 11 (2004), 485–94, not just in the prefrontal projections that synapse with the amygdala. 
As a result, the effects of extinction are felt not just in the thalamo-cortico-amygdalar pathway 
to the activation or inhibition of sympathetic responses, but also in the thalamo-amygdalar 
route, thus moderating the fear and reward responses. (There is as yet no indication that 
amygdalar extinction itself takes place without prefrontal cortical projections. But whether 
extinction in the amygdala itself cannot occur without mPFC involvement, amygdalar 
extinction is consequential in the thalamo-amygdalar fear circuit, thus moderating the 
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through disciplinary techniques (applied by institutional authorities, 
colleagues, even ourselves in the form of ascetic practices). Once the repeated 
pairing is sufficient to establish conditioning, the reintroduction of the formerly 
neutral stimulus will elicit the memory of the stimulus as aversive and, 
subsequently, that response in the organism. The initial experience of the 
stimulus as ambivalent or rewarding will still exist as a microstructural 
memory of the stimulus, but through avoidance (the conditioned fearful 
behavior) of the aversive stimulus, the individual will not gain much 
subsequent repeated experience of (sustained attention to) the stimulus as 
ambivalent. 
 To "extinguish" a conditioned stimulus's ability to evoke fear reactions 
and responses (behavior) requires the subsequent repeated experience of 
(attention to) it as ambivalent – that is, without any strong fear reaction. This 
would mean somehow changing the conditioned avoidance behavior, since 
avoidance precludes the necessary attention to the stimulus to establish its 
ambivalence731. Given the microstructure established by repeated experience of 
a stimulus as fearful, the "extinction" of the fearful status of a stimulus (its 
microstructural power to evoke a fearful reaction and response) is not in fact an 
actual extinction, but a kind of synaptic competition.732 Even if subsequent 
repeated attention establishes a new microstructural/synaptic architecture, the 
previously established synpatic architecture (microstructure) connecting the 
                                               
sympathetic fear response – see F. Sotres-Bayon et al., “Emotional Perseveration: An Update on 
Prefrontal-Amygdala Interactions in Fear Extinction,” Learning & Memory 11 (2004), 525–35).) 
731 With rats, this is accomplished by forcibly reintroducing the stimulus repeatedly without the 
initial conditioning fear stimulus. The rat cannot avoid the stimulus, and therefore proceeds to 
strengthen the original neutrality of the stimulus. 
732 This resilience of fear or reward conditioning is of obvious homeostatic importance. There is 
strong evidence that the CS-US associations bonded during fear or reward conditioning are not 
erased by extinction, even though extinction, when successful, overcomes fear elicitation (Ibid., 
527). 
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stimulus to the fear reaction remains. But the new microstructure exists along 
with the old; newly conditioned LTP mean that the stimulus is never fully 
restored to its original ambivalent status. Instead, the organism experiences 
fear and reward reactions (including emotions, feelings, thoughts733,734);735 a new 
ambivalence is established, a heightened state of "tonic readiness,” whose 
outcome is not certain. The stimulus is capable of producing both pain and 
pleasure. But because these reactions and responses use the same synaptic 
networks, sufficient repeated experience of pleasure in relation to the object can 
establish a habit of engagement with it. In the meantime, to use Luxon's and 
                                               
733 Since any CS can play the role of US, providing amygdalar and prefrontal-amygdalar neural 
architecture to support the conditioning of new fear response- or reward response-invoking 
stimuli by association, the emotion, feeling (including associated thoughts), and explicit 
memories (i.e., part of the amygdala’s response to fear-invoking stimuli (CS or US) is adrenal 
release, which in turn augments hippocampal long-term memory formation), prompted by the 
(unextinguished) fear response- and reward response-evoking CS can themselves become fear 
response- and reward response-evoking CS. (This is true for all anxiety disorders – e.g., panic, 
phobias, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder – including anxiety in 
its nonclinical forms (Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1996), 228). 
734 The conscious experience of emotional changes in the body is “feeling” – a “mental 
representation [i.e., map] of the physiologic changes that occur during an emotion” (A. 
Damasio, “Emotions and feelings: a neurobiological perspective,” in Feelings and Emotions: The 
Amsterdam Symposium, eds. A. S. R. Manstead et al. (New York: Cambridge UP, 2004), 52) – that 
is, as we have seen, in unimodal and transmodal association cortices, in connection with the 
hippocampus, and the limbic structures, including the amygdala. This mapping includes, via 
working, short-term, and long-term memory, the evocation of thoughts that are experientially 
associated with the emotional and feeling state of the organism in that moment, as well as a 
corresponding direction of attention to particular, affectively valued features of the 
precipitating stimulus/event. 
735 For example, a strict patriarchal, fundamentalist Christian upbringing may pair pious 
behavior (e.g., Bible-reading, church attendance, servility, strict repression of urges to 
masturbate, dance, listen to secular music, have sexual contact with the same or opposite sex) 
with rewards or punishment reduction (e.g., affection, allowance (financial power), dessert, less 
spanking) from primary caregivers and other childhood and adolescence authorities. Stimuli, a 
prohibitive word or look (or any other sign) from the parent, and, by extension, all kinds of 
other stimuli, i.e., any thing/event/situation that serves as a temptation to 
disobey/opportunity to obey, are paired with the unconditioned stimuli and conditioned stimuli, 
affection, food, freedom to move, to elicit unconditioned response behaviors – 
approaching/engagement or avoidance – towards (in response to) the conditioned stimuli. At the same 
time, of course, conditioning will occur wherever there is space removed from patriarchal 
surveillance, either in private, in fantasy, or when patriarchal caregivers are absent or not 
looking, or on occasions when the primary caregivers behave nonpatriarchally, rewarding 
behaviors that indirectly but covertly strengthen CS-UR (unconditioned response) pairings that 
contradict patriarchal moral behaviors – e.g., sexual and other fantasies/dreams, masturbation, 
dance, and, in general, exploratory, non-prechoreographed behaviors. 
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Foucault's terminology, the stimulus is viewed as suspicious (potentially 
painful), but also potentially trustworthy (i.e., rewarding). It will always retain 
some, even if minute, degree of its original ambivalence and subsequent fearful 
status. 
Subjects are, therefore, not entirely fearful, and when they are 
ressentimental, not entirely so. The ressentimental subject is fearful;736 it learns 
to avoid stimuli that it originally experiences as ambivalent or pleasurable 
because the application of extensive disciplinary techniques makes them 
fearful. Its experience has established the fearful status of those behaviors that 
are punished, and the fearful status of the feelings (including, possibly, the 
feelings of a state of tonic motor readiness), thoughts, explicit memories, and 
other stimuli associated with them – including other people, or parts of other 
people. As far as possible, it avoids all of these. Its ressentimentality also 
consists in its learning a slave morality – to associate suffering, weakness, 
humility with “good,” to experience feelings and thoughts of pleasure, 
strength, action, and pride as “bad.” The ressentimental subject’s compensatory 
“revenge” requires punishment of the “bad” in oneself and others, an 
avoidance of potentially pleasurable stimulus experiences (which can include 
confrontation, as our discussion of Foucault has shown) that leave this subject 
in a perpetually dissatisfied and dependent737 state.  
                                               
736 See footnotes 543 and 640 below. 
737 Nietzsche says in On the Genealogy of Morals, “While every noble morality develops from a 
triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ 
what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself;’ and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the 
value-positing eye – this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself – is of the 
essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external 
world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is 
fundamentally a reaction” (On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage, 1989), 36-7). 
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But this ressentimental subjectivity is not inevitable. We are capable of  
valuations that are not ressentimental. Fear (contrary to what LeDoux, 
explicitly, and Connolly, at least implicitly, think) is not predominant and 
preemptive, unconsciously affecting the unwitting organism through the 
conditioned amygdala; such a predominance would, as we have discussed, 
make all subjects preemptively and irreversibly fearful, and incapable of 
anything but a ressentimental morality. Instead, the (conscious) experience of 
culture both within and beyond childhood is clearly influential in predisposing 
us to differing degrees of fear and of ressentiment. Though clearly the repeated, 
pleasurable and painful experiences of stimulation in childhood give power to an 
increasingly large range of stimuli to evoke strong reactions and make probable 
certain responses in the individual, their power appears not to derive from 
their "unconscious" – and therefore consciously inaccessible – establishment in 
the neural microarchitecture that constitute our dispositions. It derives from 
conscious and repeated reinforcement in initial presentation and subsequent 
(conscious) experience.738 
 
Disciplinary and Experimental 
 To decrease the probability that it will habitually avoid and punish (so as 
to remove/avoid) itself and others, such a subject, as we have said, would need 
repeated experience of attention to the stimuli it has been conditioned to fear – 
i.e., stimuli that this subject is precisely conditioned to avoid. But the problem, 
as we have established above, is not one of a completely fear-dominated 
subject, or a (more specifically) completely ressentimental subject (with an 
                                               
738 In this sense, the psychoanalytic attention to childhood trauma/drama may serve to distract 
attention from (i.e., avoid) rather than direct it to a confrontation with the authorities and 
practices that maintain these stimuli's power to provoke specific behavioral responses. 
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intractible "motivational deficit"). Our organism, in response to the stimulus's 
original ambivalence (partial pleasure and partial pain), retains a 
microstructure making the organism "tonically motor ready;” it can maintain 
this attention (a kind of "steadiness" that is neither wholly 
trusting/approaching nor wholly suspicious) towards the stimulus – i.e., a kind 
of "agonistic respect.” The "way out" – for a conatus – of the dissatisfaction and 
unhappiness of fearful avoidance and ressentimentality, then, is to experiment 
with and refine techniques "of the self" that develop this attentiveness, 
precisely when we are “sunk in the middle of action,”739 in the act of “ordinary 
perception" of the demands of everyday life, rather than just when we are away 
from them, as Connolly seems to advise.740 Our organism's neural 
macrostructure appears, by guaranteeing the basic capacity for tonic readiness, 
to guarantee that these techniques to some extent already exist – the human 
organism is not simply disciplinary or ressentimental but also an experimental, 
risk-taking subject. What the organism does not guarantee is the degree and 
sites of these techniques' development. 
 To conclude that fear is not predominant in the organism is not to say 
that fear cannot still affect it. Clearly, fear conditioning can make avoidance 
behavior more probable, and make recall of the stimulus's original ambivalence 
difficult. But this conditioning, research indicates, requires conscious attention. 
(We may still find ourselves doing things we cannot remember choosing, but 
this does not mean that we did not.) Whereas for Connolly, our "tactics of self-
identity" and "otherness,” involving ressentimental responses, are normally 
subconscious and automatic, a growing body of evidence seems to indicate 
                                               
739 William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 26. 
740Indeed, if Connolly were right about the predominance of fear, retiring to the dark, quiet of 
the theater would not eliminate its predominance.  
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instead that our responses to ontogenic/conditioned fear stimuli are still 
choices involving conscious awareness, even when these responses happen 
quickly and don't involve long deliberation.741 That they can be recalled, 
attended to, even in the "midst of action,” is the source of our (and Connolly's) 
hope in techniques of the self that might develop our habit of attention. This 
(latter) research also seems to indicate that this habit of attention is in all 
subjectivities already developed enough to be able to maintain and even develop 
itself further, to varying degrees in both the "slow" and "fast" interactions that 
constitute our everyday lives.  The amygdala, "somatic markers,” and virtual 
memories that are crucial to Connolly's conclusions appear not to act 
independently of conscious awareness but as a result of it. 
This is not to say that watching certain films from a Bergsonian 
perspective will not affect the subject; these exercises of steady 
observation/attention in the dark and quiet, free of most fear stimulation, can, 
as Connolly says, "help" (i.e., allowed repeated attention to what one might 
normally avoid), given that perception, reaction, response, and conditioning 
require attentional focus. Such slowing down of one's movement/responses 
can result in the development (through practice) of one's ambivalence – critical 
awareness – to include attention to more minute detail by allowing the 
repeated experience of one's sensations (feelings and thoughts) – i.e., so that 
they become recallable memories. Slowing down is not necessarily a fear-
stimulated act of avoidance (a distraction from one's sensations, feelings, and 
thoughts). It can also be an act of engagement with one's sensations, feelings and 
thoughts; Connolly's film-watching technique could do this. And the resulting 
                                               
741 That working memory cannot easily access this information does not mean conscious 
attention was not involved. 
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awareness, might be maintained during faster and less restricted movement and 
interaction. But the maintenance of this attention is also made more probable 
by repeatedly practicing – by trying it. Film watching is, nevertheless, still only 
a partial confrontation with the disciplinary subject; as a technique, in and of 
itself, it does not risk the fearful (but also ambivalently arousing) struggle with 
arbitrary authority where it exists in our practices in our relations with friends, 
strangers, coworkers, and also supervisors and other authorities who enforce 
our society's conventions and laws. 
Given his desire and hope for agonistic respect, Connolly's technique 
(Bergsonian film watching) and his neuroscience seem unrealistically 
pessimistic; they at least implicitly assume a universally fear-dominated 
subjectivity (conditioned by an Augustinian command morality) – i.e., an 
apparently determined subjectivity – that contradicts both neuroscientific 
evidence and Connolly’s optimism about the transformative possibilities of 
techniques of the self. (This simultaneous pessimism and optimism reminds us 
of Luxon's and perhaps Foucault's simultaneous and contradictory conclusions 
that we are irreversibly disciplinary subjects and that we are capable of changing 
this disciplinary subjectivity.) There is hope. The modern liberal subject is not 
simply a disciplinary and ressentimental subject; s/he also has the capacity – 
i.e., freedom – (already developed to some degree) in fearful experiences to 
"remark, describe, and remember,"742 to tell the truth of her/his experience. If 
this subject wants to change his/her dispositions, behavior, and relations, s/he 
must risk this confrontation.
                                               
742 Nancy Luxon, “Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault,” Political Theory 36, no. 3 (2008), 385, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
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7. Steve Paxton’s “Interior Techniques”  
 [I]n what is given to us as universal, 
necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied 
by whatever is singular, contingent, and the 
product of arbitrary constraints?743 (Michel 
Foucault) 
 
What had the culture physically suppressed 
or selected out which we might reclaim?744 
(Steve Paxton) 
 
Contact Improvisation745 
Steve Paxton, after childhood training in gymnastics, was trained in 
aikido, ballet, and modern dance, later performing for postmodern 
choreographers Merce Cunningham and José Limón. He helped found and 
performed in the Judson Dance Theater, shortly afterwards breaking off to co-
found the experimental, improvisational Grand Union in 1970, where Paxton 
began developing the practices that were to become "contact improvisation" 
(CI). The idea in the practice of CI, whose seminal performance "Magnesium" 
took place at Oberlin College in January, 1972, was to discover, through 
spontaneous movement in contact with other dancers – trained and untrained, 
                                               
743 Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 45. 
744 Steve Paxton, “Drafting Interior Techniques,” Contact Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1993), 64. 
745 For an example of contact improvisation performance, please see Liz Erber, "Early Morning 
Contact Video," http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ql0ISYdCypQ. 
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spontaneous duets746 - human movement (and human behavior in general) 
which was “pleasant, highly stimulating, and elemental”747 to us as human 
organisms interacting with each other. There was no set choreography, no 
specific instruction. Improvisers in the space continuously chose when and 
how long and with whom they would dance and what movement to do. The 
Grand Union (1970-1976), where Paxton had begun experimenting with 
improvisation in duets (not yet named contact improvisation) two years before 
"Magnesium,” was, likewise, “totally improvisational:”  
The totally improvisational company that the Grand Union unintentionally 
became bypasses the grand game of choreographer and company. There, 
ego-play is the issue, and those gentle means of assuming authority or 
submitting to it had, in the past, been played thoroughly by the members… 
Instead, following or allowing oneself to lead is each member’s continual 
responsibility. The security of pre-set material is only occasionally indulged 
in, since it seems to get in the way of amplified self-exploration that arises in 
improvisatory performance. The weighty theatrical tradition of subjecting 
one’s self to another person’s aesthetic of time-space-effort manipulation is 
ignored in favor of the attempt to be emancipated without confining or 
restricting others.”748 
Read from a Foucauldian perspective, Paxton in this single passage indicates 
how CI, motivated by its participants' dissatisfaction with and desire to free 
themselves from the disciplinary subject in their own practices and those of 
others, is, by means of the ability to observe and experiment, a continuous 
                                               
746 Duets are typical; trios or larger groups are not impossible, but the more bodies, the more 
difficult it is to attend to all the bodies involved. 
747 Steve Paxton, “Drafting Interior Techniques,” Contact Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1993), 64. 
748 Steve Paxton, “The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 130-1. 
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practice of self-awareness in relation to others – what Luxon calls a "disposition 
to steadiness."749 Or, more accurately, Paxton said it is an "attempt" to do this. It 
could be a practice of freedom. As I have argued, in the previous chapter, the 
organism's capability for such "amplified self-exploration" is guaranteed by its 
neural macrostructure. But to succeed in achieving freedom and satisfaction for 
the self a practice/technique must risk confronting and thereby change the 
disciplinary subjectivity in one's own and others' dispositions. 
 This chapter examines CI as a technique of the self that attempts to take 
advantage of our macrostructurally guaranteed ability (those abilities to 
"remark, describe, and remember" that Foucault observed) to attend to 
stimuli/objects that we are disciplined (fear-conditioned) to habitually avoid – 
an avoidance that constitutes our obedience and submission to established 
relations of power. Achieving a risk-taking (truth-telling) subjectivity requires 
attending to those habits – those "inexplicable inhibitions"750 – as they operate 
in our behavior (i.e., our relations) to prevent this subjectivity's 
operation/development. Though CI accomplished much in this direction, 
Paxton's apparent binarization of the body and its reflexes, on the one hand, 
and consciousness and culture, on the other, helped limit its success. By 
altering its technique to include a more accurate, recallable image of the body 
and consciousness, reflexes and culture, CI might provide a habit of critique, an 
expressive subjectivity, ready to confront and tell the truth, in "the midst of 
action.”   
 
                                               
749 Nancy Luxon, "Ethics and Subjectivity: Practices of Self-Governance in the Late Lectures of 
Michel Foucault," Political Theory 36 (2008), 386, 
http://ptx.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/36/3/377. 
750 TJ, 515. 
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In his remarks on the subjectivity of the individual in American society, 
Paxton was uninhibited:  
We are conditioned to voluntary slavery. In a democracy, dictators must 
demand that others be slaves; fortunately for the dictators, the American life 
produces slaves who are unaware of the mechanism of that production. The 
ties that bind are the ties that blind.751  
This conditioning in unawareness was a production of “gestures, modes of 
posture… behavior… mental attitudes… which constitute [the] proper social 
activities and communications… as well as the accompanying mental attitudes 
we acquire or aspire to for proper presentation of our ‘selves.’"752 What we 
learn in school for the most part is “to sit still and focus our attention for hours 
each day. The missing potential here is obvious – movement of the body and 
varieties of peripheral sensing.”753 The “constraints and taboos of touching” 
that we learn as we grow up undermine our potential for satisfying physical 
contact.  
Paxton observed this general cultural production of (though he did not 
use the term) disciplinary bodies even in dance, and his own experience of it. 
Far from being a freer space of cultural production, "[i]n dance—one laboratory 
for exploring the human body and all it carries with it in this life—repression of 
possibilities is the general rule, mirroring social forms.”754 In the dance 
classroom and rehearsal space, most dancers are physically isolated: "in class 
each person is equally spaced from all the others in floor work, or sequentially 
                                               
751 Steve Paxton, “The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 131. 
752 “What had the culture physically suppressed or selected out—[via] certain gestures, modes 
of posture and behavior (i.e., body language) which constitute proper social activities and 
communications, as well as the accompanying mental attitudes we acquire or aspire to for 
proper presentation of our ‘selves’—which we might reclaim?” (Steve Paxton, “Drafting 
Interior Techniques,” Contact Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1993), 64). 
753 Ibid. 
754 Steve Paxton, “The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 133. 
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isolated when moving across the floor)…. That each person must stay within 
his isolated space allotment… is typical of our culture."755 We are afraid of 
proximity, and therefore respond to "crowding" by avoiding contact - 
"condensing the field [of movement] into a tight little bubble around the 
person," or by "withdrawing inside the skin wall;"756 "There is dignity for the 
mind even if the messages of the body must be ignored. The understanding of 
personal space is social/habitual and since the habit is defensive, having that 
space invaded can be shocking."757 
In general, dance companies, whether they were classical, modern, 
postmodern, practiced the same disciplinary techniques and reinforced the 
same hierarchical power relations that Paxton observed in society generally: 
Many social forms were used during the 1960s to accomplish dance. In 
ballet, the traditional courtly hierarchy continued. In modern dance 
(Graham, Límón,758 Lang, et al.), the same social form was used except 
magicians rather than monarchs held sway. Post-modern dancers 
(Cunningham, Marsicano, Waring) maintained alchemical dictatorships, 
turning ordinary materials into gold, but continuing to draw from classical 
and modern-classical sources of dance company organization. It was the 
star system. It is difficult to make the general public understand other 
systems, inundated as we are with the exploitation of personality and 
appearance in every aspect of theatre…. [T]his basic poverty of 
understanding on the audiences’ part is a drag....759 
                                               
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Paxton, as we note above, spent several years dancing for both Límón and Cunningham. 
759 Ibid., 131, cited in C. J. Novack, Sharing the Dance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1990), 58-9. 
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Paxton, for his part, desired "unique and personalized forms"760 of dance 
practice. His dissatisfaction with these hierarchical power relations, in which 
directors' and practitioners' reproduced impersonal dance practices, as well as 
their audiences' apparent reproduction of demand for them, appear to have 
motivated his experiments with improvising in contact, in his time at the Grand 
Union and after.761 
If the hierarchical organization of power through the technical and 
organizational rules governing both dance and society were the problem, then 
perhaps by removing these constraints, one could find a freer type of 
movement and contact. Paxton's innovation, therefore, was to remove the 
"external" constraints that produced these inhibitions, to see what the result 
might be. Paxton set up movement experiments in which there was no teacher, 
director, correction, discipline, no set choreography, and no specific instruction. 
From Paxton's perspective, CI's potential impact would be to return decision-
making authority to the dancer – a dancer who could be not just an 
institutionally recognized dancer in a culture industry, but anyone, everyone, 
in fact, who moved. CI could "reclaim" the potential that "the culture" had 
"physically suppressed or selected out.”762 It would do this by precisely 
developing our "habit of attention,"763 underdeveloped in "western movement" 
generally. In particular we lack "sensitization to the corporeal.” In western 
movement, in our sports and dance, Paxton contended that the proper 
                                               
760 Ibid. 
761 Paxton (b. 1939) continues to teach and to experiment with his body even now, describing it 
as "his laboratory." 
762 Steve Paxton, “Drafting Interior Techniques,” Contact Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1993), 64. 
763 It is not clear whether Paxton had read Foucault at the time of the writing of this article: 1993. 
Paxton is discussing the "thoughts that went through" his head in the six months between 
"Magnesium" in January and the presentation of the developing work, by then called "contact 
improvisation," in New York in June, 1972. Certainly in 1972, it would have been unlikely, 
though the article is written retrospectively. 
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performance of a particular, choreographed, and controlled form of movement 
was prioritized; the sensation of movement was merely secondary. In CI, on 
the other hand, "behavior evolves from sensing movement."764 The aikido roll, 
for example, could be taught in a western way, in terms of its form. But this 
attention to form would preclude the attention to sensation (on the back and 
neck) that were necessary for its execution, and would instead result in other 
habitual behaviors. The roll could, therefore, be broken down into parts that 
allowed one to feel these sensations. 
 This breaking down into parts, or slowing down of movement was 
crucial.765 If one wanted to achieve free, spontaneous movement instead of 
culturally imposed, habitual movement, one must develop one's habit of 
awareness in relation to the reflexive reactions of the body, which were more 
basic. Paxton "took the working model" for his investigations to be "a simple 
imaginary person with no physical, sensorial, or social inhibitions… a generic 
person with positive elements I had observed in many students, dancers, 
martial artists, and children,"766 and met with in partners, and himself, while 
doing CI. Whereas "planetary" experience/evolution had established and 
"tuned our potentials,” "cultural things develop[ed] select parts of the 
potential."767 What were the unexplored possibilities of movement (i.e., 
behavior) general to humans as generic bodies, "tuned" by a shared evolution, 
unfettered by “physical, social, or sensorial” inhibitions? One could find this 
individual by becoming aware of the way the body "reflexively" interacts with 
                                               
764 Ibid. 
765 Taking weight from and giving weight to a partner was to be “slowly developed over 
months" (Steve Paxton, “Contact Improvisation,” The Drama Review 19, no. 1 (1975), 42). Hatha 
yoga, with its emphasis on awareness of [the reflex activities involved in] breathing and 
posture, was suggested as a very gradual means of improving flexibility. 
766 Steve Paxton, “Drafting Interior Techniques,” Contact Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1993), 64. 
767 Ibid.  
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its environment. And this needed to be developed slowly, because when 
something happens "which is too fast for thought" (e.g., when we are spinning 
or rolling very quickly), consciousness "goes away.” Nevertheless,768 we can 
train consciousness to remain aware, "hang in" with the body when it is 
moving fast as well. Through specifically designed exercises, we can remain 
aware of the body’s systems reflexively interacting with “weight, momentum, 
friction, the touch of their partner, the sensation of the floor under their body… 
[and] their peripheral vision of the space.”769 For example, by closing one's eyes 
while standing, one could become aware of the tiny postural adjustments to 
shifts in weight. Consciousness, observing the reflexes, would be taught by 
them, amplifying its mediation by them.770 This new knowledge of what was 
merely reflex would become the "new ground for moving"771 and allow 
"spontaneous" improvisation. 
 Therefore, with this developing awareness of reflexes, with 
consciousness merely watching rather than under the influence of our culture, 
trying to control, dancing would take place between the reflexes of people; 
"flowing streams of movement" which were "accidental[,] pleasant, highly 
stimulating, and elemental" suggested to Paxton that CI was "a basic mode of 
                                               
768 In this confusing discussion, Paxton juxtaposes the "conscious" with the "reflexive," saying 
that consciousness must "leave" because of the speed of the event/stimulus, but then that 
consciousness can "stay" and just observe by training it. Consciousness' leaving is first a) innate 
and uncontrollable, and then, contradictorily, b) cultural and trainable. As for Paxton's 
distinction between "reflexive" and "cultural" behaviors, those reflexes that remain outside of 
the domain of conscious influence beyond the first year of life are very few— including the 
plantar reflex, cranial nerve reflexes, and tendon reflexes. Postural "reflexes," the ones that 
Paxton seems really to be referring to, on the other hand, are influenced by conscious awareness 
(and therefore culture) from early on. Indeed, this seems to be the basis of Paxton's observations 
regarding "modes of posture" that are culturally imposed. 
769 Ibid., 64. 
770 "Does the nervous system and its mediation of posture relative to gravity have the possibility 
of teaching the consciousness, and does the consciousness have the property of amplifying or 
strengthening that mediation? I assumed this reciprocity did exist" (Ibid., 66). 
771 Ibid., 63. 
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communication between the reflexes of people as they moved."772 Cultural 
habits, on the other hand, would manifest as "blocks" or "gaps" in conscious 
awareness, and would be worked through patiently and calmly, whether they 
were “emotional, orientational, or habitual."773 This calm, patient work was 
made possible because early CI practice in preparation for performances often 
involved long, intense live-in training, in which dancers would get to know 
each other very well, developing trust and awareness of themselves and their 
dance partners.  
 Paxton summed up the essential principles as follows: 
[I]mages [based on real sensations] were used to focus the mind and then 
give the mind foci within the sensations of the body. 
The words had to be unambiguous, unthreatening, informative, and 
generally understood. 
The statements had to be true, obvious, and relevant.774 
Its images would not involve "fictitious gasses,"775 but rather real sensations. 
The image would correspond to the real experience of the individual, in 
understandable, defined terms. The practice of "freedom of interaction in the 
social set,"776 based in habits of awareness, aimed at "producing freedom for 
individuals of a group, spurring them on to new awareness."777 Performances 
would be the practice itself and both would transmit, not the virtuosic and 
hierarchical "star-system,” but the pleasant, and highly stimulating freedom of 
                                               
772 Ibid., 64. 
773 Ibid., 65. 
774 Ibid., 66. 
775 Ibid., 62. 
776 Steve Paxton, “The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 131. 
777 Ibid. 
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interaction to their audiences, who might become participants. The first tour of 
the work in 1973 was called “You come. We’ll show you what we do.”778 
 The effect was powerful. Both on the dancers and the audience. Contact 
improvisers working with Paxton in the 1970s reported feelings both during 
the practice and performances (which were merely the practice but with an 
audience) of “tremendous tension and excitement about encountering 
anybody, an anticipation, not knowing what was going to happen – whether 
you were going to dance slowly, hardly move, do a lot of lifting and falling, or 
whether it was going to be sensuous or kind of playful and combative.”779 
“There was a sense of danger in it, always.”780 The effects of this ambivalent 
tension persisted even after dancing; dancers reported that they felt “extremely 
energized.”781 And they were transmitted to audiences. (By the same 
associational conditioning that happens generally throughout our neural 
micro-structure, we are capable of, to an extent limited by our experience, 
feeling the movement and sensations of others' movement/behavior782 by way 
of attending to the signs associated with that movement.) Dancers reported 
precisely this observation of audience's reactions and responses: 
What happened, I think, was that sensations were transmitted to the 
audience. They would come out of the performances flushed and sweating, 
almost, and thrilled as if they had been doing it themselves…. To tell the truth, I 
                                               
778 The second performance, after Magnesium in January, took place in the John Weber Gallery, 
June, 1972, with rehearsals in a Manhattan Chinatown loft, where the dancers also lived during 
the rehearsal period. Cynthia Novack observes that the performance was merely a continuation 
of rehearsal. Each performance lasted 5 hours, the audience coming and going as they pleased, 
no special music, lighting, costumes, or sets, except for the wrestling mat (C.J. Novack, Sharing 
the Dance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1990), 68). 
779 Lisa Nelson, who began contact improvisation performance in 1975, cited in Ibid., 70-1. 
780 Ibid., 71. 
781 Ibid., 72. 
782 See Buxbaum, L.J. et al. "On beyond mirror neurons: Internal representations subserving 
imitation and recognition of skilled object-related actions in humans," Cognitive Brain Research 
25, no. 1 (2005), 226–239. 
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don’t think there was one performance we did that wasn’t very 
enthusiastically received. It was like we had offered something to people as 
a way of looking at movement and a way of experiencing movement that 
was very new and healthy, very vital and life-supporting. And it was very 
refreshing to people, I think.783 
In some performances, audience members would actually do it themselves. 
They “would be jumping all over one another,” remaining long after the end of 
the performance, often initiating interaction with the performers; 
They would really want to start rolling around and jump on you… they 
would embrace you after a performance to congratulate you, but they’d 
hang on you, lean on you… I think that… seeing how long it was possible to 
touch somebody and not come away was very infectious… There was 
something that really unified everybody.784 
There was a “tremendous feeling of accessibility between performers and 
audience.”785 Many of these audience members would go on to practice CI 
themselves, having, some performers noted, already learned the practice from 
watching a single performance. According to Lisa Nelson: 
The performances were like a demonstration. It was very rough and you 
could drop in and out and it was okay…. Duets would last ten or fifteen 
minutes, sometimes even twenty. The solo work in between was more 
episodic, usually very weight-oriented, jumping and falling, and falling and 
rolling…. When everyone had a chance with as many people as possible, it 
                                               
783 C. J. Novack, Sharing the Dance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 72. "The 
performances were so exciting, and it thrilled me to be in them… I always felt there was a gut-
level response from the audience about what they were seeing. You understand that this is just 
my impression, but the response—the applause, the “oohs” and “aahs,” the laughter—was just 
a real physical response" (Danny Lepkoff, cited in Ibid., 72). 
784 Ibid., 73. 
785 Ibid. 
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would be over. As a person in the audience, and as a learning performer, you 
really got to see how the different levels would occur, starting from the more 
tentative contact, perhaps, to a real physical contact, bumping up against each 
other, to some very poignant, very soft communicative duet….786 
This ability for contact improvisation to communicate to the audience was 
something Paxton himself was aware of: "it is through the eyes that the 
audience begins a kinetic response, or a physical empathy with the dancer."787 
And, as the performers describe, it also provided audiences with an 
introduction to the method. Audience members might not be prohibited from 
joining performances, and certainly were not prohibited from joining the 
practice. (This continues to be the case.) Paxton would go on to call CI "a kind 
of grass roots community work."788 A new publication, Contact Quarterly, was 
established in 1975, to disseminate the central ideas of the practice, as well as 
encourage a broader discussion by practitioners and teachers. 
But, while Paxton envisioned it as a community project, CI (or this 
community project) appears to have a more radical potential, which Paxton 
only partially developed. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, the 
kinetic experience of CI, one of excitement and ambivalent tension, which is 
shared by both performer and audience (of potential performers), seems to be 
the very basis of "critique" – i.e., the ability of the individual to recall the 
original ambivalence of stimuli/objects, the ambivalence of our own 
                                               
786 Ibid., 71. 
787 Steve Paxton, "Improvisation is a word for something that can't keep a name,” Contact 
Quarterly's Contact Improvisation Sourcebook, eds. Lisa Nelson and Nancy Stark Smith 
(Northampton: Contact Editions, 1997), 125. Hereafter cited as CQ/CI Sourcebook, with the 
original year of each article’s publication in parentheses. 
788 CQ/CI Sourcebook (1989), 167. Paxton also implies that Grand Union members were at least 
sometimes thinking of politics; they "were influenced as much by their shared past and the 
particular focus on new developments in collective action as by their own decisions about the 
future" (Steve Paxton, “The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 131; italics mine). 
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feelings/sensations, behavior, thoughts, in relation to arousing stimuli/objects. 
This ambivalent tension allows attention/awareness as opposed to continued 
avoidance of fearful stimuli (on the basis of their association with punishment) 
– in this case, close interactions with others, where roles, movements, and 
contact are uncertain, and where one is aware of one's own decision-making 
authority, in direct relation to others with decision-making authority. 
Foucault theorized that our docility, our obedience to existing 
authorities and conventions, depended on just this type of association and 
avoidance. If CI could elicit and become aware of (i.e., recall) this ambivalent 
tension, the originally ambivalent value of touch and improvisation, it could 
begin to dissociate direct confrontations/negotiations from punishment. By 
reminding us in its discourse (physical sensations, images, words, as signs) of 
this primary ambivalent tension, which is also the basis of the audience's 
empathy with the dancers, CI might encourage a more risky confrontation and 
renegotiation of power generally. That is, this practice would create a new 
neural microstructure, a recallable memory, associating engagement with 
uncertain results, possible rewards, possible punishments, or, more likely, 
something in between. This experience in memory could be recalled in 
precisely those situations of potential truth-telling to immediate personal and 
institutional subjectivities789 that bring up ("automatically") in the individual's 
thoughts and sensations past painful experiences of confrontation that ended in 
punishment.790  
In developing this already existing capability to recall that one's feeling 
of tension is in fact in part a "tonic motor readiness" for action, with uncertain 
                                               
789 In part disciplinary, in part not, as we have noted. 
790 See chapter 5 for a discussion of Connolly's account of "the uncanny" in the retelling of the 
Genesis story. 
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outcomes, and that one's experience of pain and panic instead result from the 
imposition of now arbitrary authority,791 in situations just like this one, CI 
would, it seems, create a freer, bolder, more active subjectivity - a subjectivity 
willing to risk truth-telling in more direct and daring ways than before, in its 
interactions generally, with any type of audience. In a group exercising this, 
would this not lead to more direct individual and collective 
interactions/confrontations, negotiating its desires (to critique and engage) 
with those partly disciplinary, partly expressive subjectivities in its immediate 
"personal" relationships? Such a subjectivity might eventually (through 
continued practice in this recall in situations of heightened ambivalent tension 
in the organism) hesitate less in confrontation with those authorities in our 
political institutions, which are supposed to represent our desires and realize 
our interests? 
 But the development of this capacity for recalling the ambivalent feeling 
of what Rawls calls "inexplicable inhibitions" in the moment of confrontation or 
negotiation with other partially disciplinary subjectivities would appear to 
depend on the practice of CI technique, in the terms that Paxton described: a 
direct experience of the sensations in simple, truthful thoughts (or images) that 
recalled the experience, used to guide further interaction. The artist, Paxton 
wrote, had "responsibilities… to keep… these techniques… clear of 
confusion."792 
Not long after the practice and publication had begun, however, Paxton 
expressed unhappiness at the direction CI practices were taking: 
                                               
791 The practice would reveal the arbitrary nature of the imposition. 
792 CQ/CI Sourcebook, 5. 
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I want to go on record as being pro-physical-sensation in the teaching of this 
material. The symbolism, mysticism, psychology, spiritualism are horse-
drivel. In actually teaching the stand or discussing momentum or gravity, I 
think each teacher should stick to sensational facts.793 
By the end of the decade, members of the Grand Union had isolated themselves 
in their own CI practices, and the growing CI community of new teachers' 
practices, including their textual discourses, deviated and continue to deviate 
even further from Paxton's original emphases and writing.  
Paxton had emphasized the importance of: a) direct descriptions of real 
sensations as a basis for interaction; b) how CI produced freedom for the group; 
c) unambiguous and informative words used in real interactions; and d) 
rejecting our "voluntary slavery" to a "star-system" by making performance an 
indistinguishable extension of practice, with decision-making authority 
restored to the dancer. The changed discourse, on the other hand, had turned 
and continues to turn its attention to CI as: a) internal body experiments or 
somatic education describing the sensation as an aesthetic experience, for 
example, of the small dance,794 rather than information to be used in the 
interaction; b) a therapy developing the individual's "personal power and 
strength of presence" useful for "performing" in all areas of daily life and 
therefore a legitimate part of the college curriculum;795 c) the heavy use of 
metaphor and poetry in directing and describing the practice,796 including CI as 
                                               
793 Paxton, cited in C. J. Novack, Sharing the Dance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1990), 81-2. 
794 For example, Ann Woodhull, "The Small Dance, Physiology and Improvisation," CQ/CI 
Sourcebook (1977-78), 24-26. 
795 See Daniel Lepkoff "The Educational Value of Contact Improvisation for the College 
Student," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1979-80), 55. 
796 This tends to be the approach of Nancy Stark Smith, chief editor of Contact Quarterly. See for 
example "Editor's Report/High Moon—11th Hour Reflections," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1976-77), 8; 
"Dealing with the Heat," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1983-84), 91; and "Crossing the Great Divides" CQ/CI 
Sourcebook (1992), 217. 
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a "spiritual" endeavor concerned with "getting at the soul of our dance" by 
means of metaphor;797 d) minor discussions798 about the internal "politics" of 
contact dance – its alleged ability to eliminate role-related gender inequalities 
while participants engaged in it;799 but there were also complaints about new 
hierarchies and elites within the practice.800 Moreover, CI's partial inclusion in 
college dance curricula depended on demonstrating its now developed 
repertory of specific technical movements, observing the typical hierarchical 
conventions: choreography, set repertory, typical distinctions between 
audience and performer.  
Paxton, though he was critical, said generally that it was "important that 
the vision" of contact improvisation "was cloudy," since a "true group process" 
could not evolve if its "course" were already "completely predetermined."801 He 
had seen this happen with the members of the Grand Union. Because its 
structure could “open up all the possibilities,” it also “eventually led to 
isolation of its members.”802  
 To be sure, this divergence can in part be explained by a new generation 
of teachers, removed from Paxton - the "father" and by far most articulate 
disseminator of contact, primarily in the text of Contact Quarterly, but also in 
other writing, teaching, and performances. It also seemed to move in the 
direction of a more American liberal democratic cultural practice; it had 
become a personal aesthetics, a celebration of individualism and individual 
                                               
797 Martin Keogh, "A bottle of wine, a cane, a cloth," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1989), 182. 
798 In the CQ/CI Sourcebook (with articles spanning 1977-1992), four out of approximate 200 
articles are dedicated to the "politics" of CI. 
799 Byron Brown, "The Politics of Contact,” CQ/CI Sourcebook (1977-78), 18. 
800 Cynthia Novack, "Egalitarianism and Hierarchy in Contact Improvisation," CQ/CI Sourcebook 
(1988), 140-1; see also "On Lisa Nelson Dancing" CQ/CI Sourcebook (1987), 130-1; and Mark 
Pritchard, "Still Moving: My rise and fall in contact improv," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1990), 196-8. 
801 Steve Paxton, “The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 131. 
802 Ibid., 131, cited in C. J. Novack, Sharing the Dance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1990), 60. 
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experience – including the heroization of its star performers, a religious 
experience described in metaphorical terms, and its understanding of its own 
even potential political significance remained undeveloped.  
But this divergence also seemed to be in part due to the physiological 
understanding conveyed in Paxton's own practice – his teaching and (largely 
written) discourse. Paxton cannot be faulted for his persistent attention to the 
body; articles and transcripts of classes attest to Paxton's consistency in his use 
of direct descriptions of real sensations and references to actual body parts.803 
He also continued to insist on CI as a group work creating "deep bonds."804 
Some statements tended towards the abstract and metaphorical - or example, 
"quality to quality, receiving what is given. a volley – ball of karma"805 - and 
possibly spiritualist – "Does the class seek purity? If so, special learner will 
receive pure energy and pure intensity;"806 but these occurred within texts that, 
again, are focused on the teaching of bodily sensation. Finally, Paxton's 
extended, intellectual discussions, were also concerned with the body, 
philosophy of science and language, how the endocrine system can speed up or 
slow down our experience of time.807 
 Paxton's physiological discussions nevertheless relied on and reinforced 
certain conceptual oppositions – specifically he repeatedly juxtaposed the 
"reflex" and "bodily,” on the one hand, to mere "habit,” "culture,” and 
"consciousness,” on the other. We have seen some of these oppositions already 
in our discussion of Paxton above: the body and its reflexes could be free, 
spontaneous, uninhibited, unfettered, if it were allowed to act without 
                                               
803 Steve Paxton, "Transcription," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1986), 107-9. 
804 "Hier-visibility,” CQ/CI Sourcebook (1989), 167. 
805 "Teacher Teaching" CQ/CI Sourcebook (1977-78), 34. 
806 "Teacher Teaching" CQ/CI Sourcebook (1977-78), 34. 
807 "Improvisation is a word for something that can't keep a name," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1987), 125-
29. 
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consciousness' interference, its cultural blocks, gaps, impositions, and habits.808 
CI was reflexes dancing with reflexes, consciousness merely watching: "While 
in contact, we attend to our reflexes, which have been stimulated by the other's 
movements. Our reflexes move us, and this causes our partner to move. This 
cycle of movement responses is continuous and forms the basis of the 
dialogue."809 As a result, experienced as opposed to beginner dancers were their 
reflexes and their bodies.810 Consciousness might even be bypassed; 
improvisers might "sink past the conscious mind into more appropriate 
states."811 If Paxton's dialogue was also more complicated than this, this was 
still the opposition participants and many teachers appear to have remembered 
and disseminated. As Cynthia Novack puts it, “participants took the focus on 
physical aspects as a neutral value, a part of natural law rather than an 
aesthetic (cultural) overlay.”812 
  But at the same time, Paxton placed his hope for the future precisely in 
consciousness. One hoped that "one's subjective understanding will continue to 
grow, and more parts of one's body will come under conscious training."813 
Sometimes, it was a combination of "reflex and intuition"814 that explained the 
pleasure experienced in contact improvisers' duets; dancers learned confidence 
in their "choices.” Whereas in most statements it is the evolved, reflexive body 
that is the basis of freedom, in others "[i]t is the habit of adaptation which will 
keep us reproducing the system."815 Consciousness was now not the problem 
                                               
808 "The dignity of the mind" came at the "expense of the messages of the body" (Steve Paxton, 
“The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 133). 
809 Steve Paxton, "Fall After Newton" (transcript), CQ/CI Sourcebook (1987), 129. 
810 Ibid., 143. 
811 CQ/CI Sourcebook (1989), 69. 
812 C. J. Novack, Sharing the Dance (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 68. 
813 "Jumping Paradigms," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1992), 253. 
814 "Q & A," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1980), 68. 
815 "Improvisation is a word for something that can't keep a name," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1987), 129. 
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but the solution. Paxton noted that he was comfortable with these kind of 
contradictions; "CI ha[d] always abounded in logical contradictions."816 Most of 
the rest of the contact community, however, chose to ignore the contradictions 
and instead think in more familiar  - ironically, culturally habitual - terms, 
avoiding the question of consciousness and culture altogether. Now CI was an 
activity of the body and the soul, the body itself became spiritual, and one 
needed to be free from the mind. The body's pre-cultural status eliminated any 
need to engage in questions of culture, the cultural production of one's entire 
organism (consciousness as part of the body), and even possibly the need to 
change these institutions; if one could simply supersede a disciplinary 
consciousness through "bodily experience,” then why bother with specific 
sensations relating to "culture" – especially if one's experience of "culture" and 
authority had been painful. One's relationship to the world and even oneself 
now became highly metaphoric. 
 
Since, as we have seen, the work of repeated pairing establishes the 
brain's associational neural microstructure, its recallable memory, Paxton's 
more repeated association of the body with reflex, on the one hand, and culture 
with conscious inhibition, on the other, helped secure the divergence of the 
teaching and textual discourse away from an understanding of the production 
of one's inhibitions – inhibitions which many (teachers, students, and the 
outside dance community) expected to disappear into an egalitarian utopia 
once they entered the studio.817 Equally significant was the dissociation of 
                                               
816 "Hier-visibility," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1989), 167. 
817 See Cynthia Novack, "Egalitarianism and Hierarchy in Contact Improvisation," CQ/CI 
Sourcebook (1988), 129; "Hier-visibility," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1989), 166. 
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relaxation from tension;818 since it was cultural, it was to be avoided. Moments 
of tension could be answered by going back to one's bodily sensations and 
relaxing. Exciting moments were, for Paxton, not "tense" but "adrenalized"819 or 
"glandular.” 
 I will suggest that CI discourse could be altered to realize its more 
radical potential. It would have to make clear that consciousness is aware but 
behaviorally avoids stimuli that one is conditioned to fear, rather than 
disappears because "the body" or its reflexes are faster and wiser; that 
conscious experience – of culture - is necessary for the development and change 
of reflexes;820 that consciousness itself behaves like a reflex, automatically 
attending to fearful, rewarding and novel (i.e., arousing) stimuli to produce an 
ambivalent tension (i.e., tonic motor readiness), and a potentially recallable 
memory; that this ambivalent tension provides the possibility of attending 
consciously to stimuli, thoughts, feelings, and external objects (including 
people and parts of people) one is accustomed to avoid, but might interact with 
to see whether that fear is substantiated; that this conditioning of avoidance 
behaviors may result from disciplinary conditioning, and that the confrontation 
with (i.e., engaging in) the stimuli that precipitate avoidance will bring up 
associated memories indicating those disciplinary techniques and possibly 
institutional practices that establish them. 
                                               
818 "New material comes into range with the ability to relax into contact and attune movement 
awareness to the demands of the situation. The body can move more swiftly when it acts out of 
intuition rather than prejudice. Relationships become possible at high speeds that would be 
arduous if slowed. It becomes evident that dancers have been only touching the surface" (Steve 
Paxton, “The Grand Union,” The Drama Review 16, no. 3 (1972), 134). 
819 Steve Paxton, "Fall After Newton" (transcript), CQ/CI Sourcebook (1987), 129. 
820 As noted above, those reflexes that remain outside of the domain of conscious influence 
beyond the first year of life are very few—including the plantar reflex, cranial nerve reflexes, 
and tendon reflexes. Postural "reflexes," the ones that Paxton seems really to be referring to, on 
the other hand, are influenced by conscious awareness (and therefore culture) from early on. 
Indeed, this seems to be the basis of Paxton's observations regarding "modes of posture" that 
are culturally imposed. 
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In CI, (as we noted above) dancers choose their partners or no partners, 
when their duets begin and end, type of movement or no movement, and so 
on. With all of these prohibitions removed, certain general patterns can, 
nevertheless, still be noted.821 Most beginners worry about and feel humiliation 
when improvising, even when dancing alone. The more unfamiliar the 
movement is, the greater the fear, even when that movement poses no obvious 
threat to participants and spectators, and, when engaged in, even bring them 
satisfaction. S/he feels anxious, thinks judgmental thoughts, recalls previous 
experiences of humiliation, gets scared of other people's judgment, and in 
response often initiates habitual (usually recognizable) movement forms (for 
example, ballet or modern dance movement, if they are in his/her training, or 
performance of a recognized character/role).  
The spontaneous physical interaction of contact usually compounds this 
basic improvisational fear. As with improvisational solo movement, the more 
unfamiliar the form, the greater the feeling of anxiety and fear. S/he generally 
avoids extended visual, manual, pubic, and abdominal contact, between not 
just the same but also opposite genders, again, even when it poses no 
immediate physical threat and can, when engaged in, provide feelings of 
pleasure. When this contact does occur, s/he tends to interpret it 
conventionally – as a sign of the other’s attraction or repulsion, approval or 
judgment; the dancer often reports feeling "confused" or intensely ambivalent. 
S/he appears to default into habitual, conventional movement forms 
(heterosexual duets, men lifting women, performing romance or conflict), even 
                                               
821 The following observations (where it is not indicated otherwise) on improvisational dance 
are based on my own experience, and then discussed and corroborated in informal interviews, 
and with dancers from all over Europe and North America in response to my presentation of 
this material as a formal paper at CI36, the recent 36th anniversary celebration the beginning of 
"Contact Improvisation" in 1972. 
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when s/he intends to be spontaneous.822 In the public performance of contact 
improvisation these patterns can be even more marked. 
But these patterns, though corroborated by the vast majority of contact 
improvisers, are nevertheless not generally discussed, in either Contact 
Quarterly or the CI community in general. Beginning improvisers all have their 
own particular experiences, some of course more intense/extreme than others, 
but their habits of movement and observations of the apparent reproduction of 
impersonal dance practices and judgment in their own CI practice overlap 
generally enough that they - combined with Paxton's critiques of American 
education and culture – would suggest a pervasive and successful (though not 
total) disciplinary project in the terms that Foucault's early work describes. And 
they also contain a partially developed "critique" – a suspicion about the 
inexplicability of those inhibitions of acts of pleasure – acts of pleasure which, 
when they do occur in CI, occur without punishment. This critique (I have 
observed above) is neurally guaranteed in the fact of conscious attention, but its 
degree and direction of development is not guaranteed, and has not been fully 
realized in CI. 
To the extent that we really are voluntary slaves, then associating a 
recallable "image of the real,” a "kinetic image" – perhaps "ambivalent tension" 
or "tonic motor readiness" - with the sensation of this tension might allow it to 
come to mind and help us attend to rather than avoid/obey the disciplinary 
                                               
822 One of my recollections after a CI "jam": "I watch and judge myself: my movement is ugly. I 
feel stupid, standing there unsure what to do next… everyone else seems to be fine, but I’m 
back somewhere deep inside myself again, watching myself freeze up. Moving feels better, but I 
notice the tension around my mouth and face, I plan out my movement to be beautiful but it 
doesn’t work. When I’m with a partner, I’m watching them for directions… I feel like I’m doing 
the wrong thing… they’re going to leave. Or that they’re staying too long. I’m embarrassed that 
the movement and weight transfers are rough and disjointed. It doesn’t matter if no one else is 
watching and judging, because in these moments I’m judging and punishing myself, and my 
partner. It’s my fault. Or it’s theirs. I can even feel this way when I’m dancing alone. It sucks. I 
just want it to be over, go home, and forget it ever happened." 
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subjectivity in ourselves and others. Though CI is a development of a 
habit/practice of attending in conditions of uncertainty, by associating this 
habit with a "pre-cultural" body, with touch but not thought, CI's discourse 
diminishes its potential political effect, by – in its current manifestation at least 
– motivating a partial retreat, obediently, to an allegedly "pre-cultural" body. 
The more confrontational potential of CI is to establish this recallable truth of 
ambivalent tension in the face of choice/decision/confrontation – i.e., to 
continue acting knowing that this tension is only a sign that one (organism, 
including one's consciousness) is attending, preparing for response - and to 
develop this in growing numbers of expressive and less disciplinary 
subjectivities, "truth-tellers.” 
 In other words, CI practice provides a repeated and ongoing experience 
of ambivalent tension towards (as opposed to avoidance of) previously fearful 
stimuli in interactions with others – i.e., in the prohibited physical behaviors of 
unchoreographed physical contact with others; the improviser steadies the 
practice of his decision-making authority in direct relationship with others who 
also have decision-making authority. The improviser can (through these 
interactions with others) thereby become critically aware: of the organism's 
sensations, feelings, and thoughts, and behavior that characterize our fearful 
avoidance (i.e., our disciplinary subjectivity); and the arbitrariness of their 
production through prohibitive conditioning in one's own experience of the 
institutional, interpersonal, and individual practices and techniques (what 
people do to us, what we do to them, what we do to ourselves). By developing 
his ability to remain aware of (i.e., not avoid) formerly fearful stimuli, and his 
awareness (recallability) of this ability (i.e., as a choice), the improviser can 
continue to risk further engagement with others – potential allies and potential 
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enemies – with uncertain outcomes. That is, CI could effect a potential "radical 
democratization" of its participants. 
If Connolly is right that the feeling of anxiety is the "most productive 
and dangerous effect"823 of the uncanny, its elicitation in CI has not made the 
most of it. CI practices elicit but then turn this tension away from "culture" and 
"consciousness" and exclusively toward the sensations of an allegedly "pre-
cultural" body. This image-inary association undermines the radical potential 
of Paxton's achievements – extensively practicing/performing and describing 
an experimental technique of awareness of the self in relation to others, as the 
basis for their more expressive, less obedient, improvisatory interaction.  
                                               
823 William Connolly, The Augustinian Imperative (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 135. 
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8. Conclusion 
So apparently even a government formed on 
values of freedom and equality will trample 
on freedom and equality. How embarrassing.  
…If liberty and equality are chosen, then at 
the moment of choice, they exist. What 
happens the next moment is something for all 
of us… to ponder.824 (Steve Paxton) 
 
Freedom and equality as choices imply an uncanny moment, in which 
we, the people, both want the ambivalent uncertainty of decision-making and 
also feel fear of (or "inhibtions" in relation to) decision-making, and therefore 
may reliquish the opportunity to others. That is, we may decide to let others 
decide, or we may decide to take decision-making authority ourselves in 
relation to others. These others can be our dance partners, friends, teachers, 
doctors, lawyers, government representatives, state authorities, and so on. In 
these deciding moments, what we conclude about our fears or inhibitions – i.e., 
whether they indicate the hopelessness of attempting to take authority or that 
we will have to "try it" to find out – is in fact what constitutes this decision, and 
also the changes to the arrangement of power that result. If the form or degree 
of democracy is decided in this deciding moment, then it is crucial to examine it 
– what leads up to it, and what happens in it. 
I began this discussion recounting just such a deciding moment, an 
experience of power's operation in my body – a recallable image (i.e., memory) 
of the present decision to confront (or not confront) authority in relation to a 
                                               
824 Steve Paxton, "Hier-visibility," CQ/CI Sourcebook (1989), 167. 
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past experience of discipline and punishment now internalized as a bodily 
reaction. If this was the moment in which I decided my relation to authority, 
my share in power, it seemed to be strongly affected by disciplinary techniques 
applied by authoritative others – and subsequently by myself – upon myself, in 
order to achieve and reinforce a (not entirely but still strongly) disciplinary 
subjectivity. This subjectivity, its origins, limits, and possibilities, were 
variously explored in the ensuing chapters. 
My discussion of Foucault's analyses of disciplinary techniques and 
techniques of the self provided an introduction to the problem of freedom for 
the modern subject – a subject whose obedience and docility, produced by the 
application of disciplinary techniques throughout society, were apparently 
automatic and guaranteed. But Foucault's later attention to parrhesia assumed 
another subject, whose capacity to "remark, describe, and remember" could be 
developed into a practice of steadiness in telling the truth, even in risky 
confrontations with political authority. While the earlier disciplinary 
subjectivity automatically reproduced his own docility, this new subjectivity, 
even in its nascence, was to somehow "supersede" it. Just how disciplinary was 
the subject then? This question, for Foucault, could be answered only through 
techniques of the self and in relationship, aimed at producing "critique" – a 
courageous habit of attention towards the truth. Parrhesiastic practice was, in 
this sense, Foucault's implicit answer to his earlier enlightenment question: “in 
what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied 
by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary 
constraints?”825 But could this be hoped for? What was the human capable of? 
                                               
825 Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York : Pantheon Books 1984), 
45. 
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And was the disciplinary subject then not completely disciplinary? Finally, was 
the parrhesiastic practice really "politically" consequential, if the parrhesiastes 
would not be "a legislator"? These questions remained unanswered, at least in 
these analyses. Perhaps the parrhesiastes would find out in practice, 
experimentally. 
If Foucault hoped his parrhesiastes would be more critical, Plato's 
psychophysiological techniques, I argued, tended to produce obedience. 
Though not an "ascetics,” the "freeman's" practices still aimed to harmonize his 
conduct with the law, just as his governing of his household would do for his 
wife, children, and slaves (but, since he was a citizen, also possibly the entire 
polis). It was this conditioning in obedience that would be the foundation of the 
republic. The continued tendency in political theory to ignore this larger 
Platonic project is a habit more indicative of our own than Plato's time – that is, 
the habit of ignoring the psychophysiological basis of power, on which the 
"play" of Plato's conceptualizations do their work. If Platonic conceptuality still 
set the terms for philosophy in our time, then perhaps this too relied on habits 
in our own disciplinary subjectivity, and its establishment through our own 
liberal institutions of power. 
 My analysis of Kant's enlightenment philosophy, then, found it to be a 
simultaneous celebration of the triumph of reason and a discursive project 
aimed at reinforcing the work done by techniques of humiliation – techniques 
which Kant himself noted were particularly effective in conditioning early 
obedience, and later voluntary submission to liberal institutions of government. 
Rawls and Habermas merely extend this Kantian conceptuality further into 
mainstream liberal democratic thought. Both Rawls' reflective equilibrium and 
his overlapping consensus rely upon and reinforce conditioned and coercive 
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exclusions – in liberal political history, in childhood, and even later, whenever 
"inexplicable inhibitions" arise and overlapping consensus fails to occur. Rawls' 
own theory, then, plays a central and self-conscious part in the political 
conception's "wide role as educator,” taking certain questions off "the political 
agenda" for good. Habermas, first projecting a universal conception of 
communicative rationality and then, like Rawls, relying on a potentially 
exclusive acculturation of norms, also ends up with legitimation and 
motivation "deficits.” While the fact that the fantasy of post-conventional ego 
identification (even once Habermas changes its source to a particular liberal 
democratic cultures) is not realized is devastating for Habermas' theory, this 
does not mean that his and Rawls' prominence in mainstream liberal 
democratic theory is any less secure. Their terminology continues to have a 
reinforcing effect upon an already conditioned mainstream liberal subjectivity, 
repeatedly reminding it of its commitments to "universal rational consensus.” 
 In contrast to Kant and his heirs, Connolly's analyses explained the 
ressentimentality of our dispositions as an effect of our early and later 
conditioning, a resilient conditioning that needed to be worked upon through 
techniques that affect our "linguistic" and "visceral register[s].” On the basis of 
his understanding of neuroscientific evidence and Bergsonian theory, Connolly 
recommends specific film viewing techniques, applied to specific films, for 
changing our dispositions when we are accessible, outside of the demands and 
pressures of everyday life. Since disciplinary technique is "ubiquitous" – and 
especially in those potentially confrontational moments with the authorities of 
our lives, we needed more broadly applicable techniques, ones that involved 
direct relations with others. Neuroscientific evidence, moreover, indicated the 
always imminent possibility for conscious practices, even in the midst of strong 
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emotional reactions. Foucault's parrhesiastic capabilities – remarking, 
describing, and remembering – were found to have a neurophysiological 
basis.826 A capacity for critique was guaranteed in the ambivalent tension of the 
organism's conscious attention. But, as Foucault observed, this needed to be 
developed, and neuroscientific evidence suggested it needed to be developed 
not just in those closer personal relations, but also in confrontation with 
disciplinary authority. 
 Steve Paxton's "interior techniques" of contact improvisation (CI) 
possessed this potential. As a face-to-face, confrontational, development of 
one's "habit of attention,” it might develop in its participants the increasingly 
radical, decision-making, "expressive subjectivity" and trust required for 
eventual, powerful, collective confrontation and negotiation of political power 
in our liberal institutions. And it might do so by means of a radical 
transformation of the human organism. But through his persistent 
juxtaposition of the body/reflex with consciousness/habit/culture, and referral 
of attention and experience back to "the body" rather than to "consciousness" 
(the apparent source of our "voluntary slavery"), Paxton undermined this 
radical potential. CI teachers and participants followed what seemed like 
Paxton's lead, celebrating the body and its now spiritual and highly individual, 
personal powers; culture and consciousness, being the problem, were never 
consistently associated with the sensations of the body, and so in participants' 
minds were unconnected, and could be ignored. I suggested how CI's radical 
potential, given its powerful effect on participants and audiences alike, might 
be realized through slight changes in Paxton's technique – changes that would 
                                               
826 The capacity for "critique" was present in the "tonic motor readiness" of the organism in 
response to arousing stimuli. See Chapter 5 for this discussion. 
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associate the body's ambivalent tension with its history of corporealization, its 
present relation to others, and the possibility of becoming an expressive 
subjectivity "in the midst of" it. 
  
In all of these chapters, the authors seemed to assume both an originally 
coerced and manipulated subjectivity and that it had been (Plato, Kant, Rawls, 
and Habermas) or could be (Connolly, Foucault, and Paxton) transcended to 
achieve their privileged subjectivity and form of communicative relations or 
rationality. It turned out, however, that – in the terms of each account – the 
original subjectivity was not transcended but in fact the essence of the ideal 
subjecitivity and the motivating force and source – by its attachment to each 
author's respective "image of the real" – for "achieving" this ideal (and this is 
perhaps an inevitable result of describing subjectivity in polarized terms). 
Foucault wants to "sidestep" a disciplinary (automatic and ascetic) subjectivity 
achieve a more expressive,827 relational subjectivity, but using an image of the 
latter whose appeal to the former, to the extent that it does appeal, seems 
difficult to explain. Plato intends to transcend bodily desire/sophistry and 
achieve reason/philosophy, but legitimizes the latter with specific images of the 
obedient person both in his noble lie, the myth of the metals, and in his 
moderate "free man.” Kant and Rawls want to establish the stability of liberal 
political principles and institutions through their images: Kant would overcome 
the prejudicial (passionate or affective) empirical person, realizing the rational, 
noumenal person, but through humiliation techniques aimed at creating 
affective attachments (i.e., habitual pain avoidance) to an image of abstract 
                                               
827 A subject who is both hopeful and suspicious as with Connolly, and primarily linguistic, as 
with Habermas. 
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noumenal personality, obedient to God and the universal moral law; Rawls 
wants to overcome the coerced, acquiescent subject of the morality of authority 
to attain principled, moral, rational personality or citizenship, but ends up 
relying on acculturated and ulimately coerced and manipulated particular 
attachments to cultural images of first, rational person-hood, and, later, the 
(political) citizen. Habermas would overpower particular cultural attachments 
and instrumental rationality to obtain a patriotic, communicatively rational 
citizen; Habermas ultimately, however, depends on a pre-ideal attachment to 
specific (idealized) images (of deliberative democracy) from one's own culture, 
including its particular political-legal condition. Connolly would compete 
against a fearful and ressentimental subject to accomplish a critically analytical 
and inclusive, pluralist subjectivity, but using an image of the latter – a non-
ressentimental subjectivity with a "preliminary gratitude for the abundance of 
being" or "nontheistic gratitude" whose emergence and development from 
original ressentimentality is hard to account for. Finally, Paxton (or CI) would 
bypass conscious/cultural habitual "slavery" to establish "a simple imaginary 
person with no physical, sensorial, or social inhibitions" – that is, the reflexive 
body, with unique and personalized forms of movement and contact; but it was 
hard to find a basis for this reflexive communication within the voluntary, 
habitual slavery resulting from American cultural education.  
This apparently habitual opposition of an earlier (deterministic) image of 
subjectivity to a latter preferred image/ideal appears to make both earlier and 
later subjectivities (in their extreme, polarized types) impossible, and thereby 
undermine these images and the techniques prescribed to obtain them; we are 
left with no believable image of the real from which to make prescriptions or 
"critique" these theories. (Moreover, this opposition, insofar as it attempts to 
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secure an ideal identity by punishment of or flight from – avoidance of – its 
inverse seems even ressentimental.) But the possibility of an ambivalent tension 
or "critique" appears to be borne out by experience and recent neuroscientific 
research, which suggests explicitly what the contradictions of all these theories 
– to varying degrees – may only imply – i.e., that: Subjects do not automatically 
reproduce disciplinary behavior, but not reproducing it tends to be very scary, 
and very exciting; what subjects choose appears not to be guaranteed by neural 
structure, pure practical reason, or even historical luck; subjects, part 
disciplinary and part expressive, experience in their everyday lives moments of 
ambivalence – critical anxieties.  
Given these observations of experience, perhaps, if we want to go 
beyond this dichotomy of free critique vs. disciplinary subjectivity, we need to: 
a) confront and rethink the generally established pain/fear vs. pleasure/reward 
understanding of conditioning, desire, and motivation, and b) discuss forms of 
government, accounts of our history and our selves, and techniques 
(disciplinary and of the self) in terms of their likelihood of producing more or 
less disciplinary subjectivities or more or less expressive subjectivities.. that is, in 
terms of their encouragement or prohibition of that ambivalent tension of 
decision-making that characterizes experimental, improvisational practices (and 
not just discussion) – practices that, by attending to and confronting our 
inexplicable and unhappy inhibitions, allow us to become clearer about and act 
against and to change those rules and conditioning which are arbitrary and 
unnecessary. 
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